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Abstract 
 
Over the past four decades in Australia, many politicians, policy-makers, 
experts and social commentators have sought to increase the organisational 
autonomy of public schools and their principals. This trend of shifting the 
locus  of  educational  decision-making  and  management  away  from 
bureaucratic centres to individual schools and parents continues, with the 
Western Australian state government recently introducing the Independent 
Public  Schools  policy.  This  policy  devolves  an  increased  range  of 
organisational  and  curriculum  responsibilities  from  the  state  education 
bureaucracy to selected public schools. This thesis examines what appears 
to be the enduring trend towards school autonomy and self-management.  
  The  perspective  of  this  thesis  is  informed  by  the  theoretical, 
analytical and historical insights of Foucauldian studies of government, or 
governmentality.  Foucault’s  studies  have  increasingly  influenced 
sociological and historical studies in education. His notions of power and 
discipline have been elaborated and applied in the study of the micro power 
relations  of  schooling.  Unfortunately,  while  the  study  of  schooling  as  a 
technology for disciplining the individual’s mind and body has received 
most  attention,  Foucault’s  studies  in  government  have  been  less  widely 
understood, elaborated and used. This thesis explores Foucault’s genealogy 
of the formation of the modern liberal state (and governmentality) and the          
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rich and subtle insights it provides into the complex relationship between 
the state, politics, society and the government of education. 
  I explore Foucauldian studies in government with the aim of teasing 
out their implication for our understanding of the relationship between self-
managing  school  reforms  and  the  state,  politics  and  government.  In 
particular, I argue that the trend in public schools towards school autonomy 
and  self-management  cannot  be  adequately  understood  without 
understanding  the  inherent  dilemma  embedded  within  the  discourses  of 
politics and government of modern liberal democracies. This problem can 
be  described  as  an  agonistic  tension  in  liberal  governmentality  between 
political and governmental authorities enabling individual and economic 
freedom, whilst needing to secure the state and the welfare of its constituent 
elements under the condition of freedom.  
  This tension fuelled a ‘crisis of liberalism’ or a ‘crisis of liberal 
governmentality’  in  the  late  twentieth  century.  This  crisis  involved 
vociferous  critiques  of  the  welfare  state  in  conjunction  with  a  cultural 
renewal of the discourses of individual freedom, emancipation, liberation 
and  empowerment.  According  to  Foucault,  central  to  this  crisis  was 
concern about the costs of the perceived growth of excessive government of 
the post World War Two era, measured both economically and in terms of 
personal and political freedom. This thesis puts the case that the emergence 
of ‘self-managing school reforms’ is linked to this ‘crisis of liberalism’. 
The  self-managing  school  constitutes  both  an  instrument  and  object  of          
  vi 
government, re-regulating the domain of education according to an ethos of 
individual empowerment, activity, enterprise, autonomy and responsibility.  
  To illustrate some of the consequences of these reforms, two case 
studies are examined. The first explores the emergence at a national level of 
the  devolution  of  responsibilities  and  authority  to  schools,  particularly 
canvassed  in  the  Schools  In  Australia  report  (1973)  and  by  the 
Commonwealth Schools Commission (1973-1988). The second case study 
examines the use of self-management techniques and practices in schools. 
These  reforms  have  sought  to  strengthen  the  capacity  of  those  within 
schools to manage themselves and their schools as competitive enterprises 
with diminished reliance on central education bureaucracies. I argue that 
this development, like the case of devolution, is linked to the new ways of 
rationalising and enacting the care and government of the population and 
the  state  emerging  from  the  crisis  of  liberalism.  I  conclude  with  a 
discussion  of  the  implication  of  this  trend  towards  self-management, 
specifically in terms of what is at stake for the liberal state from a mode of 
government that seeks to govern for its citizens’ freedom and also, often 
antagonistically, for the state’s security.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Western Australia, where this thesis was written, the state government 
recently invited state schools to apply for what it terms Independent Public 
School status (Department of Education 2010c). Independent public school 
status  accords  school  leaders  and  teachers  greater  decision-making 
autonomy and flexibility than those schools managed by the ‘one size fits 
all’ approach of the central bureaucracy (Department of Education 2010a). 
The Department’s information material lists twenty-five ‘flexibilities’ that 
Independent  Public  Schools  are  accorded,  including  the  recruitment  of 
staff,  the  use  of  resources,  the  design  and  use  of  curriculum,  and 
responsiveness to their communities and other demands and opportunities 
(Department  of  Education  2010bb).  Principals  and  school  communities 
have  eagerly  taken  up  this  invitation  to  ‘unlock  their  school’s  future’ 
(Strauss 2010).  
  While  the  Director-General  of  Education  touts  the  Independent 
Public School (IPS) policy as a new initiative, the IPS policy’s discourse of 
school autonomy and independence is located within a policy trajectory of 
devolution,  school  autonomy  and  self-management  that  has  marked  the          
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discourses of education management since at least the 1970s. In Australia, a 
policy  of  devolving  decision-making  responsibilities  from  bureaucratic 
centres to the school level was first canvassed in the early 1970s (Karmel 
1973)  and  since  this  time  a  plethora  of  official  government  reports  has 
sought  to  shift  the  locus  of  educational  decision-making  away  from 
bureaucratic centres to individual schools (Beazley et al. 1984; Black 1993; 
Directorate  of  School  Education  1994;  Hoffman  1994;  McCarrey  1993; 
Ministry of Education 1987). 
  Former  Western  Australian  Minister  for  Education,  Bob  Pearce, 
described the nature of this shift in an interesting way. He described it as an 
inversion in how education systems were being thought about and governed 
(Pearce 1987). He observed that for most of the twentieth century public 
education  was  organised  around  centralised  education  bureaucracies. 
Individual  schools  belonged  to  an  educational  system  and  it  was  the 
educational system and decisions related to it that determined a school’s 
activities. The quality of individual schools was perceived to be a product 
of  fostering  the  effectiveness,  excellence  and  efficiency  of  the  whole 
education system. Pearce reasoned that during the 1980s this rationality had 
been inverted. The individual public school was perceived to be the key 
organisational unit of education systems and it was the effectiveness and 
excellence  of  individual  schools  that  determined  the  excellence  and 
effectiveness of education systems.  
  These developments were described in the late 1980s by Caldwell 
and Spinks (1988; 1992) in terms of the emergence of the ‘self-managing 
school’, something resembling the Independent Public School. The self-         
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managing school designates a model of school that under the condition of 
decentralisation  assumes  a  range  of  responsibilities  for  the  day-to-day 
management  of  schools.  While  central  education  bureaucracies  maintain 
strategic and legal functions, the rationalities, techniques and practices of 
management expertise are employed in the pursuit of the management of 
schools as relatively autonomous organisations. This includes assuming the 
responsibilities of managing school budgets and staff recruitment, creating 
school  policies  and  development  plans,  implementing  performance 
management  regimes,  and  building  school  cultures  (Beare  et  al.  1989; 
Brennan  2009;  Caldwell  and  Spinks  1988;  Caldwell  and  Spinks  1992; 
Harman  et  al.  1991).  Considering  these  past  developments,  today’s 
Independent Public School initiative appears to be linked to a continuing 
reform to the organisation of schools and their relationship to the education 
system. The central concern of this thesis is this ongoing reform towards 
achieving school autonomy and self-management (as witnessed by the IPS 
initiative), and its continued relevance to political and educational decision-
making.  This  concern  can  be  posed  as  four  broad  questions  about  self-
managing school reform: (1) How should it be understood? (2) What are 
the conditions of possibility for its existence? (3) What is its significance to 
contemporary politics and government? (4) What might an analysis of its 
relationship to politics and government tell us about contemporary reforms 
like the IPS initiative?  
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A Foucauldian approach to studying self-management 
 
A number of perspectives on self-managing reforms can be discerned from 
the  literature.  One  explanation  for  ‘self-managing  reforms’  is  that  these 
merely  signal  education  systems  being  dragged  into  the  twenty-first 
century. For too long, it is said, education systems have been organised 
archaically  (Beare  et  al.  1989;  Caldwell  and  Spinks  1988).  In  this 
reasoning, the creation of self-managing schools is a reasonable solution to 
the  putative  endemic  inefficiency  and  dysfunction  of  antiquated  public 
bureaucracies  and  bureaucratic  modes  of  governance.  Contemporary 
economic,  management  and  organisational  research  points  to  a  de-
bureaucratised and devolved mode of governance as a form of organisation 
that  is  superior  to  centralised  bureaucratic  management  (Bennis  1975; 
Buchanan and Wagner 1977; Du Gay and Hall 1996; Osborne and Gaebler 
1993; Peters and Waterman 1982). Here, self-management is construed as 
largely  an  organisational  reform  made  possible  by  the  advancement  of 
technical knowledges of organisations and human beings. 
  Another explanation for school autonomy and self-management is 
that it reflects a social, political and cultural movement towards freedom 
and empowerment. On one side of this argument are those who criticise the 
welfare state and its supposed trampling of individual freedom and choice 
through  its  excessive  regulation  (Howard  2005;  Kemp  1997).  For  these 
liberals and neo-liberals, the policy of school self-management represents a 
welcomed demise of the power of government bureaucracies and the vested          
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interests  ensconced  within  them,  and  the  restoration  of  individual  and 
community  power.  On  the  other  side  of  this  explanation  in  terms  of 
freedom and empowerment are social progressives who, although sceptical 
about  liberalism’s  valuing  of  markets  and  choice,  nevertheless  construe 
school  self-management  as  empowering  for  schools,  teachers  and 
communities  (Dudley  and  Vidovich  1995;  Rizvi  1994).  An  essential 
element  of  self-management,  so  the  argument  goes,  is  its  capacity  to 
empower  individuals  from  the  unnecessary  constraints  imposed  on  self-
determination by bureaucracy and the state.  
  Related  to  the  social  progressive’s  perspective  is  another 
explanation  for  the  emergence  of  self-management  that  comes  from  a 
critical theoretical trajectory. Often advanced by critical sociologists, it is 
argued  that  self-management  is  the  regrettable  scion  of  the  political 
programme of the New Right and neoliberal ideologues (Gewirtz 2002; 
Whitty  et  al.  1998).  This  analysis  locates  the  emergence  of  self-
management in a crisis and restructure of the welfare state in the 1970s and 
1980s, and it seeks to uncover the veil of obfuscation that supposedly hides 
the  political  ideologies  and  economic  interests  self-management  serves 
(Ball 1990a; Gewirtz 2002; Smyth 1993). Of particular importance to this 
mode  of  analysis  is  how  self-management  addresses  the  state’s  need  to 
secure  the  control,  consent  and  obedience  of  the  population  in  order  to 
secure its own legitimacy.  
  While  I  do  not  reject  these  popular  perspectives  in  toto,  my 
approach to self-managing reform is somewhat different.           
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  Unlike the above ‘technical’ explanation, this thesis does not regard 
self-managing reforms as merely ‘organisational reform’ because to do so 
circumscribes the field of analysis to the domain of ‘organisations’ and to 
questions  of  structure  and  function.  Firstly,  it  is  not  clear  that 
decentralisation  and  self-management  actually  produces  the  benefits  its 
advocates claim, with many studies finding little or no detrimental impact 
on  academic  outcomes  caused  by  school  self-management  policies 
(Grissmer  et  al.  2000;  Levacic  and  Hardman  1999;  Malen  et  al.  1990; 
Walberg et al. 2000). Secondly, this perspective fails to engage analytically 
with the link between the discourses of politics and government and the 
production and enactment of organisational reform (Angus 1994; Miller 
and O'Leary 1989; Miller and Rose 1995; Rose 1999a; Smyth 1993). This 
thesis construes self-managing reforms to be governmental.  
  My concern for ‘government’, however, needs to be distinguished 
from the social progressive and neo-liberal perspectives that equate self-
managing reforms with the functions of freedom and empowerment. This 
perspective  glosses  over  how  freedom  and  empowerment  are  deployed 
within the objectives and practices of government. So enamoured by the 
normative  ideal  of  individual  autonomy  and  self-governance,  the 
idealisation of freedom and empowerment comes at the expense of properly 
understanding the governmental conditions of individual self-governance. 
Alternatively,  I  do  not  regard  government  as  a  coercive  instrument  for 
securing  control  and  the  legitimacy  of  the  state  and  capital.  This 
perspective is fraught with a limitation. It adopts the posture of what Rose 
(1999a) terms socio-critique, whereby political authorities and government          
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are construed as principally concerned with the functions of control, capital 
accumulation and legitimacy. Socio-critique too narrowly understands self-
management as serving the interests of the state and capital by oppressing 
autonomy, instrumentalising consciousness and conduct, and obfuscating 
reality and the exercise of power.  
  I attempt to overcome what I perceive to be the above analytical 
pitfalls  in  the  analysis  of  self-managing  reforms  by  drawing  upon 
Foucauldian  studies  of  government  (Barry  et  al.  1996b;  Burchell  et  al. 
1991; Dean and Hindess 1998; Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008; Marston and 
McDonald 2006; Meredyth and Tyler 1993). The insights and concepts of 
these  studies  open  up  a  field  of  analysis  beyond  the  conception  of 
government  as  reducible  to  the  activities  of  a  sovereign  power  seeking 
legitimacy and control.  
  While  Foucault  and  his  studies  have  increasingly  influenced 
sociological studies in education, particularly around his notions of power 
and  discipline,  Foucault’s  studies  of  government  have  been  less  widely 
elaborated  and  used.  To  address  this  gap,  I  want  to  explore a spects  of 
Foucault’s  studies  in  government  so  as  to  illustrate  and  justify  their 
relevance  and  significance  to  the  study  of  education  and  contemporary 
education reform. Broadly, I use this exploration as a basis for examining 
how  the  self-managing  school  developed  from  emerging  ways  of 
rationalising the problems of government and the government of the state, 
and how the resulting self-managing school constitutes both an instrument 
and object of government that re-regulates the domain of education.  
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Governmentality 
 
The approach I take in this thesis is to explore the relationship between 
self-managing  school  reforms  and  how  we  think  about  and  enact 
government. I pursue this exploration using the theoretical and historical 
insights of Michel Foucault’s studies of power and government (Foucault 
1988a; Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008), as well as Foucauldian scholars that 
have pursued historical and theoretical investigations using the insights of 
Foucault (Barry et al. 1996b; Burchell et al. 1991). Specifically, I draw 
upon  the  family  of  studies  termed  ‘studies  in  governmentality’, 
‘governmentality studies’, or ‘Foucauldian studies in government’, and the 
important  elaboration  of  and  research  on  governmentality  conducted  in 
particular by Nikolas Rose (1999b) and Mitchell Dean (1999). Although 
this thesis does not apply some kind of ideal-type conceptual ‘framework’ 
derived  from  governmentality  studies  to  the  study  of  education  reform, 
there are key elements and insights from ‘governmentality studies’ that I 
use. 
  Foucauldian  studies  of  government  illuminate  the  connections 
between how the problems and objectives of the state are rationalised by 
political authorities, and the knowledge, technologies and practices used in 
the  cultivation  of  individuals  as  citizen-subjects.  For  example,  as  with 
governmentality studies I too am concerned with those “practices that try to 
shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, 
needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups” (Dean 1999, 12). 
Such  studies  explore  how  political  discourses  are  translated  into  the          
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everyday lives of citizens, and how regulatory knowledges, techniques and 
practices  structure  the  individual’s  field  of  possible  thought  and  action, 
instrumentalising people’s freedom and autonomy. Hence, these studies are 
very much concerned with how freedom and autonomy are conditions for 
the exercise of power in the modern liberal state. 
  Employing this broad conceptual orientation, what Dean terms an 
‘analytics of government’ (Dean 1999), this study researches a range of 
everyday,  political,  expert,  social  and  cultural  texts  and  practices  that 
constitute the truths and knowledge of the present (Popkewitz et al. 2001). 
This  examination  of  texts,  knowledge  and  techniques  is  the  basis  for 
exploring the relationship between the self-managing reform of schools and 
transformations  in  how  political  authorities  and  others  rationalise  the 
government of the state. Specifically, it links the techniques, practices and 
objectives of school autonomy and self-management with the emergence of 
new ways of thinking about the objects of government, the problems that 
government  should  be  directed  to,  to  what  ends  government  should  be 
directed, and through what means government should occur.  
  Therefore,  the  methodological  approach  of  this  thesis  is  distinct 
from methods that analyse self-management in terms of freedom, or as a 
technical development for maximising the functioning of the educational 
organisation. My approach is also distinct from socio-critique because it 
does not analyse self-management in terms of how it seeks to control and 
oppress individuals to pre-determined and often obfuscated interests and 
ends. Instead, I attempt to set out a way of analysing education reform that 
is distinct from these approaches. The analytics of government I adopt here          
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explores the link between self-managing school reforms, as the regulatory 
techniques and practices of government occurring at local sites, and the 
problematisation and rationalisation of the government of the state and its 
population. In other words, education and social policy is not construed as 
simply a system for state control, but sets of knowledge and practices that 
“produce and promote certain means and ends” (Marston and McDonald 
2006, 7). 
 
Thesis overview 
 
This thesis puts the case that self-managing reforms can be understood in 
relation  to  transformations  in  how  political  authorities  think  about  the 
population  and  society,  the  human  being,  the  problems  that  beset 
individuals,  and  the  resulting  ways  of  acting  upon  and  intervening  in 
matters of life and state. By this I do not mean that self-managing reforms 
are self-evident solutions to the problems of governing presented by brute 
reality,  for  example, s e l f -management  as  an  inevitable  response  to  the 
inexorable globalisation of capital and culture. Rather, my proposition is 
that  problems  related  to  schooling  and  its  organisation  emerge  from 
problematisations  occasioned  by  certain  ways  of  reasoning  related  to 
governing  individuals,  national  populations  and  problems  related  to  the 
state. Specifically, I examine the link between school self-management and 
the emergence in the late twentieth century of a discourse of enterprise and 
autonomy in the rationalities of government.          
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  But  these  transformations  in  the  rationalities  and  modalities  of 
government are not merely the product of changes occurring at the end of 
the  twentieth  century.  I  argue  that  this  contemporary  transformation  in 
governmental rationalities and technologies, what Foucault (2008) terms 
the ‘crisis of liberalism’ (2008, 69), evokes an enduring dilemma at the 
core of liberal government and today’s welfare state. This dilemma is a 
product of the historical development of the liberal state and it refers to 
contestations  around  how  governmental  power  is  rationalised  and 
exercised. Specifically, for liberal government, this crisis revolves around a 
tension  between  the  state’s  pastoral  role,  or  its  care  for  the  welfare  of 
individuals,  and  the  fact  that  how  individuals  are  cared  for  (their 
individualisation)  is  inseparable  from  how  the  state’s  existence, 
government, wellbeing, productivity and security is reasoned (totalisation) 
(Dean 1994; Dean 1999; Foucault 1988a).  
  This coincidence of totalisation and individualisation manifests a 
tension at the heart of liberalism. This is a tension between the development 
of an extensive normalising apparatus of administration that has occurred in 
the name of care and welfare, and the ambition of producing freedom for 
individuals, the economy and civil society as a condition for the liberal 
state’s security. This thesis argues that the critique of the welfare state in 
the 1970s and the consequent emergence of advanced liberal rationalities 
and  modalities  of  rule,  including  self-managing  school  reforms,  can  be 
interpreted as a product of this inherent tension in liberal rule. In short, it 
manifests a critique and scrutiny over the welfare state’s crossing of the 
threshold between freedom and ‘unfreedom’.           
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  I then examine how self-managing reforms in education insert into 
the domains of the family and school an advanced liberal rationality of 
government,  as  it  seeks  to  establish  increased  choice,  autonomy,  self-
governance and empowerment from the state and bureaucratic control. In 
relation  to  the  domain  of  the  family,  self-managing  reforms  and  the 
diminution  of  central  bureaucratic  control  have  reconstituted  the 
relationship between the family and schools. Parents are seen to be key to 
the success of the educational enterprise and this increasingly requires them 
to be ‘empowered’ and actively engaged in their children’s schooling by 
supporting  early  intellectual  development  in  the  home,  by  becoming 
actively involved in matters related to their children’s schooling, and by 
making  decisions  about  the  best  school  for  their  children  to  attend.  In 
relation to the domain of school, these reforms have also reconstituted the 
space of schooling and teaching. A new ‘empowered’ professional identity 
for school leaders has been cultivated. This is an identity that emphasises 
the  capacities  to  self-manage,  to  be  entrepreneurial,  to  operate  in  the 
education  marketplace,  and  to  be  responsive  to  local  circumstances  and 
consumer  demands.  By  reorganising  the  centralised  management  of 
schools,  self-managing  reforms  appear  to  support  increasing  parental 
choice, community empowerment and school leader autonomy.  
  I  conclude  that  self-managing  school  reforms  are  indicative  of  a 
shift in how government and the government of the state is conceptualised 
and enacted and that self-managing reforms enact a re-regulation of the 
domain  of  education.  Indicative  of  a  transformation  in  our  modality  of 
government  created  by  a  crisis  of  liberal  government,  this  re-regulation          
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seeks to establish increased autonomy and freedom for citizens that were 
supposedly diminished by the welfare state. Both schools and parents have 
been empowered to take charge of their lives and activities as ‘autonomous 
choosers’ operating in a market setting (Marshall 1996). This has involved 
orienting  the  management  of  schools  to  the  interests  of  parents  and 
asserting that parents, rather than the state, bear the principal responsibility 
for  the  education o f  children.  I  conclude  with  a  discussion  of  the 
implications  of  construing  the  government  of  schools  in  terms  of  self-
management and self-governance.  
 
Thesis structure 
 
This thesis is composed of three parts. Part I, ‘Self-Managing Reforms’, 
offers  a  definition  of  the  object  of  my  investigation,  the  self-managing 
school, and puts forward an explanation for its emergence in terms of a 
transformation in how government is rationalised and technologised.  
  Part II, ‘The State and Government’, uses the genealogical work of 
Foucault  to  examine  more  fully  the  historical  conditions  for  the 
contemporary  crisis  of  the  welfare  state  and  the  transformation  of  the 
rationalities  and  technologies  of  government.  Considerable  attention  is 
given  to  Foucault’s  historical  account  of  the  formation  of  the  modern 
liberal state because it is an account that has not been used extensively in 
education research. 
  Part III, ‘Programs of Freedom: Empowerment and Entrepreneurial 
Management’,  returns  to  the  analysis  of  self-managing  reforms  in  the          
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domain of education. Utilising the insights of government outlined in the 
preceding  chapters,  it  focuses  on  two  case  studies  to  illustrate  the 
transformation  in  educational  governance  generated  by  the  crisis  of 
liberalism: the family-school relationship and then on the organisation of 
schools.          
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Chapter 1: The Self-Managing School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
What  is  the  self-managing  school  and  how  should  this  ‘big  idea’  of 
contemporary  education  policy  (Whitty  et  al.  1998)  be  studied?  This 
chapter  begins  the  task  of  defining  this  object  of  investigation  by  first 
examining Caldwell and Spinks’ (1988) The Self-Managing School. While 
The  Self-Managing  School  is  not  the  definitive  text  of  school  self-
management, it does describe two important dimensions of the reform to 
schools and their organisation that are central to any understanding of self-
management. The first dimension is the accordance of autonomy to schools 
from  central  education  bureaucracies,  and  the  second  dimension  is  the 
employment of management techniques that enable schools to manage their 
affairs as relatively autonomous organisations.  
  Although Caldwell and Spinks (1988) perceive the merging of these 
two  dimensions  in  the  self-managing  school  as  a  largely  administrative          
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change  brought  about  by  the  refinement  of  technical  knowledge  of 
organisations and people, it would be remiss to attribute their emergence to 
a merely ‘technical’ explanation. To do so fails to adequately grasp the 
political  dimension  of  self-managing  reforms,  which  includes  their 
connection to the broader reform of government occurring during the same 
period. This chapter provides an overview of this political dimension of 
self-management  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  definition  of  the  self-managing 
school  not  merely  as  a  technical  object  but  as  a  political-technical 
assemblage. This chapter, therefore, utilises Caldwell and Spinks’ notion of 
the self-managing school in order to extend our understanding of what it is. 
 
The self-managing school  
 
One of the most influential education management texts of the past four 
decades in Australia and the United Kingdom has been The Self-Managing 
School by Caldwell and Spinks (1988). Since the publication of this text, 
the ‘self-managing school’ has been rendered into an object of deliberation, 
evaluation  and  elaboration  by  education  management  researchers, 
sociologists,  bureaucrats,  politicians,  principals  and  teachers.  The  ‘self-
managing school’ has entered into the lexicon of many within the field of 
education, and this partly explains why its authors have acted as consultants 
for education departments, policy-makers, bureaucrats and principals the 
world over on school-based management. Indeed, during the twenty years 
or more since their text’s first printing and after many variations of this text 
since (Caldwell and Spinks 1992; Caldwell and Spinks 1998; Caldwell and          
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Spinks 2008), Caldwell and Spinks continue to be invited to consult and 
speak as authorities on the self-managing school.  
  While I too use the ‘self-managing school’ as a term to define the 
modern  organisation  of  the  school,  I  do  this  not  because  Caldwell  and 
Spinks created this object or definitively defined it. It cannot be said, for 
instance,  that  Caldwell  and  Spinks’  text  was  a  blueprint  for  education 
reformers  that  resulted  in  an  unfettered  implementation  or  emulation  of 
their model of the self-managing school. Rather, there are many variations 
of the ‘self-managing school’ and these differ depending upon the political 
and policy context within which school reform and self-management have 
been enacted. Hence school self-management in New Zealand (Codd 1993) 
looks  different  to  what  school  self-management  looks  like  in  Western 
Australia  (Angus  1995;  Haywood  1994).  Moreover,  continuing  school 
reform since the text’s publication means that the 1988 description of the 
self-managing school differs from the kind of description made of it today. 
  I do not use ‘self-managing school’, therefore, to refer to a model of 
school that Caldwell and Spinks outlined in their publications. Rather, the 
term ‘self-managing school’ is a portmanteau term for describing a general 
contour of reform in school management and governance that has occurred 
since  the  1970s,  which  Caldwell  and  Spinks  identify,  and  which  has 
continued  to  occur  since  the  publication  of  The  Self-Managing  School
1. 
What, then, are the two dimensions of school reform identified by Caldwell 
and  Spinks  and  which  are  also  pertinent  to  the  existence  of  the  self-
managing school?  
                                                 
1 See Appendix (a) for an outline of significant policies.          
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The ‘self’ in self-management 
 
The term the ‘self-managing school’ encapsulates two dimensions of the 
object of Caldwell and Spinks’ analysis. The first pertains to the first term 
in  the  hyphenation,  ‘self-managing’.  The  self  in  ‘self-managing’  gives 
emphasis  to  the  organisational  autonomy  of  schools,  as  captured  in  the 
following definition provided by Caldwell and Spinks: 
 
the  self-managing  school  [is]  one  for  which  there  has  been 
significant  and  consistent  decentralisation  to  the  school  level  of 
authority to make decisions related to the allocation of resources. 
This  decentralisation  is  administrative  rather  than  political,  with 
decisions  at  the  school  level  being  made  within  a  framework  of 
local, state or national policies and guidelines. The school remains 
accountable to a central authority for the manner in which resources 
are allocated. (Caldwell and Spinks 1988, 5) 
 
Caldwell  and  Spinks  distinguish  the  self-managing  school  from  the 
centralised, bureaucratic form of school administration that had dominated 
public  education  for  most  of  the  twentieth  century.  With  this  mode  of 
governance, an external authority managed the school and to this extent the 
school  was  conceived  as  dependent  upon  the  policies,  procedures  and 
activities of centralised educational bureaucracies. These were responsible 
for the school’s programmes, policies and budgets and the mundane aspects 
of  school  operations  such  as  plant  maintenance  and  purchases.  In 
comparison, the self-managing school designates a school that although in 
certain ways is still accountable to central authorities, also has considerable          
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management  independence.  The  self-managing  school  has  a  range  of 
responsibilities that include managing budgets, setting priorities, devising 
policies and educational programmes and allocating resources in response 
to these. 
  The  emergence  of  the  self-managing  school  was  therefore 
inextricably tied to a discourse of devolution and autonomy. Indeed, at the 
time of The Self-Managing School’s publication, research had increasingly 
linked the effectiveness of schools to gaining their organisational autonomy 
from bureaucracy (Caldwell and Spinks 1988; Chapman 1990). The value 
of decentralisation or devolved structures of authority were championed by 
education research (Gittell 1972; Lopate et al. 1970), organisation research 
(Owens  1995;  Sergiovanni  and  Carver  1973)  and  school  effectiveness 
research (Purkey and Smith 1983; Reynolds 1976; Reynolds and Cuttance 
1992;  Rutter  et  al.  1979).  Given  this  emphasis  on  autonomy,  it  is 
unsurprising that Caldwell (2003) attributes the ‘foundation text’ for their 
self-managing school to the Interim Committee of the Australian Schools 
Commission’s  landmark  report,  Schools  in  Australia  (Karmel  1973),  a 
report that argued for the devolution of authority and independence from 
centralised education bureaucracies for the formation of their curriculum 
and pedagogy. 
  Therefore, the first term ‘self’ in the hyphenation ‘self-managing’ 
designates a growing emphasis on schools as key organisational units of the 
education system. Caldwell and Spinks identified a trend away from the 
bureaucratic management of schools and a shift towards individual schools          
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managing  their  affairs  as  organisations  relatively  autonomous  from 
education bureaucracies.  
 
The ‘management’ in self-management 
 
The second dimension of the self-managing school pertains to the second 
term in the hyphenation. This refers to the capacity of the public school to 
manage itself. In Caldwell and Spinks’ (1988) estimation, the school has a 
potentially autonomous organisational form that has been stifled under the 
conditions of bureaucratic management. Their text attempts to intervene in 
this  situation  by  rendering  the  school  intelligible  as  a  composition  of 
properties  and  processes  readily  amenable  to  management.  Utilising  the 
knowledges  and  techniques  of  organisational  theory  and  management 
expertise (for example, Ackoff 1969), Caldwell and Spinks describe the 
features,  techniques  and  practices  of  the  effective  organisation,  such  as 
objective  setting,  corporate  planning  and  budgeting.  Moreover,  they 
provide pro formas for use by school leaders on many aspects of managing 
a school.  
  Caldwell  and  Spinks’  descriptions  of  the  school  as  well  as  their 
provision  of  templates  amounts  to  rendering  the  public  school  into 
existence as a self-managing, discrete organisation. The reader of their text 
is left with a clear impression that the school is composed of knowable 
organisational properties and processes. As schools are organisations they 
necessarily have goals and outcomes and these can be optimised through 
practices of objective setting and corporate planning. By implication, then,          
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the intended reader, the school leader, is compelled to utilise management 
techniques and practices to support its capacity to manage its autonomy. 
Importantly for the authors, the instituting of this capacity to self-manage 
will correct the deficiencies produced by the central bureaucracy’s control 
of school management.  
  Therefore,  the  second  term  in  the  hyphenation,  ‘managing’, 
designates the second dimension to the self-managing school; that is, the 
self-managing  school  is  constituted  by  the  employment  of  management 
theory and manageable techniques and practices that enable those working 
within schools to manage their autonomy effectively and efficiently. 
 
Caveat 
 
Implicit in my descriptions above is that since at least the 1970s a range of 
school  management  and  organisational  experts  were  elaborating 
organisational and managerial features of schools along the lines of self-
management,  long  before  Caldwell  and  Spinks  (Owens  1995).  For 
example,  school  effectiveness  research  established  a  purportedly  neutral 
and  objective  knowledge  of  the  properties,  processes  and  problems  of 
school organisations by marrying organisational theory and management 
expertise with the collection and calculation of school statistics (Mortimore 
1988; Reynolds 1976; Rutter et al. 1979; Slee et al. 1998). From these 
taxonomies of the processes and components of the ‘effective school’, or 
the  effectively  managed  school,  education  administrators  were  offered 
practices  and  techniques  for  improving  organisational  management  and          
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performance. This marked the beginning of improvement and development 
plans. Therefore, well before the publication of The Self-Managing School, 
an  albeit  inchoate  self-managing  school  existed  in  the  employment  of 
organisational and management theories, techniques and practices that were 
carving out the individual school as a distinct object for improvement. My 
point, however, is that Caldwell and Spinks formalised these trends.  
 
The self-managing school as a technical assemblage 
 
One troubling aspect of the definition of school self-management adopted 
by  Caldwell  and  Spinks  (1988)  arose  for  me  when  I  was  presenting 
preliminary findings of this research to colleagues. After outlining these 
two dimensions to the self-managing school, a colleague suggested that the 
self-managing  school  was  a  necessary  development  in  response  to  the 
inefficiency  of  the  centralised  control  of  schools  by  education 
bureaucracies.  His  point  was  that  central  bureaucracies  constrained  how 
schools managed their resources, that school autonomy was a progressive 
development away from the outmoded model of bureaucratic management, 
and  that  this  reform  would  without  doubt  improve  efficiency  and 
educational  outcomes.  What  troubled  me  about  his  contribution  to  the 
discussion were the assumptions embedded in his interpretation of school 
self-management as a response to the failures of bureaucracy.  
  His  argument  about  the  failure  of  bureaucracy  was  an 
understandable observation insofar as it was informed by the commonly 
accepted  anti-bureaucratic  analyses  of  experts  of  organisations  and          
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management.  Bureaucratic  features,  such  as  a  hierarchical  command 
structure and an emphasis on rules, have been construed by researchers as 
harmful to individual rationality, efficiency, creativity, enterprise, initiative 
and s e l f -reliance  (Blau  and  Meyer  1971;  Caiden  1982;  Crozier  1963; 
Emery and Emery 1974; Hummel 1977; Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Peters 
and Waterman 1982). Merton (1957) famously argued, for example, that a 
rational-formal model of bureaucratic management produces an emphasis 
on  procedures  and  rule-compliance  and  this  delimited  worker  decision-
making discretion. For Merton, this meant that the identification, pursuit 
and optimisation of organisational goals were displaced by an obsessive 
regulation  of  the  minutiae  of  behaviour  required  by  the  rules  of  the 
organisation.   
  My colleague’s reiteration of this criticism of bureaucratic design’s 
poor fit with human behaviour is supported by the expertise of workplace 
psychology  and  management.  His  comments  during  the  discussion  that 
bureaucracy assumes that ‘man is a machine’ resonated with the criticism 
made by management psychologists that classical bureaucratic management 
failed  to  take  account  of  the  motivational  complexity  of  human  beings, 
often assuming the individual worker is lazy, irresponsible and dependent 
(Argyris 1957; Davis and Cherns 1975; Herzberg 1966; McGregor 1960; 
Porter  1961;  Warr  1976).  Bureaucracy,  it  was  claimed,  had  outlived  its 
usefulness  because  psychology,  and  other  ‘truthful’  disciplines  such  as 
management and organisational theory, had shed light on a “new concept of 
man, based on increased knowledge of his complex and shifting needs…          
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[instead of] an oversimplified, innocent, push-button idea of man” (Bennis 
1975, 287). 
  With this type of analysis of bureaucracy, my colleague could be 
forgiven  for  accepting  as  commonsense  the  idea  that  self-management 
emerged  out  of  the  inherent  failures  of  bureaucracy.  Indeed,  people’s 
negative personal perceptions of bureaucracy, as characterised by Hummel 
in  the  following  quote,  probably  make  the  above  negative  appraisal  of 
bureaucracy appear self-evident: 
 
Everyone has trouble with bureaucracy. Citizens and politicians have 
trouble  controlling  the  runaway  bureaucratic  machine.  Managers 
have trouble managing it. Employees dislike working in it. Clients 
can’t get the goods from it. Teachers have trouble getting an overall 
grip on it. Students are mystified by the complexity of it. (Hummel 
1977, vii) 
 
  What  troubles  me  about  my  colleague’s  assessment  of  self-
management, and indeed what troubles me about the organisational and 
management  knowledge  he  draws  upon,  is  that  the  identification  of  the 
weaknesses of bureaucracies and bureaucratic management is perceived to 
be  the  product  of  the  progressive  refinement  of  our  supposedly  neutral, 
objective  and  technical  knowledge  of  human  behaviour,  the  ‘human 
psyche’, the management of workers, and organisations. Thereupon, the 
motor of organisational reform in education is assumed to be a product of 
our developing knowledge of the world in the human and social sciences. 
This  has  supposedly  afforded  us  the  increased  capacity  to  describe  the 
effective  properties,  functions  and  practices  of  the  autonomous,  self-         
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managing  school,  as  if  they  were  hidden  realities  discovered  by  the 
technical advancement of our knowledge of humans and organisations. 
However, this assumption is problematically sociologically realist. 
That is, the fields of organisational and management theory are assumed to 
be  disinterested  disciplines  that  present  solutions  to  self-evident 
sociological problems. Hence, Caldwell and Spinks (1988) asserted to the 
chagrin  of  critical  sociologists  that  self-management  is  “administrative 
rather  than  political”  (1988,  5).  However,  a  technical  and  functionalist 
account of self-management that assumes that the experts of management 
and organisations are engaged in a relatively neutral and objective process 
of  finding  more  effective  and  efficient  techniques  and  practices  for 
optimising schools fails to engage with the substantive political dimension 
of self-management (Angus 1993; Angus 1994; Ball 1998b; Gunter 2000; 
Smyth 1993). It neglects, for instance, the relationship between political 
power  and  the  knowledge  produced  in  the  disciplines  of  management, 
organisational  theory  and  psychology,  as  well  as  the  role  of  these  in 
constituting the reality these purport to describe
2. I argue that organisational 
and managerial truths are political rather than simply neutral and technical. 
                                                 
2 Hence Ackoff’s (1969) corporate plan was utilised by Caldwell and Spinks (1988) as 
a largely technical practice for rationalising the activities of schools so that school 
leaders could be responsive to the new realities being discovered of the organisation of 
schools. For Caldwell and Spinks, this was seen as an improvement on past practices 
because it recognised that organisations possessed inputs and outputs, that workers 
desired  self-management  and  responsibility  in  their  work,  and  that  the  energy  of 
teachers could be harnessed to the achievement of school goals. For Caldwell and 
Spinks, the corporate plan was merely a technical elaboration of a refined knowledge 
of school in light of the errors and weaknesses of past practices. It could be deployed 
for the purpose of achieving the seemingly neutral ends of improved efficiency and 
productivity of individuals and the organisation.           
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The self-managing school as a political-technical assemblage 
 
In defining the self-managing school as a product of policy developments 
related to bureaucratic decentralisation and knowledge developments in the 
disciplines of management and organisational theory, Caldwell and Spinks’ 
(1988) field of visibility is severely obscured. It does not perceive self-
management  and  its  anti-bureaucratic  discourse  as  tethered  to  political 
forces in any substantial way.  
  Fortunately, education management’s inattention to the political has 
been  corrected  by  researchers  who  have  sought  to  understand  the  self-
managing school politically by situating its formation along a trajectory of 
the  technical  and  political  knowledges  and  practices  associated  with 
‘welfare state restructure’ (Fergusson 1994; Gewirtz 2002; Smyth 1993). In 
particular, it is argued that the self-managing school is inextricable from the 
politically driven de-bureaucratisation of public services (Gewirtz 2002), 
and  the  politically-driven  processes  and  practices  of  public  sector 
deregulation  and  re-regulation  (Meredyth  1998),  or  what  Rose  (1993; 
1999b;  Rose  1999c)  similarly  terms  the  double  movement  of 
‘autonomisation’ and ‘responsibilisation’ (also Dean 1999).  
  We can begin to establish how these processes and practices are 
positioned in relation to politics and the state by drawing attention to a 
number of important features of political discourse in this period, not all of 
which are necessarily novel (Miller and Rose 1990). In particular, political 
authorities  were  concerned  with  optimising  national  economic          
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competitiveness,  improving  the  productivity  and  competitiveness  of 
corporations  and  individuals,  reinvigorating  the  economy  and  culture 
around  enterprise,  and  eradicating  inefficiencies  from  the  public  sector 
created  by  its  centralised,  planning  oriented,  bureau-professional 
organisation  (Clarke  and  Newman  1997;  Newman  and  Clarke  1994; 
Rhodes 1994).  
  These concerns constitute a problematisation of government insofar 
as  these  problematised  the  contribution  of  current  governmental 
rationalities, technologies and programs to the improvement or otherwise of 
the nation’s economy and its people. Indeed, there was regularity to these 
concerns and problematisations. Many Western liberal democratic nations 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia began to be suffused with a political discourse that construed that 
if their nations were to continue to foster social and economic wellbeing, 
then they needed to limit the size of the state and government, foster active, 
competitive  and  entrepreneurial  behaviour,  improve  organisational 
management,  flexibility  and  accountability,  and  remove  incentives  to 
dependency and passivity, or the expectation that the state owes people a 
living (Dean 1999; Rose 1999). This way of understanding and reasoning 
the field of government, politics and its objects of concern has been termed 
‘advanced liberalism’ or the more narrowly defined ‘neo-liberalism’ (Barry 
et  al.  1996a),  and  this  encompassed  the  perception  that  the  excessive 
regulation of the state and its government stifled the creative, enterprising 
and  wealth-generating  exercise  of  autonomy  by  individuals  and  private 
enterprises.           
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This arc of political and governmental criticism was extended to 
what Clarke and Newman (1997) term the bureau-professional organisation 
of  the  public  sector,  in  contrast  to  its  managerialist  organisation.  The 
former was increasingly construed as antipathetic to the emerging discourse 
of  government,  as  represented  by  the  idiom  of  ‘smaller  government’, 
‘entrepreneurship’,  ‘flexibility’,  ‘privatisation’,  ‘deregulation’, 
‘competition’, ‘performance’, ‘autonomy’, ‘markets’ and ‘consumers’, and 
more  besides  (Du  Gay  2000a;  Du  Gay  2005).  The  public  bureaucracy 
became  an  unenviable  emblem  of  ‘big  inefficient  government’.  Its 
monopoly of the provision of public goods and services was a threat to 
liberal  and  democratic  ideals  (Buchanan  and  Wagner  1977;  Friedman 
1968), a n d  a  frustration  to  national  economic  growth,  economic 
competition,  public  sector  efficiency  and  the  fostering  of  active, 
competitive and entrepreneurial citizens.  
  Numerous  official  investigations  into  public  services  and  private 
enterprise were mobilised within the grain of these concerns and objectives 
(Burke  1986;  Coombs  1976;  Government  of  Western  Australia  1992; 
Hilmer 1993; Public Service Commission 1994; Reid 1983). The result was 
reform variously termed ‘new managerialism’, ‘corporate managerialism’ 
and  ‘new  public  management’  (Clarke  et  al.  2000;  Davis  et  al.  1989; 
Hoggett 1996; Hood 1991; Pollitt 1993; Yeatman 1993) that occurred along 
two axes. Along the first axis was increasing organisational and individual 
autonomy  and  agency  (autonomisation),  and  along  the  second  axis  was 
increasing  the  responsibility  of  organisations  and  their  members  for          
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organisational  performance  through  a  range  of  responsibility-inducing 
mechanisms (responsibilisation).  
  This double movement involved in the first instance the devolution 
of  responsibilities  from  bureaucratic  and  political  centres  to  dispersed 
departments, agencies and programmes. These entities were to operate with 
relative autonomy from centres of political and bureaucratic calculation, 
fostered by the use of markets and contracturalism. These devices would 
foster  a  high  degree  of  individual  discretion,  increased  local  decision-
making  responsibility  and  organisational  self-determination  (Yeatman 
1993). In the second instance, these technologies of autonomisation were 
bound to a swarm of technologies of responsibilisation. Technologies of 
responsibilisation encompasses the assemblage of knowledge, techniques 
and practices applied to relatively autonomous public organisations for the 
purpose  of  regulating  at  a  distance  their  activities  and  outcomes.  These 
include  the  use  of  management  regimes  that  emphasise  objectives  and 
outcomes,  and  organisational  and  personnel  performance  management 
regimes  that  transfer  data  from  dispersed  sites  to  centres  of  calculation 
(Powers 1997). 
  These  reforms  remodelled  the  public  sector  according  to  the 
political  and  governmental  concepts  and  technologies  of  performativity, 
entrepreneurship and the market (Clarke and Newman 1997). Downsized 
and  rendered  lean,  public  service  organisations  entered  into  competitive 
relations in the provision of public goods and services, whilst rationalist 
forms of management such as auditing and management by results sought 
to render ever-present the calculation of output and performance. Just as          
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importantly, the bureaucracy’s calculation of needs and interests informed 
by the “scientifically informed production of truth by professionals” (Dean 
1999, 169; Rose 1993) was eroded by user-pays and market mechanisms 
that used individual consumer preference to regulate organisational activity. 
One significant effect of this remodelling, therefore, was to extirpate from 
the welfarist governmental machine the enclaves of bureau, professional 
and union power that putatively frustrated efficiency and the exercise of 
private choice (Clarke and Newman 1997).    
  Pertinently, this displacement of the bureaucratic and professional 
modes of governance fostered by the welfare state (through the techniques 
of autonomisation/agency and responsibilisation/performance) reflected a 
concerted  attempt  to  reconfigure  how  power  within  the  state  was  to  be 
exercised.  Construing  the  bureaucratic  and  professional  ‘enclosures’ 
fostered  under  the  welfare  state  as  a  problem  for  social  and  economic 
wellbeing (Clarke et al. 2000; Clarke and Newman 1997; Du Gay 1996), 
the bureau-professional organisation of the public services was reformed by 
the insertion into the public sector of new politically desirable rationalities, 
practices and calculative regimes (Dean 1999; Rose 1996). Through this, 
“the relations of power within the state [were] unlocked and transformed” 
(Newman and Clarke 1994, 22), and for reformists this could not come 
soon enough.   
  Given  the  link  between  political  discourse  and  public  sector 
organisational  reform  it  is  difficult  to  maintain  a  purely  technical 
explanation of self-managing reform. Public sector reforms constitute more 
than  technical  organisational  improvements  based  upon  the  neutral  and          
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objective advances of management and organisation theory. Rather, with 
the  concerns,  language,  concepts  and  objectives  of  political  authorities 
(such  as  accountability,  competition,  efficiency,  enterprise  and 
responsibility) translated into knowledge produced of and instruments used 
in the public sector, the expertise of management and organisation together 
operated  as  “‘indirect’  mechanisms  for  aligning  economic,  social  and 
personal conduct with socio-political objectives” (Miller and Rose 1990, 2). 
In short, organisational reform is political. 
  No  doubt  this  process  is  complex  and  I  am  not  suggesting  that 
organisational and management expertise is a mere servant of state power, 
for the knowledge produced in the human and social sciences also shapes 
political  discourse  (Barry  et  al.  1996b;  Miller  and  O'Leary  1987;  Rose 
1996b; Rose 1999a). However, the nub of my argument is that we cannot 
excise politics from our discussion of self-managing reforms as many like 
my colleagues do. To do so is like a surgeon eschewing the use of the 
scalpel.  Including  politics  into  the  analysis  renders  perceptible  to  the 
analyst the alignment between a political discourse centred on autonomy, 
enterprise, competition and markets (and its political problematisations), 
and experts’ problematisation and analyses of public sector organisations.  
  From this perspective we can scrutinise the assumption that self-
managing  reforms  emerge  from  the s e l f -evident  failures  of  bureaucratic 
design. We can also question the notion that it was the neutral and objective 
progress  of  human  reason  that  discovered  the  problems  of  bureaucracy; 
those  problems  being  bureaucracy’s  lack  of  autonomy,  enterprise  and 
resistance to new management techniques and practices. Indeed, the public          
  34 
bureaucracy’s  proceduralism,  inflexibility  and  lack  of  entrepreneurship 
have previously been seen as its strengths (Du Gay 2005). That these were 
now  its  problems  says  quite  a  bit  about  the  current  political  valuing  of 
choice,  competition  and  entrepreneurship  and  the  criteria  according  to 
which the public sector and government will be judged today. In what way, 
then,  has  the  organisation  of  schools  and  school  systems  resembled  the 
above problematisation and reform of the public sector?  
 
The politics of school self-management 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising, given the vociferous attacks on the public sector 
and  its  bureaucracy,  that  Australian  education  systems  and  their  central 
bureaucratic  management,  which  had  served  the  nation’s  interests  well 
throughout  most  of  the  twentieth  century,  was  now  seen  as  beset  by  a 
number  of  problems.  What  were  some  of  the  problems  said  to  afflict 
Australian education systems?  
  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it was increasingly argued that 
Australian  education  systems  and  schools  lacked  proper  incentives  for 
improving  educational  standards  and  the  efficient  and  effective  use  of 
resources (Karmel 1985; McCarrey 1993). Schools were construed as being 
inadequately integrated into the national economic infrastructure and were 
therefore  a  frustration  to  national  economic  competitiveness  (Bell  and 
Stevenson 2006; Lingard et al. 1993; Lingard et al. 1995; Marginson 1993; 
Marginson 1997a). Many blamed the quality of teaching for a perceived 
lowering  of  literacy  and  numeracy  standards,  economic  recession  and          
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social  indiscipline.  Education  bureaucrats  and  teacher  unions  were 
frequently criticised for protecting their professional power at the expense 
of  proper  accountability  to  the  public  for  their  outcomes  and  use  of 
resources (Berliner and Biddle 1995; Chubb and Moe 1990; Scott 1990). 
For  Australian  Federal  Education  Minister  David  Kemp,  the  best  way 
forward for public education was to: 
 
ensure  that  government  schools  can  compete  effectively,  to  give 
them greater autonomy from bureaucratic control and more freedom 
to exercise this leadership... I want to be sure that these funds are 
going  to  schools  which  are  autonomous  and  effective  and  this 
funding  is  not  being  used  to  support  schools  which  are  non-
competitive and ineffective... I believe a move to greater autonomy 
for  government  schools  will  provide  Australia  with  the  sort  of 
schooling that this country needs for the next century: competitive, 
vibrant, diverse, and flexible. (Kemp 1997) 
 
Mirroring reforms to the public sector more broadly, Kemp’s vision 
for  Australian  education  systems  involved:  (1)  the  devolution  of 
responsibilities away from bureaucratic centres, and (2) the introduction 
into  schools  of  what  others  describe  as    ‘post-welfare’  managerial  and 
entrepreneurial calculative regimes (Arnott 2000; Fergusson 2000; Gewirtz 
2002;  Hatcher  1994;  Mac  An  Ghaill  1994;  Troman  1996).  These  self-
managing reforms have included: 
 
•  The  introduction  of  performance  management  and  accountability 
regimes  for  managing  staff  relations,  staff  performance  and 
organisational performance, which include staff appraisal systems,          
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performance-based  pay  and  school-wide  audits  (Education 
Department  of  Western  Australia  1996b;  Mahoney  and  Hextall 
2000; McNeil 2003). 
•  The introduction of corporate management techniques and practices 
that specify and guide the pursuit of organisational objectives and 
targets,  which  include  through  corporate,  strategic  and  school 
development plans (Hargreaves and Hopkins 1991).  
•  The introduction of technologies for measuring and comparing the 
performance of schools and education system, both nationally and 
internationally  (Bracey  2000;  Bracey  2003).  Standardised  tests 
render  visible  to  teachers,  principals,  bureaucrats,  parents  and 
politicians  the  outcomes  of  teaching  and  learning  in  schools, 
especially in relation to politically valued criteria, such as literacy 
and numeracy (Gleeson and Husbands 2001; Husbands 2001; Meier 
2002; Torrance 1997). These have enabled schools to take increased 
ownership over their results and the means to their improvement, as 
well as enable centres of bureaucratic and political calculation to 
monitor and govern schools at a distance and to specific ends. 
•  The  publication  of  exams  results,  benchmark  testing  results  and 
graduation  rates.  On  the  one  hand,  publication  makes  school 
performance  transparent  and  accountable,  enabling  comparisons 
that  facilitate  the  identification  of  and  intervention  into  low 
performing  schools  (Gillard  2009;  Kemp  1999a,  1997;  Nelson 
2004b). On the other hand, publication of results provide “parents          
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and  the  community  with  the  information  they  need  to  make 
informed choices about schooling” (Kemp 1999a).  
•  The  use  of  novel  techniques  for  fostering  increased  competition 
between schools to stymie the problem of ‘provider capture’ (Ball 
1994; Gewirtz et al. 1995; Whitty 1997; Whitty et al. 1998). In the 
United Kingdom, choice and autonomy were pursued through the 
policy  of  giving  schools  the  opportunity  to  opt  out  of  the  state 
system.  These  ‘grant-maintained  schools’  are  currently  free  from 
the  control  of  Local  Education  Authorities.  The  Australian 
Commonwealth  Government’s  Economic  Planning  and  Advisory 
Committee also touted this strategy in 1993 (Clarke and Johnston 
1993).  The  reasoning  behind  this  was  that  if  improvements  in 
responsiveness  and  accountability  were  not  achieved  through 
devolution alone, schools should be encouraged to opt out of the 
government  systemic  school  system  (Angus  and  Olney  1998; 
Caldwell 1998). The Independent Public Schools policy mentioned 
in the introduction of this thesis is an example of this strategy.  
•  The loosening of rules governing student enrolments has fostered 
autonomisation.  Under  the  comprehensive  model  of  the 
neighbourhood  school  that  developed  post  World  War  Two, 
students were obliged to attend their local schools, as determined by 
the education department (unless they attended a private school). In 
Western Australia, if a student wanted to attend a school outside of 
their boundary, a ‘cross-boundary application’ needed to be made. 
By  the  late  1980s  and  through  the  1990s  restrictions  on  student          
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intake have been progressively removed by a policy of de-zoning in 
many  Australian  states  (Campbell  and  Sherington  2006;  Scott 
1990). However, in Western Australia this has only occurred in the 
last decade. Under the current policy, students are entitled to attend 
their local school yet they also have the right to apply to schools 
outside of their catchment area. 
•  The authorisation of selective and specialist schools also supports 
autonomy  and  choice  (Department  of  Education  2010d).  These 
schools operate within the public education system, however, they 
have special rules that enable them to recruit particular students and 
implement specialist programs. 
•  Enabling school leaders increased freedom to manage their schools. 
For  instance,  in  its  School  Assistance  (Learning  Together  – 
Achievement  Through  Choice  and  Opportunity)  Act  2004,  the 
Australian  federal  government  made  as  a  condition  of  state 
education funding agreements, that states give principals increased 
control  over  their  schools  (Smyth  2006).  Increasingly,  principals 
have been encouraged to exercise this freedom in market oriented 
ways,  such  as  developing  business  partnerships,  promoting  their 
school and building a positive profile of their schools through the 
media and prospectuses (Meadmore and Meadmore 2004).  
•  The  continued  financial  support  to  the  private  school  sector, 
including loosening the regulations to enable private schools to be 
established close to public schools in the same area. 
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  While we should be cautious of not only over-stating the extent of 
this  self-managing  reform  but  also  simplifying  its  causes  (Arnott  2000; 
Hatcher  1994),  self-managing  school  reform  is  nevertheless 
incontrovertibly constituted from the abovementioned political trajectory 
involving  reform  to  the  welfare  state  and  its  machinery.  Performance 
management techniques have penetrated the bureau-professional enclave of 
schooling  with  a  new  set  of  rationalities  and  practices  of  performance, 
measurement,  accountability  and  competition.  Through  increasing  the 
autonomy of schools and the authority of school leaders over a range of 
responsibilities, schools have been enjoined to operate more as business-
like  competitive  enterprises.  To  the  extent  that  the  above  knowledge, 
techniques and practices of organisational and management expertise have 
been  indispensable  to  the  achievement  of  political  ambitions  around 
autonomy, competition and enterprise, the ‘self-managing school’ cannot 
be said to be a product of an incremental improvement in organisational 
knowledge. It is in this sense that the self-managing school is a political-
technical assemblage.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The  above  discussion  has  given  some  form  to  the  object  of  the  self-
managing  school.  The  self-managing  school  is,  as  Caldwell  and  Spinks 
(1988; 1992) assert, a school that has been devolved a significant level of 
authority  from  the  bureaucratic  centre.  It  is,  therefore,  a  relatively 
autonomous organisation. Indeed, autonomy and self-management appear          
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to have been to some degree an objective or vision of policy-makers for 
some time. An inchoate form of the self-managing school can be found in 
the  devolution  of  authority  and  organisational  autonomisation  that 
increasingly occurred in Australia during the 1970s and 1980s. Caldwell 
and  Spinks  also  draw  attention  to  how  this  autonomy  is  to  be 
responsibilised  by  utilising  management  expertise.  The  knowledge, 
practices  and  techniques  of  management  are  employed  to  develop  the 
capacity of those working within schools to manage its freedom towards 
the  ends  of  organisational  optimisation,  for  instance,  efficiency  and 
effectiveness. 
  However,  this  double  movement  of  autonomisation  and 
responsibilisation  can  only  be  understood  fully i f  w e  e schew  a  purely 
technical account of self-management. Self-managing reform to the public 
services  has  involved  reforming  the  bureau-professional  forms  of 
organisation associated with the welfarist bureaucracies post-World War 
Two. As Clarke and Newman (1997) astutely point out, this organisational 
reform is linked to the politically inflected reform of the welfare state. Self-
managing  reform,  therefore,  should  be  understood  through  this  political 
trajectory inasmuch as political authorities have sought to reform the public 
sector in response to its political prerogatives, particularly to install more 
efficient, entrepreneurial and consumer-oriented forms of governance. 
  I concluded this chapter by illustrating how this reform manifests in 
the educational domain today. While Caldwell and Spinks define the self-
managing school principally in terms of management frameworks within 
devolved  structures  of  authority,  I  have  included  the  more  recent          
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introduction of performance management techniques and practices, and the 
techniques and practices related to the market and marketisation, that have 
over  the  past  two  decades  enveloped  the  school  and  teacher.  The 
rationalities,  techniques  and  practices  of  these  broader  self-managing 
reforms have effectively reconfigured Caldwell and Spinks’ (1988) model 
of  the  self-managing  school  into  a  competitive,  market-oriented  and 
entrepreneurial form.  
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Chapter 2: The Political Dimension of Self-
Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I provided a definition of the self-managing school 
as a political-technical assemblage because its emergence was inseparable 
from political machinations related to reforms to the public sector and the 
welfare  state.  Having  established  that  self-management  and  elements  of 
school self-management are tied to the political realm, and having given an 
indication of this link, I wish to explain in more detail the nature of this 
relationship  and  what  this  might  tell  us  about  the  emergence  of  self-
management. 
  I will examine three explanations that relate the broader trend of 
self-management  to  the  late  twentieth  century  reform  of  politics,          
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government and the welfare state. First, there is what I term the ‘liberal’ 
account  of  these  reforms,  whereby s e l f -management  signals  a  move 
towards a freer and more empowered citizenry through the unwinding of 
the welfare state and its regulation. Here self-management is a part of a 
meta-narrative of increasing personal autonomy. Second, there are ‘critical’ 
accounts which construe self-management in an idealist form, attributing to 
it the value of individual empowerment and political self-determination. 
Third, there is an alternative critical sociological explanation in which self-
managing  reforms  are  generated  from  welfare  state  restructure  and  the 
crisis of its legitimacy.  
  This chapter outlines what I perceive to be the limitations of these 
conceptualisations  of  the  political  and  governmental  dimension  of  this 
reform. My goal is to come to grips with a more fine-grained understanding 
of the political and governmental dimensions underpinning the emergence 
of school autonomy and self-management. In the chapter that follows, I 
finalise  these  insights  by  outlining  my  methodological  approach  to  the 
analysis of school autonomy and self-management, which draws from the 
conceptual and historical insights of Foucauldian studies of government.  
 
Freedom from the state 
 
Self-managing reform has been described in the language of ‘freedom and 
empowerment’. This idiom is used in public choice theorists’ analyses of 
the provision of public goods and services (Buchanan and Wagner 1977), 
in  business  management  texts  on  the  organisation  of  private  enterprise          
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(Peters  1992;  Peters  and  Waterman  1982),  in  management  analyses  of 
public  administration  (Osborne  and  Gaebler  1993),  and  in  education 
management  texts  (Caldwell  and  Spinks  1988,  1992;  Hargreaves  and 
Hopkins  1991;  Schmuck  1984).  In  these  accounts  central  bureaucracies 
represent oppressive institutions constraining the freedom of individuals to 
make and act upon personal decisions, while self-managing, quasi-market 
reforms  promise  to  empower  those  working  in  the  public  sector  by 
removing  bureaucracy’s  constraints  on  individual  and  organisational 
freedom.  
  The  goal  associated  with  this  discourse  of  ‘freedom’  and 
‘empowerment’ was not limited to un-encumbering public bureaucracies 
and schools from the structural and administrative constraints imposed on 
individual enterprise. As broadly mentioned in the previous chapter, many 
market  advocates,  politicians,  political  and  social  commentators,  and 
education  management  writers  perceived  that  reform  of  centralised 
bureaucracies and providers of public goods and services needed to also 
address the ‘villainous’ (Pollitt 1993) sectional political and professional 
interests  of  the  bureaucratic  officials  and  trade  unions  deeply  rooted  in 
these organisations (Beare 1990; Beare et al. 1989; Chubb and Moe 1990; 
Down 1968; Niskanen 1971; Niskanen 1973; Ostrom 1973). As they saw it, 
these  ‘bureaucratic  enclosures’  were  riven  with  entrenched  structures  of 
power through which individuals and groups pursued their self-interest at 
the expense, not only of the excellence of organisations, but also, and just 
as importantly, of the interests of the nation and its citizens.           
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  The  language  of  freedom  and  empowerment,  therefore,  also 
reflected  deep-seated  concerns  about  how  the  authority  of  the  public 
services was being exercised and the effects of this on the freedom and 
rights of citizens. While the concern for individual freedom and the state’s 
exercise of authority constitutes a feature of the broader debates around 
bureaucracy and education in Australia throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
(Howard 2005; Kenway 1990; Preston 1994), they dominated education 
policy  during  the  Howard  government’s  reign  from  1996  to  2007.  For 
example, former Federal Education Minister, David Kemp, styled himself 
as a champion for the rights and freedoms of citizens against the ‘provider 
capture’ of public education and the interests ensconced therein: 
   
The sad voices of the opponents of choice desperately attempting to 
defend the rigid centralised systems inherited from the 19
th century 
are more and more out of tune with the times and with what we now 
understand  about  the  dynamics  of  a  democratic  system….  The 
nature of the defenders of educational monopolies – principally the 
union leaders whose power rests on centralised industrial relations 
processes – reveals that it is a narrow sectoral self-interest which is 
the  principal  opponent  of  a  more  democratic  society  based  on 
empowerment  through  choice.  The  centralised  systems  have 
perpetuated  the  alienation  of  disadvantaged  parents  and  the 
educational disadvantages of their children. (Kemp 1997) 
 
Two years later he commented: 
 
The  centralised  welfare  state  based  on  bureaucratic  provision  of 
services has now been recognised in many countries as not merely 
an  inefficient  and  wasteful  way  of  providing  for  those  who  need 
assistance, but arranged around incentives where service to the client          
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was often the lowest of priorities. Too often this welfare state was 
disempowering and alienating in its scale and remoteness from the 
ordinary person. (Kemp 1999b) 
 
  While  Kemp’s  concern  is  obviously  with  how  bureaucracy 
constrains the activities of teachers, public servants or parents, his concern 
extends beyond this. He construes education policy as a field where the 
very principles of liberal democratic society are in contest. He argues, for 
instance, that in their defence of a non-market driven system of education 
the established interests of those within the field of education frustrate the 
empowerment  of  ‘ordinary’  citizens.  In  this  policy  contest,  Kemp 
unambiguously portrays the teachers’ unions as self-interested ‘defenders 
of  educational  monopolies’  opposed  to  democracy,  and  he  positions  his 
government on the side of defending the ‘democratic system’, ‘democratic 
society’ and the ‘empowerment’ of citizens.  
  Kemp  was  not  alone  in  characterising  the  field  of  contemporary 
education in this way. Former Federal Education Minister, Julie Bishop, 
feared  for  the  “social  engineers  working  away  in  state  government 
education  bureaucracies…  Ideologues  who  have  hijacked  school 
curriculum and are experimenting with the education of our young people 
from  a  comfortable  position  of  unaccountability,  safe  within  education 
bureaucracies” (Bishop 2006). If only, it was reasoned, schooling could be 
returned  to  the  citizens  that  it  was  meant  to  serve.  This  was  also  the 
reasoning behind former Prime Minister John Howard’s observation that 
there  was  a  “frustrated  mainstream  in  Australia  which  sees  government 
decisions  increasingly  driven  by  the  noisy,  self-interested  clamour  of          
  47 
powerful  vested  interests  with  scant  regard  for  the  national  interest…” 
(Howard 1995).  
  In this clamour of criticism, these politicians targeted the welfare 
state, its bureaucratisation, and the interests purportedly vested within it. In 
this  battle,  they  perceived  that  there  was  something  fundamentally 
principled at stake in the bureaucratic organisation of education systems, 
specifically,  individual  liberty.  Hence,  when  former  Federal  Education 
Minister, B rendan  Nelson,  declared  that  freedom  of  choice  within 
education markets was a “fundamental democratic right” (Nelson 2004a), 
he  sought  to  reconcile  social  organisation  (specifically  education)  with 
what he perceived to be the liberal foundations and principles of Western 
civilisation.  It  is  in  this  vein  of  thought  that  John  Howard  unabashedly 
remarked that the goal of his government’s education policies was “to free 
the individual” (Howard 2005).  
  Believing in the moral righteousness of individual freedom and the 
need to restore freedom as a principle of social organisation so as to secure 
the  vitality  of  liberal  democracy,  how  was  freedom  to  be  restored  and 
therefore the individual empowered? 
 
Freedom and self-managing reform 
 
For  those  thinking  and  behaving  within  this  discourse  of  liberal 
empowerment,  organisational  autonomy,  decentralisation,  markets  and 
individual  choice  were  bulwarks  of  the  regulatory  welfare  state  and  its 
bureaucratic power. Conceiving freedom to be the capacity to make choices          
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within a market setting relatively free from the constraints of the state and 
bureaucratic  power,  re-organising  the  public  sector  around  markets  and 
fostering  the  autonomy  of  public  organisations  promised  to  restore 
individual freedoms.  
  Rather  than  concentrating  power  in  particular  sites,  such  as 
bureaucracies,  and  with  particular  people,  such  as  bureaucrats,  markets 
would  disperse  power  across  the  state.  Through  the  mechanisms  of 
consumer choice, markets would enable public organisations like schools to 
be disciplined by the ‘free’ choices of individuals rather than by ‘established 
interests’. Professional, bureaucratic and union groups would be less able to 
exercise a monopoly over the decision-making of individuals or constrain 
the  autonomous  actions  of  individuals,  the  expression  of  individual 
preferences, or their self-determination (Beare et al. 1989; Chubb and Moe 
1990). For the former Prime Minister, John Howard, this amounted to re-
organising  the  public  sector  around  the  ‘great  liberal  principles’  of 
incentive, choice and self-reliance (Howard 2001), sentiments that market 
advocates like Chubb and Moe would undoubtedly agree with. 
For those working within the public sector, self-management and its 
techniques promised to remove the constraints on managers imposed by its 
entrenched bureau-professional organisation. Government departments and 
agencies would be encouraged, if not forced, to develop their own mission 
statements  and  objectives,  making  budgetary  decisions  and  generally 
managing their performance (Davis et al. 1989; Weller and Lewis 1989). 
Freedom here was associated with enabling public organisations and those          
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within them to determine their collective destiny in the same way as an 
individual would shape his or her own life.  
  Self-management  also  promised  to  liberate  schools  and  citizens. 
The  creation  of  a  market  of  educational  providers  promised  to  restore 
power to individual citizens for the education of their education, and end 
what  some  construed  as  the  socialisation  of  educational  objectives.  For 
example, market advocates, Chubb and Moe (1990), write:  
 
Effective  authority  within  market  settings,  then,  is  radically 
decentralized. In private sector education, the people who run each 
school decide what they will teach, how they will teach it, who will 
do the teaching, how much to charge for their services, and virtually 
everything else about how education will be organized and supplied. 
Students and parents assess the offerings, reputations, and costs of 
the  various  schools  and  make  their  own  choices  about  which  to 
attend. No one makes decisions for society. All participants make 
decisions for themselves. (Chubb and Moe 1990, 29) 
 
  While on the one hand schools would be disciplined by the choices 
of empowered parents choosing which schools their children are going to 
attend, on the other hand, greater school autonomy would empower school 
leaders. Like their management counterparts in the public sector, principals 
are to be accorded managerial decision-making authority for such things as 
staff recruitment, day-to-day management, school publicity, and budgeting. 
‘Freedom to manage’, as it has been described, promised to free principals 
from the constraints and influence of bureaucrats, professionals, unions and 
experts. Understanding self-management in terms of freedom has led some 
to  claim,  “management  arrangements  are  what  empower  people.          
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Empowerment, in short, is the purpose of management” (Hargreaves and 
Hopkins 1991, 15).  
  Resembling  Fukuyama’s  (1989)  infamous  characterisation  of 
Western society’s irresistible progression towards individual freedom and 
market liberalism, in these descriptions freedom and empowerment are the 
motors of the reform of the welfare state and the goal of self-management, 
and their ultimate ethical justification. These are the principles according to 
which liberal democratic societies are to be organised. How satisfactory is 
it, however, to explain this reform as a progression towards a society free 
from bureaucratic, sectarian and excessive governmental power? Can we 
use this rhetoric of freedom as a way to legitimately understand the basis 
and nature of reform of the public sector and education systems?  
 
Freeing the liberal subject? 
 
The  rhetoric  of  freedom  used  by  the  above  self-managing  reform 
proponents represents a ‘mode of intelligibility’ that Hindess (1987a; also 
Hunter 1994; Meredyth 1994) characterises as ‘principled’. In this mode of 
perception, society and governmental programs are to be, or are expected to 
be, organised around a priori moral philosophical principles drawn from 
canonical liberal political and philosophical doctrines. For liberals, freedom 
is one of those immutable absolutes, and the market is the form of that 
principle.  Accordingly,  government  activity  and  policy  must  be  an 
expression of freedom through the market form.          
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  With freedom (and the market) constituting the overriding principle 
for social and political organisation, government is to be put to the service 
of  freedom.  Hence  the  above  commentary  and  analyses  construe  the 
problem with the welfare state and its bureaucracy as one of organising 
social and political life around state power rather than individual freedom 
and  the  market.  Neo-liberal  thinkers  and  politicians  perceived  these 
interventions  into  the  civil  and  economic  spheres  of  life  as  a  threat  to 
individual  liberty.  In  contrast,  securing  the  organisation  of  social  and 
political  life  according  to  the  principle  of  freedom  required  the  state  to 
divest itself of the civil and economic spheres of life by circumscribing its 
activities to securing the ‘natural order’ of these realms, in this case by 
instituting the market, and maintaining the state’s legal and constitutional 
infrastructure.  
  However,  this  perspective  problematically  essentialises  both  the 
market and the state. That is, both are seen to have “an essence or inner 
principle that produces necessary effects simply by virtue of its presence” 
(Hindess 1987a, 8). In this case, the market is an index of freedom whilst 
the state and its planning is an index of control. Markets are seen to denote 
progress towards freedom whilst the welfare state and its planning modus 
operandi  signal  a  dominating  power  essentially  incompatible  with  the 
exercise of personal liberty enabled by the market. While this essentialised 
and dichotomous conceptual premise enables the pursuit and assessment of 
social and policy developments in terms of freedom, or the “actualisations 
of economic or political theories” (Meredyth 1994, 181), it fails to grasp 
the  conditions  and  complexity  of  government  (Hindess  1987a).  In          
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particular, freedom and government are not binary opposites but mutually 
constitutive in so far as the rationalities and practices of the governmental 
state form free citizens (Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008; Rose 1999b). 
  For example, in liberal democracies, the freedom of individuals is 
dependent  upon  individual  self-government  and  this  is  made  possible 
through the civilising apparatuses associated with liberal state formation 
(Burchell  1996;  Hunter  1988;  Hunter  1994).  The  disciplinary  and 
governmental  technologies  associated  with  the  exercise  of  state  power, 
such  as  schooling,  social  work  and  health  institutions,  provide  the 
“practices  of  governmental  self-formation”  (Dean  1995,  563).  Through 
these  practices,  norms  of  behaviour  and  thought  are  enfolded  into  the 
individual’s being, and the attributes and capacities of the rational, self-
determining  and  autonomous  individual  are  formed.  Here,  the  ‘free 
individual acting in the market place’ is a product of enrolling individuals 
in governmental technologies that do not seek to crush their freedom and 
autonomy, but instead shape it. The market, for instance, operates optimally 
not when individuals are ‘free’, but when they think and act in ‘market-
oriented’ ways.  
   This  important  link  between  government  and  freedom  and  its 
exercise in the market is blurred in neo-liberal perspectives that invoke a 
rhetoric of freedom and empowerment (from the state and government) in 
their descriptions of self-managing reform (Kemp 1999a; Nelson 2004b). 
Because  it  is c aught  up  in  the  essentialist  dialectic  of  freedom  and 
government,  where  freedom  is  the  over-riding  rationality  of  reform, 
anchoring the analysis of self-management to this point of view fails to          
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acknowledge that self-managing reform (including decentralisation, freeing 
schools to compete in a market place of providers and therefore providing 
parents with choice of schools), rather than signalling freedom through the 
diminution  of  the  state  and  government,  is  evidence  of  governmental 
power,  its  reconfiguration  and i t s   extension.  In  other  words,  while  neo-
liberals  may  justify  self-managing  reform  with  the  rhetoric  that  it 
empowers  individuals  and  restores  individual  freedom,  this  rhetoric  and 
claim does not constitute an adequate basis for us to understand what self-
managing reform actually is. 
  Take,  for  example,  the  characterisation  of  the  marketisation  of 
schools  and  the  performance  management  regimes  of  testing  and  the 
publications  of  results  that  have  accompanied  self-management 
(Buckingham  2008).  While  marketisation  and  performance  management 
regimes may be lauded for giving freedom of choice of school for parents, 
these  regimes  actually  cultivate  in  citizens  certain  forms  of  calculation 
related  to  exercising  one’s  freedom  in  the  education  marketplace.  In  a 
context in which parents can no longer expect the state to choose which 
schools their children will attend, parents are to think about their children’s 
education in terms of choosing the most suitable provider of educational 
goods and services. This choice is to be informed not by parental intuition 
or community gossip but through assessing the performance data of schools 
in respect to key indicators, such as exam results and rates of graduation. 
Therefore, far from returning to individuals the possibility of making free, 
rational  choices  free  from  the  state,  bureaucracy  or  other  constraining 
relations of power (Lauder 1991), these markets and market mechanisms          
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install certain ways of reasoning how one will exercise free choice (Besley 
and Peters 2007; Smith 1993).  
  Put  simply,  freedom  is  being  re-shaped  around  governmental 
imperatives rather than being retrieved in some un-distilled form. So, while 
John  Howard  claimed  his  government’s  policies  attempted  to  ‘free  the 
individual’,  his  policies  for  greater  freedom  involved  an  assemblage  of 
regulatory  techniques  for  guiding  the  individual  in  making  certain  free 
rational  calculations  and  decisions.  These  regulatory  techniques  actually 
give rise to the autonomous, rationally calculating and self-governing self 
that is assumed to be a priori (Hindess 1996b). 
  We should, therefore, approach with scepticism the belief that the 
proliferation  of  choice,  markets,  devolution  and  self-management  are 
generated from a kind of evolutionary logic of human freedom and self-
government. The ‘neo-evangelical’ claims (Derrida 1994) that such reforms 
to  contemporary  liberal  democracy  signal  not  only  the  restoration  of 
individual  liberty  but  also  the  indomitable  power  of  freedom  and 
empowerment  in  shaping  social  organisation  and  social  and  historical 
developments  (Fukuyama  1989)  should  be  taken  with  a  bucket  of  salt
3. 
                                                 
3 I describe his notion of ‘the end of history’ as infamous because as Derrida 
writes: “For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-
evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized 
itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, 
famine,  and  thus  economic  oppression  affected  as  many  human  beings  in  the 
history of the earth and of humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of 
liberal  democracy  and  of  the  capitalist  market  in  the  euphoria  of  the  end  of 
history, instead of celebrating the ‘end of ideologies’ and the end of the great 
emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made 
up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to 
ignore  that  never  before,  in  absolute  figures,  have  so  many  men,  women  and 
children been subjugated, starved or exterminated on the earth” Derrida, J. (1994).          
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Education  policy  cannot  return  society  to  a  pre-social  and  pre-political 
reality free from relations of power and out of which individual freedom 
will  be  restored  because  freedom  is  conditional  on  the  exercise  of 
governmental power and the objective of government is not reducible to the 
principle of freedom.  
 
Is empowerment ‘de-governmentalisation’? 
 
A  similar  rendering  of  reform  is  evident  in  some  accounts  of  social 
progressives. These too have represented self-managing reforms in terms of 
freedom,  empowerment  and  autonomy,  which  suggests  a  ‘de-
governmentalisation’  of  the  educational  arena.  Rather  than  reject  this 
language outright as obfuscation, mystification or myopic, I want to wrest 
this  discourse  of  freedom,  empowerment  and  autonomy  from  its 
‘principled’ use and to instead locate it firmly in relation to the realm of the 
government of the state and its people. Let me elaborate. 
  Some  critics  have  keenly  described  devolution,  school  autonomy 
and self-management in the language of freedom and empowerment. For 
Rizvi (1994), the ‘devolutionary thrust’ in the Schools in Australia (Karmel 
1973)  report  and  the  subsequent  reports  of  the  Commonwealth  Schools 
Commission  (1975,  1976,  1978)  represents  attempts  at  creating  an 
empowering autonomy for schools, teachers and communities in the face of 
bureaucratic instrumentalism. He reasons: 
 
                                                                                                                          
Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 
international, New York: Routledge.          
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the loss of a sense of community in modern society which had led to 
increased alienation and disaffection, a sense of powerlessness in the 
face of organizations that had become too large, too complex and 
altogether too remote from the cultural meaning by which humans 
live… devolution and self-management are central mechanisms for 
releasing a ‘tremendous reservoir of social energy, now locked in 
resentments  of  bureaucratic  and  hierarchical  organization’.  (Rizvi 
1994, 1) 
 
Rizvi  evokes  an  image  of  a  monolithic  bureaucracy,  a  fear  of  popular 
alienation and powerlessness, and a conviction that reforming bureaucracy 
will  produce  community  empowerment.  Large  bureaucratic  education 
systems  were  perceived  to  be  oriented  to  control  and  means-ends 
rationality, frustrating authentic self-determination. Rizvi concludes that in 
diminishing the power of these constraints devolution and self-management 
supports the empowerment of citizens, particularly for the working class 
and disadvantaged (see also Lingard et al. 2000). With a similar sentiment, 
Dudley  and  Vidovich  (1995)  reflect  on  the  advocacy  for  devolution, 
decentralisation and school autonomy in the reports of the Commonwealth 
Schools Commission:  
 
in spite of its contradictions and inconsistencies, the ideology of the 
Schools Commission as espoused in these early reports did have a 
coherent  focus  which  could  best  be  described  as  the  democratic 
empowerment of the individual. (Dudley and Vidovich 1995, 117)  
   
  This  kind  of  description  resonates  with  the  abovementioned 
politicians  and  experts  of  management  who  proclaim  that  the  de-
bureaucratisation of education systems removes constraints on individual          
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activity  and  decision-making  imposed  by  an  over-bearing  state  and 
government. In limiting the power and monopoly exercised over choice by 
political authorities, unions, professionals and the state, devolution, school 
autonomy  and  self-management  are  said  to  empower  individuals  by 
increasing their exercise of personal freedom (Beare et al. 1989; Caldwell 
and  Spinks  1988;  Chubb  and  Moe  1990).  Here,  self-managing  reforms 
through  the  ‘logic  of  empowerment’  resemble  a  move  towards  a  more 
liberal state and less government.  
  Anyone conversant with the topic of self-management might object 
to this comparison between education management theorists and critics by 
claiming that they represent two very different perspectives. And this is 
true  to  an  extent.  While  the  former  construed  managerial  and  market 
strategies and practices as concomitant to de-regulation, self-determination, 
self-reliance  and  therefore  empowerment,  critics  such  as  Dudley  and 
Vidovich (1995), Rizvi (1994) and Lingard et al. (2000) have been critical 
of, if not hostile towards, their use. Management and markets represented 
the corruption of the democratic empowerment essential to devolution and 
self-management  by  individualistic,  economistic  and  instrumentalist 
rationalities. These rationalities and practices, it was argued, produce: 
 
an institutional culture in which ends are separated from means and 
where  people  are  valued  only  for  what  they  produce…  the 
importation  into  education  of  instrumentalist  values,  grounded  on 
such  motives  as  the  self-interest  of  the  individual.  (Olssen  et  al. 
2004, 191-192)  
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  However, despite this difference the belief of critics that devolution 
and self-management can be empowering reinforces their similarities with 
the  above  proponents  of  managerialist  approaches  to  self-management. 
Both  assume  that  devolution,  self-management  and  school  autonomy 
constitute  a  desirable  form  of  social  organisation  that  possesses  the 
potential to create individual and community freedom and empowerment, 
where  freedom  and  empowerment  are  understood  essentially  and 
philosophically. Rizvi writes, for example, that “devolution is not simply a 
decision-making system; rather, it is a moral principle for organising social 
life, essential for securing human dignity and freedom” (Rizvi 1994, 2). 
The argument he presents is that devolution is the organisational principle 
for  freeing  and  empowering  individuals,  communities  and  schools  from 
bureaucracy’s  iron  cage  of  excessive  and  restrictive  constraints  on 
individual  and  community  authentic  self-determination.  It  promises  an 
empowered, democratic and free society. 
  These critics’ account, therefore, are beset by a similar limitation to 
that  of  the  liberals’  account  just  described.  When  liberal  or  progressive 
accounts describe devolution as a ‘moral principle’ for securing freedom 
rather than, say, a governmental program or technology for ‘conducting’ 
people,  their  analysis  tends  to  operate  at  the  level  of  abstraction  and 
philosophy. While abstraction is not problematic in itself, we must exercise 
caution when assuming that this mode of analysis can describe the actual 
decision-making that occurs in the field of public policy (Burchell 1994; 
Hindess 1987a; Meredyth 1994). Its method of deriving principles such as 
freedom, emancipation and self-determining personhood from theoretical          
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abstraction risks a “contemplative bracketing of the actual ‘governmental’ 
organization of the school” (Hunter 1994, 29).  
  In  other  words,  for  critics,  the  problem  of  educational 
administration is frequently understood as a broadly philosophical problem 
(Hunter 1994; Meredyth 1994). For example, for Rizvi the administration 
of  education  is  expected  to  be  reconciled  with  the  achievement  of 
democracy and our “highest moral principles of justice and equality” (Rizvi 
1994, 2). Drawing upon Marxist theorist, Raymond Williams, Rizvi casts 
devolution  as  a  principle  of  organisation  reconciled  with  the  theoretical 
domain of Marxism. That is, devolution and self-management are a means 
to  authentically  empower  people  from  government,  bureaucracy  and 
economic exploitation. The problem here is that Rizvi reduces the domains 
of government and its technologies of administration to abstract principles 
and  their  realisation.  He  indexes  the  organisation  of  education  to  the 
achievement  of  an  historical  mission  of  individual  freedom,  moral  self-
development and self-determination. In so doing, his analysis privileges the 
abstracted principles derived from Marxism and liberalism whilst ignoring 
the actual historical formation and discursive practices of the educational 
arena.  
  In  summary,  then,  self-management,  freedom,  emancipation  and 
empowerment do not signal the achievement of a principled freedom or the 
restoration of an autonomous subjectivity. The fact is that they are invoked 
in  governmental  programmes  and  strategies  aimed  at  administering 
individuals in relation to problems that confront education systems and the 
prosperity  and  wellbeing  of  the  state,  economy  and  population.  The          
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language  of  ‘freedom’,  ‘autonomy’  and  ‘empowerment’  are,  to  use  the 
language of Dean, “inserted into a system of purposes” (Dean 1999, 169) 
that aim to shape individual conduct in response to determined problems 
(Baistow 2000; Cruikshank 1999). In other words, rather than indicating an 
absence  of  government,  their  employment  in  political  reasoning  and 
programmes of government suggest that they to operate as ‘solutions’ to the 
perceived problems of state power, government over-reach and regulatory 
excess.  In  other  words,  self-managing  reforms  constitute  government 
through empowerment and autonomy.  
 
The crisis of legitimacy 
 
The final explanation of the link between politics, government and self-
managing reforms that I want to canvass comes from those who link self-
managing  reforms  in  education  to  a  crisis  of  the  welfare  state  and  the 
subsequent need for its restructure (Dale 1989; Gewirtz 2002; Hall 1998; 
Whitty et al. 1998). Derived from a Gramscian and a Habermasian line of 
thought, this explanation of reform may be termed the legitimacy thesis.  
Prevalent in the critical accounts of reform in the United Kingdom, 
this thesis begins with the idea that between the end of World War Two and 
the  1970s  there  emerged  an  agreed  form  of  political  and  governmental 
organisation: the welfare state (Clarke and Newman 1997). This welfare 
state was based upon a settlement or compromise between capitalists and 
socialists,  the  Left  and  Right,  and  labour  and  capital  (Offe  1984).  The 
consensus  included  limiting  the  role  and  size  of  the  capitalist  market,          
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combating  the  anti-social  elements  in  the  capitalist  market  economy 
(Hindess 1987a), and fostering government’s protection of the wellbeing of 
all through the expansion of welfare programmes and activities designed to 
protect  the  welfare  and  the  social,  civil  and  political  rights  of  citizens 
(Marshall 1964). This included the provision of comprehensive schooling, 
universal health care and social security programs and payments.  
Being  a  settlement  between  different  interests,  the  welfare  state 
rested on contradictory, tenuous and unstable foundations. This was the 
condition for cracks in the consensus slowly appearing in the late 1960s 
and 1970s under the weight of a global economic downturn, a tightening of 
private capital investment, rising unemployment, a shrinking youth labour 
market and the counter-culture movement (Offe 1984). The legitimacy of 
the welfare state was subjected to scrutiny. Continued disparities between 
social  groups  in  the  distribution  of  resources  and  social,  health  and 
educational  outcomes  were  used  as  evidence  by  liberals,  social 
progressives, the New Right and conservatives alike of the failures of the 
welfare state, its expansive bureaucracy, and its welfare programs (Dean 
1999).  
  According to these accounts of crisis, this ‘legitimation crisis’ of the 
state in the 1970s was constituted by the following three crises (Ball 1990; 
Dale 1989; Dudley and Vidovich 1995; Gewirtz 2002). First, there was a 
fiscal crisis of the state, which pertained to securing the accumulation of 
capital  and  economic  growth  under  the  weight  of  global  economic 
recession. Second, there was a crisis of legitimacy of the state on account of 
the  scepticism  about  the  efficacy  of  welfare  and  the  achievement  of          
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equality,  for  instance,  through  compensatory  and  redistributive  policies. 
Third, and related to both of these, was a crisis of social control, with 
doubts over the ability of the state to secure the welfare of the population 
leading to civil unrest and disputes between industry and workers. 
  With the capitalist welfare state coming under siege, securing the 
consent and obedience of the population was necessary to avoid bringing 
instability  to  the  entire  governmental  system.  This  ‘problematic  of 
legitimacy’ was fertile territory for the political ideologies and social values 
of  conservatives,  the  New  Right  and  neoliberals  to  take  root  and 
territorialise  the  social,  political  and  economic  landscape  (Dudley  and 
Vidovich 1995; Smyth 1995). Moreover, the capitalist state, keen to avert 
questioning of its legitimacy and hence the disobedience of its citizens, 
sought  to  install  more  efficient  and  economic  methods  for  generating 
economic growth and regulating citizens.  
  The ensuing reforms resemble those I have termed self-managing 
reforms.  These  included  the  reduction  in  the  size  of  the  public  sector, 
reform  to  public  sector  organisation  through  managerialism  and 
commercialisation, the privatisation of public sector agencies and entities, 
the  atrophy  of  the  power  of  unions,  the  creation  of  quasi-markets  and 
competitive mechanisms in the delivery of public goods and services, and 
the  reduction  in  corporate  taxes  in  order  to  stimulate  private  capital 
investment.  These  reforms  averted  the  crisis  of  capital  accumulation  by 
supporting public sector efficiencies and fostering private sector models of 
action, private investment and, consequently, wealth creation.           
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  The market and managerial reform of the public sector would also 
perform  a  hegemonic  function.  As m arkets  depoliticised  economic  and 
social matters, because the market is seen as a blindly neutral means for 
distributing resources based upon personal attributes such as enterprise and 
self-reliance, social and economic disparities were attributable to individual 
conduct rather than contestable structural inequalities (Apple 2005; Whitty 
et al. 1998). As well, by enrolling individuals into market-based activity 
and  consequently  tying  people’s  personal  ideology  and  conduct  to  the 
capitalist hegemonic order and its goals, markets countered the potentially 
explosive effects of growing cynicism regarding capitalism and the welfare 
state  (Gewirtz  2002;  Whitty  et  al.  1998).  Moreover,  markets,  although 
described in the language of empowerment, freedom and autonomy, were a 
means for disciplining individuals for efficient conduct modelled on private 
enterprise (Pollitt 1993).  
This  perspective,  therefore,  attributes  self-managing  reforms 
encompassing the use of markets and management to the crisis of the state 
and its legitimacy. These reforms promised to strengthen the welfare state’s 
popular  legitimacy  by  disciplining  individual  conduct  around  economic 
imperatives,  and  thereby  diverting  people’s  criticism  of  its  capitalist 
functions and its ineffectiveness in guaranteeing social equality.  
 
A welcomed or regrettable reform? 
 
Critics and proponents of self-managing reforms would largely agree with 
many empirical descriptions of changes to the welfare state occurring from          
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the  time  of  the  crisis  in  1970s.  This  would  include  the  move  towards 
decentralised forms of authority and organisation, the reconfiguration of the 
centralist regulation of educational activity, the use of quasi-markets and 
market mechanisms, the exercise of restraint by governments and political 
authorities  in  acting  in  ways  that  may  distort  the  market,  and  the 
undermining of the legitimacy and influence of bureaucrats, professional 
groups and unions (Lingard, Knight, and Porter 1993; Marginson 1997a; 
Olssen, Codd, and O'Neill 2004). Despite this agreement, the perspective 
drawn from the ‘legitimacy thesis’ takes a more critical position on the 
intent and effects of self-managing and welfare state reform that liberals 
would care to embrace. 
Liberals, such as those affiliated with the New Right, regard self-
managing reforms positively because these reconcile political and social 
organisation  with  the  supposed  liberal  fundamentals  of  Western 
civilisation. That is, in reducing the power and influence of the state and 
government  over  the  civil  and  economic  spheres  of  life,  these  reforms 
strengthened  the  private  sphere  including  individual  freedom,  personal 
responsibility  and  self-reliance.  The  individual  and  his  or  her  freedoms 
were restored as the ontological precept of social and economic activity, 
and  a  more  efficient,  just  and  democratic  means  for  distributing  scarce 
resources was offered to the modern liberal state. Even those affiliated with 
the  Left,  such  as  the  Australian  Labor  Party  (ALP),  welcomed  these 
reforms: markets, many with the ALP argued, offered individuals freedom 
while  also  being  an  efficient  means  for  distributing  scarce  resources 
(Marginson 1993; Marginson 1997a; Marginson 1997b).          
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  In contrast to liberals, critical sociologists perceive the intent and 
effects of such reforms rather negatively. In the eyes of many critics, the 
increasing use of markets represented a means for “defeating socialism” 
(Leys 2001, 12). Conceiving the welfare state as a “little island of socialism 
created  by  the  working  class  in  the  sea  of  capitalist  society”  (Hindess 
1987a,  100-101),  and  essentialising  the  market  as  rapacious  and 
exploitative,  many  critics  have  expressed  concern  that  individual  self-
interest  had  become  a  privileged  organising  principle  of  governmental 
activity  at  the  expense  of  educational,  social  and  moral  principles  (Ball 
1998; Gewirtz, Ball, and Bowe 1995; Gewirtz 2002; Olssen, Codd, and 
O'Neill  2004).  Reinforcing  the  status  quo  and  serving  the  power  and 
interests  of  society’s  most  privileged,  both  marketisation  and 
managerialisation  threatened  social  democratic  values  (such  as  the 
protection of citizenship rights and a commitment to social equality) and 
democratic practices (such as democratic decision-making in organisations 
and stakeholder negotiation in policy formulation).  
  For Gewirtz (2002), self-managing reforms, paradoxically, are the 
foundations  for  another  looming  crisis  of  legitimacy  for  the  state  and 
capitalism. She anticipates that social instability, fragmentation and conflict 
will result from the welfare state being hollowed out and its role reduced to 
driving efficiencies and supporting economic competitiveness. For Gewirtz, 
this crisis can be averted only if those individuals with a social democratic 
and welfarist ideology once again control the state. 
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Distinguishing between sovereign power  
and governmental power 
 
Those  working  with  the  crisis  of  legitimacy  perspective  have  made 
important  contributions  to  the  self-managing  reform  debates.  As  I 
mentioned, such research has linked self-managing reforms to the reform of 
the  welfare  state,  and  they  have  identified  many  of  the  knowledges, 
techniques and practices that have made this reform possible. However, I 
believe new insights about these reforms can be gleaned by approaching 
this period from a different perspective. Specifically, while I agree that self-
managing reforms are related to a crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, evident in 
industrial conflict, global recession, reform of the public sector, and fiscal 
restraint  on  government  and  attacks  on  state  power  in  the  name  of 
individual empowerment, I want to approach this as another type of crisis, 
not necessarily one of legitimation. This begs the question, then, what kind 
of crisis was it? And why did it precipitate self-managing reforms?  
  From the perspective of a Foucauldian “analytics of government” 
(Dean  1999,  18),  the  form  of  political  analysis  associated  with  the 
‘legitimation crisis perspective’ runs the risk of conflating government with 
the sovereign state. Let us consider this conflation in more detail.  
  In his later genealogies of the liberal state and government, Foucault 
cast doubt on a form of political analysis that centred on state power. He 
made a remark oft repeated in Foucauldian studies of government that we 
had  yet  to  “cut  off  the  king’s  head”  (Foucault  1998,  89).  This i s  a  
fascinating turn of phrase to say the least. Foucault’s imputation was that 
modern  political  theory  continued  to  use  political  concepts  of  earlier          
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centuries  to  describe  the  exercise  of  political  power  in  the  twentieth 
century.  
The problem with this kind of analysis is that it remains transfixed 
by the notion of a sovereign form of power, usually identified with the 
state. This analysis assumes Hobbes’ (1996) Leviathan image of the state. 
The  state  is  construed  as  a  centre  of  power  with  tentacles  of  control 
sprawled  out  over  the  entire  social  body  of  the  nation,  a  “vertical 
encompassment”  (Ferguson  and  Gupta  2005,  107).  It  is  composed  of 
instrumentalities or institutions invented largely by the state, which enact 
its functions, including its most basic including creating and enforcing laws 
and  rules,  protecting  the  commonwealth,  and  in  Marxian  analysis 
supporting capitalist relations of production. Beyond these functions, the 
state  is  inescapable  and  all-powerful,  shaping  all  social  and  economic 
relations in some way.  
  This  image  of  the  state  produces  a  very  specific  conception  of 
political  power.  It  takes  as  the  principal  rationality  of  politics  and 
government the maintenance of the obedience, legitimation and consent of 
the population, and in turn the maintenance and augmentation of the state’s 
power,  or  the  power  of  those  that  ‘control’  the  state.  Consequently, 
analytical privilege is accorded to a “conception of government as the work 
of a sovereign power that is founded on, and operates through, the consent 
of  its  subjects”  (Hindess  1996a,  131).  This  form  of  political  and  social 
criticism targets the repressive and ‘reproductive’ role of state institutions 
in  securing  consent  or  obedience  through  legislation,  domination, 
subjugation, obfuscation and coercion (for example, Althusser 1971).          
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  This conception of political power is clearly evident in the analysis 
of the crisis of legitimacy. Indeed, use of the word ‘legitimacy’ gestures to 
its  conceptual  lineage  from  the  classical  liberal  political  philosophy  of 
Locke  and  Hobbes  in  which  consent  is  the  function  of  power  (Hindess 
1996a). In its contemporary deployment, the 1970s is described as a crisis 
of  legitimacy  because  the  people’s  consent  to  the  exercise  of  sovereign 
power  was  questioned:  did  the  state  have  the  legitimacy  to  exercise  its 
political  power?  Did  those  in  power  have  the  consent  of  the  people  to 
control the state? How could the obedience and consent of the people and 
hence the power of the state, its instrumentalities and those in control be 
secured?  
  This form of reasoning political and governmental power is possible 
because government is conceived as the sovereign state securing consent 
and legitimacy, often in the interests of “an impure sovereignty residing 
elsewhere: in the prince, the old ruling elite or the new capitalist classes” 
(Hunter 1994, xviii-xix). However, because governing merely serves the 
interest of preserving and extending the legitimacy, strength and force of 
the  state,  state  sovereignty  and  the  exercise  of  governmental  power  are 
problematically conflated. In separating state sovereignty from government, 
Foucault (Foucault 1998; Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008) illuminated how 
the  practical  problems  of  governing  related  to  the  population  and  the 
processes, phenomena and institutions proper to it, shape the concerns of 
the  political  sphere  and  the  state  beyond  the  question  of  legitimacy. 
Moreover, the state was not a magical ‘source of power’ inasmuch as “the 
state only rules through specific instruments of government” (Hunter 1994,          
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xix).  According to Foucauldian studies, and I expand upon this in the 
following chapter, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries government 
gained autonomy from the problems of sovereignty (Hindess 1997). This 
meant that the administration of the state increasingly became concerned 
with governing the population and its social and economic activity for the 
purpose of optimising its health, wealth, tranquillity and wellbeing. The 
exercise of sovereign power based on rulers issuing edicts for securing the 
citizens’ obedience and the state’s territory, power and legitimacy made 
way for rationalising the exercise of political power governmentally. The 
pre-eminent  political  concerns  were  now  governing  the  population,  the 
field of social interaction, and the processes of the economy based upon the 
nature and knowledge of these objects of government. 
  By expanding our perspective on the matter of state and political 
power to include this field of government, it is possible to propose that 
securing the state’s legitimacy was not the over-riding concern of policy-
makers and politicians in the 1970s. It is fanciful to imagine, for instance, a 
room full of politicians and policy-makers deliberating on how to secure 
the  state’s  legitimacy  or  the  consent  of  the  people.  I  do  not  deny  the 
existence of specific tactics used to legitimise political and governmental 
decision-making, or to create the appearance of effective and reasonable 
governmental  decision-making  and  action  where  perhaps  there  is  little 
(Zipin  and  Brennan  2009).  Rather,  my  point  is  that  the  rationalities  of 
consent and legitimacy do not exhaust the field of rationalities and concerns 
that traverse the domain of politics and government (Dean 1999; Hindess 
1996a). The political thought of the 1970s and 1980s was concerned with          
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addressing  a  panoply  of  issues  confronting  the  nation,  including  civil 
disorder,  what  probably  appeared  to  be  the  troubling  or  foreboding 
problems of rising unemployment and slowed economic growth, the need 
to  stimulate  economic  activity  while  keeping  inflation  under  control, 
improving  the  efficiency  and  accountability  of  the  public  services, 
addressing the social consequences of the idleness of unemployed youth 
and poverty, and increasing young people’s access to and participation in 
education (Hall 1986).  
  In pointing to these practical problems of government I do not mean 
that  the  analyses  of  the  crisis  of  legitimation  ignore  or  gloss  over  their 
political significance. However, that form of analysis potentially reduces to 
questions of legitimacy, consent and obedience any political deliberations 
on and responses to the raft of problems within the state, such as those 
described  above.  As  with  centuries  in  political  philosophy,  the  crisis  of 
legitimation  analytic  maintains  a  focus  on  analysing  social  and  policy 
developments, such as self-managing reforms in education, in terms of how 
these secure the obedience of the population of rational and autonomously 
willed individuals and the state’s legitimacy.  
  An  alternative  to  this  approach  is  to  move  away  from  deferring 
complex social and policy developments such as self-managing reforms to 
a single logic of legitimacy, as if the object of government was to establish 
the  state’s  legitimacy  and  secure  the  obedience  of  the  population.  By 
treating the political concern for government as a domain linked to but 
relatively  distinct  from  the  question  of  state  sovereignty,  the  doors  are 
thrown  open  to  the  possibility  of  analysing  the  complex  array  of  self-         
  71 
managing  reforms  that  proliferated  from  the  1970s  in  terms  of  (1)  the 
specific problems these reforms responded to, (2) the expertise, knowledge 
and techniques that were brought to bear on these problems, and (3) the 
specific political and governmental ends to which these interventions were 
directed.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the analysis of the relationship between 
politics  and  self-managing  reforms  should  not:  (1)  construe  self-
management  as  aligning  the  organisation  of  social,  political  and 
governmental life with the principle of individual liberty; (2) construe self-
management as authentically empowering individuals and communities in 
their self-determination; or (3) give too much weight to the idea that school 
self-management is a product of a crisis of legitimacy that confronted the 
welfare state in the 1970s.  
  While  these  perspectives  do  provide  insights  into  self-managing 
reform, they also have their limitations. In the first and second instances, 
the question of government is often erased, as if we had moved into a state 
of  individual  liberty,  self-development  and  self-governance.  In  the  third 
case, the state and its relationship to the government of the population are 
frequently  seen  through  the  prism  of  legitimacy,  consent  and  obedience 
and, consequently, the causes for and effects of self-managing reforms are 
reduced to securing its own legitimacy and power.           
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  My  task  in  the  following  chapter  is  to  outline  a  different  set  of 
concepts  for  explaining  the  link  between  self-managing  reforms  and 
politics, and therefore, to offer an alternative approach to the analysis of 
self-management.           
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Chapter 3: History, Theory and Method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I concluded the previous chapter by gesturing towards the limitations of 
placing the state’s legitimacy as the privileged object of political analysis. I 
suggested that this obscures the importance of a separate ‘governmental 
domain’, which I characterised as a realm of political and governmental 
problems  beyond  that  of  consent  and  legitimacy.  It  is  the  task  of  this 
chapter  to  explore  in  greater  detail  how  this  distinction  between  state 
sovereignty  and  government  emerged  and  how  this  opens  the  way  for 
analysing  self-managing  reforms  not  at  the  level  of  state  legitimacy,  or 
‘state restructure’, but as a transformation at the level of, what Foucauldian 
studies  in  government  term,  governmental  rationalities  and  techniques 
(Dean 1999; Rose 1999a). I argue that there are key insights and concepts 
derived from this Foucualdian perspective that are useful for thinking about 
the relationship between self-managing reforms, government and politics.  
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Rethinking the state and government 
 
Foucault’s genealogies and subsequent Foucauldian studies in government 
support the case that the crisis of the 1970s should be analysed not in terms 
of changes in the ‘state form’ occasioned by questions of its legitimacy, but 
in terms of a transformation in the government of the population and the 
processes,  phenomena  and  institutions  proper  to  it.  This  focus  on  the 
transformations within the fields of government and politics has been given 
considerable currency by the increasing scepticism raised about the power 
of ‘the state’ to significantly explain social and political developments and 
here I want to elaborate on what this entails (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 
1991; Dean 1994, 1999; Foucault 1977, 2007, 2008; Rose 1999a, 1999b).  
  As discussed previously, the studies by Foucault and his followers 
into the formation of the modern liberal state cast doubt on the conceptual 
architecture  of  conventional  political  theory  by  disaggregating  the 
sovereign  state  from  government.  By  analytically  beginning  with  “the 
heterogeneous and dispersed microphysics of power” (Jessop 2006, 36), 
these studies identified an important historical development that occurred 
around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe. This was the 
emergence of a distinct mode of exercising power that involved acting upon 
the  social  body  for  the  purposes  of  maximising  the  health,  wealth  and 
tranquillity of a state’s population.  
  This signalled a transformation in the administration of the state 
away from a sovereign mode of administration towards one concerned for          
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governing the population. Administration based on the constitution, law, 
edicts and the use of brute force made space for a mode of regulation of the 
population based upon knowledge of the internal features and processes of 
the  population  and  the  economy.  This  government  of  the  population, 
governmentality, rather than sovereign power and its concerns, became the 
“common  ground  for  all  modern  forms  of  political  thought  and  action” 
(Rose et al. 2006, 86). While one important consequence of illuminating 
this transformation has been the criticism of an analysis of the state and 
political power solely focused on consent, legitimation and obedience, there 
is  another  important  methodological  point  to  be  drawn  from  a  close 
examination of how this transformation occurred. 
  Put  simply,  this  transformation  in  social  administration  is 
irreducible to the thoughts and actions of ‘a state’ or its politicians seeking 
obedience, control and its legitimacy. This might be a conclusion drawn by 
state-control or state-centred analyses (Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies  1981;  Dale  1989;  Gewirtz  2002).  However,  such  a  perspective 
underestimates the influence of a range of actors and entities beyond the 
political  realm  that  composed  the  social  body,  which  included  social 
reformers,  educationalists,  churches,  charities  and  philanthropists. 
Organised  around  a  multiplicity  of  rationalities,  practices  and  activities, 
these diverse actors and entities were engaged in regulating various aspects 
of the life and conduct of individuals and organisations. It was from these 
heterogeneous actors and organisations and their haphazard knowledges, 
techniques and practices of researching, caring, educating and correcting          
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that the state assumed responsibility for caring for the population and the 
processes and phenomena immanent to it. 
  Described by Foucault (2008) as the ‘governmentalisation of the 
state’,  the  state’s  taking  responsibility  for  the  care  and  welfare  of  the 
population involved rulers and political authorities increasingly connecting 
their calculations, strategies and technologies to the diverse assemblage of 
largely  non-political  rationalities,  practices,  projects  and  groups  “that  in 
different  ways  had  long  tried  to  shape  and  administer  the  lives  of 
individuals  in  pursuit  of  various  goals”  (Rose  et  al.  2006,  87). 
Consequently, the Foucauldian analysis of government does not treat the 
state  as  a  fixed  and  united  entity  that  gives  rise  to  government  and  its 
practices  and  techniques.  Rather,  the  state  is,  counter-intuitively,  a 
composition  of  multiple  and  dispersed  agents  of  rule  and  the  resulting 
“patterns of regulation” (Popkewitz 1996, 29). The state is continually re-
shaped and its limits continually shifted as a consequence of the activities 
of  these  heterogeneous  agents,  organisations  and  individuals  engaged  in 
administering  the  health,  wealth  and  education  of  the  population.  If  the 
state has the appearance of an essence and of being a centralised power, 
this is a consequence of, firstly, its congealing of these mobile relations 
between the instruments of political authority and the agents of social rule 
and, secondly, its being a rationality of these diverse agents for the exercise 
of governmental power across the social field. In treating the state as “a 
dynamic ensemble of relations and syntheses that at the same time produces 
the  institutional  structure  of  the  state  and  the  knowledge  of  the  state” 
(Lemke  2007,  48),  the  state  is  re-imagined  as  a  centripetal  rather  than          
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centrifugal  force,  drawing  things  into  a  ‘centre’  (Deleuze  and  Guattari 
1987).  
  Consequently, if the state is effectively an instrument and effect of 
government,  then  the  analysis  of  political  and  governmental  power  is 
irreducible to the state construed as an essentially unified, all-powerful and 
calculating actor seeking legitimacy and obedience through government. 
The state is not the cause and originator of modern forms of government 
because it does not occupy the entire field of power relations and regulatory 
practice, and in fact it “can only operate on the basis of the other, already 
existing power relations” (Foucault 1980b, 64). The analysis of politics and 
government must instead give considerable regard to the activities of this 
multiplicity  of  agents  of  social  rule  and  their  normative  knowledges, 
practices and techniques. These make the modern state and its government 
possible. 
 
A transformation in the modalities of rule 
 
The state and techniques and practices of government 
 
If the state does not have a central ‘body’ from which it deliberates and 
calculates, or is limited in its possession of techniques and instruments for 
the  calculation  and  enactment  of  government  (instead  relying  on 
heterogeneous social agents for these), then the link between the crisis of 
the  welfare  state  and s e l f -managing  reforms  cannot  be  explained  by 
reference to a state deliberating on and utilising its instruments in relation 
to the problems of its form, strength or legitimacy. Instead, based upon the          
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preceding discussion this link is best explained in terms of how the plethora 
of agencies, organisations, programs and practices at this time engaged in 
what appears to be a “transformation in the modalities of rule” (Larner 
2000, 251; Popkewitz 1996; Popkewitz 2000c) 
  To  focus  on  transformations  in  the  modalities  of  rule  involves 
eschewing the state-centred legitimacy approaches employed by Gewirtz 
(2002),  Dale  (1989)  and  the  Centre  for  Contemporary  Cultural  Studies 
(1981). Because the ‘legitimation analytic’ conflates sovereign power and 
governmental power, it construes these reforms as being generated from 
three crises that agents within the state “feel the need to resolve” (Gewirtz 
2002, 10). Consequently, it narrows these conflicts to problems bearing on 
the state in terms of control and legitimation, which the state as a social 
actor needed to act on in order to secure obedience and the interests of 
sovereign rule. Here the state originates, enacts and determines the ends of 
social, political and policy developments in top-down fashion. 
  However, as I have noted, when we separate the sovereign from the 
governmental then the state as some unified entity with pre-given functions 
cannot explain these reforms to the government of the population, to the 
field  of  education,  or  to  the  public  sector.  By  instead  focusing  on 
government as in large part the activity of a plethora of seemingly non-
political  and  indirectly  governmental  entities  and  actors ( which  may 
include community groups, social movements, the expertises of economics, 
management, psychology, sociology and social work), the problem-space 
of  analysis  becomes  how  the  relatively  recent  transformation  in  the 
government of the population, education and the public sector (commonly          
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described as neo-liberalism), evinces a transformation in how this array of 
spatially scattered agencies, organisations and programmes were practising 
and therefore regulating.  
  Self-managing  reforms  constitute  this  late  twentieth  century 
transformation of the techniques and practices of regulation of the welfare 
state. This transformation included: the introduction into the public services 
of new management techniques that governed public sector employees to 
the ends of improving objectives and outputs rather than bureaucratic or 
‘public service principles’; the introduction of performance management 
techniques that sought to shape the calculations and conduct of individual 
employees  and  the  organisation  as  a  whole a r ound  ‘performance’;  the 
devolution  of  responsibilities  from  central  authorities  that  would  accord 
greater  autonomy  for  self-managing  various  aspects  of  the  public 
enterprise; and the employment of quasi-markets and market techniques 
which  facilitated  both  parental  choice  in  the  selection  of  schools  and 
competitive and entrepreneurial practices within schools.  
   In this description, the crisis of welfare state, or its ‘restructure’, is 
this  transformation  in  the  techniques  and  practices  of  government. 
Moreover,  this  transformation  is  not  the  product  of  a  centralising  state 
augmenting  its  power,  although  state  institutions  have  harnessed  these 
techniques  and  practices.  Rather,  it  is  the  product  of  an  assemblage  of 
fragments of knowledge, theory, concepts and practices created and used 
by a variety of social actors, expertises and agents of regulation, including 
social  progressives,  management  consultants,  sociologists,  psychologists          
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and  educationalists,  who  endeavour  to  manage  aspects  of  the  personal, 
social and economic life of the population.  
  Therefore, the study of self-managing reform must concern itself 
with self-managing reforms as a multiplicity of governmental techniques 
and practices. This involves eschewing an analysis of ‘the state’ as some 
material and institutional structure controlled by doctrines and principles 
and  rather  paying  attention  to  the  relationship  between  self-managing 
school  reforms  and  the  scattered  organisations,  knowledge  producers, 
actors  and  programs  engaged  in  managing  specific  problems  of  human 
existence. 
 
Rationalities of government 
 
Focusing attention simply on the technologies, techniques and practices of 
government risks analysis being conducted in the style of the ‘sociologies 
of governance’ (Dean 2007; Rose 1999b). Sociologies of governance are 
realist in that they are pre-eminently concerned with mapping the “actual 
organisation and operations of systems of rule, of the relations that obtain 
amongst political and other actors and organisations at the local levels and 
their connections into actor networks and the like” (Rose 1999b, 19). But 
merely documenting the techniques, practices and connections that produce 
governance  tells  us  little  about  why  these  techniques  and  practices  for 
governing  emerged  at  this  particular  time  and  with  what  authority  they 
emerged and proliferated.           
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  Foucauldian  studies  in  government  enable  the  analyst  to  move 
beyond this analytical straightjacket. These studies provide a ‘toolkit’ for 
asking  what  the  conditions  were  for  the  transformation  in  the  technical 
regime of government. We may ask, for instance: what were the truthful 
ways of knowing, speaking and acting that enabled a transformation in how 
we thought about the individual and society and their government? What 
problems  emerged  for  government,  and  in  relation  to  what  truths  and 
authority were these rendered into problems to begin with? What are the 
presuppositions and the assumptions of these regimes of government?  
  According to Foucauldian studies in government, we can approach 
these  questions  by  attending  to  an  element  intrinsic  to  the  technical 
modalities  of  government  and  their  emergence;  that  is,  governmental 
rationalities (Dean 1999; Foucault 2007, 2008; Gordon 1991; Rose 1999b). 
For Foucault, government always contains an element of thought, and is in 
fact conditioned by thought. A rationality of government refers to a “way or 
system  for  thinking  about  the  nature  of  the  practice  of  government… 
capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both 
to its practitioners and to those upon whom it is practised” (Gordon 1991, 
3). This consists of reasoning about what is to be governed, for what reason 
things are to be governed, through what means government should occur, 
and with what authority and to what ends.  
  These rationalities are inscribed in the theories, programmes and 
know-how of dispersed regulatory social agents and authorities, and are 
therefore, implemented in their employment. Reaching beyond the fixation 
of sociologies of governance on documenting the networks of governance,          
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the Foucauldian analytic of government examines the form or systems of 
reasoning  about  the  perceived  legitimate  objects  of  government,  the 
desirable ends of governmental intervention, and the legitimate means for 
enacting  government  embodied  in  the  deployment  of  regimes  of 
governmental  practices,  which  may  include  a  program  of  social 
intervention or educational reform.  
  Although  these  rationalities  pertain  to  ways  of  thinking  about 
government  and  the  exercise  of  governmental  power,  these  are  not 
necessarily created within the realm of political interests or sovereignty. 
Governmental  rationalities  are  historically  and  institutionally  contingent 
inventions  of  humans  (Dean  1994;  Gordon  1991).  For  modern  liberal 
government, it is in the truth making of the disciplines and expertise that 
form is in large part given to governmental reason. Dean describes this is 
terms of the:  
 
forms of expertise, knowledge, information and calculation that are 
the  conditions  of  government,  its  programmatic  character,  the 
language and vocabulary of rule, the formation of administrable 
objects and domains, and the changing forms and rituals of truth 
that authorize and are authorized by governmental practices and 
agents. (Dean 1995, 560)  
   
Here  our  investigative  lens  is  directed  towards  the  historically  and 
institutionally  formed  regimes  of  truth  and  knowledge  that  shape  our 
reasoning around what constitute the proper objects, means and ends of 
government. However, it should also extend to how new ways of thinking 
about government are invented in ad hoc ways that link up and integrate          
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into a coherent logic an array of “practical attempts to think about and act 
upon  specific  problems  in  particular  locales,  and  various  other  existing 
techniques and practices” (Rose 1999b, 27).  
  In  short,  then,  an  analysis  of  the  governmental  techniques  and 
practices  of  self-managing  reform,  and  the  crisis  it  manifests,  is 
impoverished without engaging with the transformation in how Western 
liberal  democracies  came  to  reason  government  and  the  exercise  of 
governmental power in the late twentieth century. That is, how Western 
liberal  democracies  came  to  think  about  what  were  the  proper  objects, 
means and ends of government. This is unlike sociologies of governance 
because it assumes a constructivist theoretical stance. It opens to critical 
thought how our forms of visibility, intelligibility and action, especially 
around government, are shaped by the production of knowledge and truths, 
which constitute the condition of possibility for the techniques, practices 
and programs for our own government.   
    
Political discourse 
 
I have thus far outlined important historical facts, ideas and concepts in 
order to outline an approach to the analysis of self-managing reforms. This 
analysis is predicated on the notion that self-managing reforms are linked to 
a crisis of the welfare state during the 1970s and 1980s.  I have made the 
case  that  this  crisis  represents  a  transformation  in  the  rationalities  and 
techniques  of  government  and  therefore  self-managing  reforms  can  be 
studied  as  a  manifestation  of  this  crisis  of  government.  If,  however,          
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government is distinct from the state and politics, what is the connection 
between  politics  and  self-managing  reforms  that  I  have  described  in 
previous chapters?   
  In  response  to  this  question,  and  putting  it  simply,  the  political 
realm  has  a  specific  form  of  reasoning  and  these  articulate  with t he 
rationalities of government of the heterogeneous organisations, agents and 
discourses engaged in the administration of the population. This link exists 
because  when  the  diverse  arts  of  government  involving  the  complex  of 
organisations, agents and programs were linked into the circuits of political 
power, political authorities then made the improvement, optimisation and 
individualisation  of  the  population,  and  the  means  through  which  these 
would be achieved, their interest. In brief, the political rationalisation of the 
government  of  the  state  became  ineluctably  tied  to  social  agents’ 
rationalisation of the regulation of life-conduct (Dean 1994; Reueschmeyer 
and Skocpol 1996), or the attempts made to govern the conduct of people 
by structuring their field of possible thought and action.  
  Take, for example, the link between governmental rationalities and 
political  discourse  that  I  raised  in  chapter  one.  In  the  1970s  and  1980s 
political  authorities  became  concerned  with,  among  other  things,  the 
problem  of  industrial  and  corporate  competitiveness,  the  levels  of 
dependency and passivity in the population, and the sense of entitlement to 
welfare.  Political  authorities  increasingly  construed  the  rationalities, 
technologies  and  programs  of  the  welfare  state  as  a  problem  for  the 
government of the state. The expansion of political power across the social 
body and into the details of people’s personal lives was construed as too          
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controlling, detrimental to personal and economic freedom and a threat to 
national economic competitiveness. Increasingly it was reasoned that the 
regulatory power of the state should be restrained, that government should 
empower  individuals  from  the  state  by  enabling  their  self-fulfilment, 
autonomy  and  enterprise,  and  that  the  competitive  market  and  private 
enterprise should take the lead in social and economic development.  
  This political rationalisation of the state in terms of how to secure 
the state, its population and its economy, did not remain in the domain of 
politics.  It  could  not  because  the  only  way  political  objectives  can  be 
achieved  is  by  translating  these  into  the  activities  of  those  with  the 
technologies that could shape the conduct of individuals and organisations. 
Consequently, the above political discourse of enterprise and competition 
spread throughout the social body, including into the enclosures of experts 
and  their  bounded  expertise.  Rose  (1999a)  draws  our  attention  to  the 
‘inscription’ of this political discourse into the knowledge production in 
workplace  management.  Since  the  post  World  War  Two  period,  fields 
within  psychology  were  producing  theories,  knowledge  and  concepts  of 
human  beings  as  enterprising,  autonomous,  self-motivated,  and  self-
actualising.  As  well,  management  researchers  problematised  private  and 
public sector organisations in terms of their failure to create opportunities 
for personal autonomy, motivation, self-fulfilment and enterprise (Miller 
and Rose 1995; Rose 1996b; Rose 1999a).  
  This  alignment  between  the  concerns  and  objectives  of  political 
authorities and the techniques and knowledges for governing the workplace 
in  an  enterprising  manner  was  not  coincidental.  Through  political          
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discourse, as a “relatively systematic, explicit, discursive problematization 
and codification of the art or practice of government” (Dean 1994, 187), the 
political strategies, moralities, epistemologies and idioms were translated 
into  the  government  of  specific  problem-spaces  such  as  the  workplace 
(Callon  and  Latour  1981;  Wittrock  and  Wagner  1996).  Through  this 
process,  the  knowledges  of  the  human  and  social  sciences  increasingly 
corresponded with the political domain’s new diagnosis of the problems 
confronting the state and the ambition of political authorities to create an 
enterprising, active, flexible, self-motivated and empowered society as a 
way to improved national wealth, health and wellbeing (Rose and Miller 
1992).  
  Suffusing  governmental  and  social  domains  with  the  political 
discourse of enterprise, autonomy, responsibility, initiative and flexibility 
was not the work of an all-powerful state or a political class. These new 
rationalisations of government by political authorities brought a diversity of 
experts,  authorities  and  disciplinary  and  government  technologies  into  a 
centre,  through  a  range  of  mechanisms  and  incentives  (see  for  example 
Rose and Miller 1992). And alternatively, the knowledge and techniques 
created outside of the political domain by these experts and authorities fed 
back  into  the  reasoning  of  the  political  domain.  Here,  state  institutions 
extended their scope of operation: 
  
by a complex set of strategies, utilizing and encouraging the new 
positive knowledges of economy, sociality and the moral order, and 
harnessing already existing micro-fields of power in order to link          
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their governmental objective with activities and events far distant in 
space and time. (Rose 1999b, 18) 
 
Political  authorities  and  social  experts  and  authorities  were  effectively 
brought  into  a  common  project  of  transforming  the  modalities  and 
rationalities of government.  
 
Conclusion 
 
To the extent that critical sociology of education has taken up the analysis 
of self-managing reforms in terms of the exercise of political power it is 
laudable. However, the type of analysis that focuses on the legitimacy of 
the  state  or  which  construes  the  state  as  a  key  social  actor  fails  to 
adequately  engage  with  self-managing  reforms  as  ‘governmental’.  This 
chapter has provided a number of key insights, concepts and perspectives 
for an alternative analysis of self-managing reforms and its relationship to 
the exercise of political power.  
  I have argued that instead of using the state as the principal object 
for explaining both why and how the state and the field of education were 
transformed, such analysis might begin with examining the transformation 
of a plethora of governmental rationalities, practices and techniques. This 
has  not  meant  I  have  rejected  the  state  as  an  important  category  for 
analysis. I have argued, for instance, that the political domain has translated 
its socio-political objectives related to the state into the activities of social 
actors and the practices of knowledge production of a range of experts and 
authorities. What I have focused on, however, is that the change to the state          
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reflects a transformation in the modalities of government made possible by 
a transformation in the rationalisation of government by a range of social, 
governmental and political authorities.  
  In  short,  then,  self-managing  reforms  might  be  thought  of  as  an 
instance of, or program that reflects, this transformation of the modalities of 
government  made  possible  by  a  transformation  in  the  rationalities  of 
government, including the government of education, by a range of social 
and political actors.  
What, then, explains the causes and basis of this transformation in 
political  rationality  and  governmental  rationalities  and  practices  that 
occurred most fully in the 1980s? Why this transformation and why at this 
time? In Part II of this thesis I examine how the crisis and critique of the 
welfare state might be understood as a manifestation of a tension intrinsic 
to  the  historical  emergence  of  the  modern  exercise  of  political  and 
governmental power and how it has come to be reasoned and enacted in our 
modern governmental state. It is at the roots of the rationalisation of the 
exercise of state power that we can find the source of that which causes 
grief to the welfare state at the end of the twentieth century. By implication, 
this  will  provide  us  with  a  better  understanding  of  the  emergence  and 
nature of self-managing school reforms, to which I shall return in Part III of 
the thesis.  
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LIBERAL STATE AND ITS CRISIS 
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Introduction 
 
Part I set out a definition of the self-managing school by exploring the key 
texts and reforms that gave pertinence in expert and policy circles to the 
individual school as a discrete organisational entity. The contours of the 
self-managing school are created from the currents of self-managing reform 
occurring through the public sector. As these have been inextricably linked 
to  the  rationalities  and  machinations  occurring  in  political  and 
governmental discourse around ‘welfare state restructure’, I argued that the 
self-managing  school  might  best  be  thought  of  as  a  political-technical 
assemblage.  
  I  then  argued  that  while  the  self-managing  school’s  emergence 
reflects a re-organisation of the welfare state, it should not be understood as 
being  propelled  by  some  sort  of  cultural  progression  towards  freedom, 
empowering self-determination, or as a product of a crisis of the state’s          
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legitimacy.  Introducing  the  contributions  of  Foucault  and  Foucauldian 
researchers on the subject of government, I outlined key concepts and ideas 
of  an  alternative  approach  to  analysing  the  reform  of  this  period  that 
focuses  on  the  transformation  of  rationalities  and  technologies  of 
government.  However,  attributing  this  transformation  of  the  state  (and 
therefore self-managing reforms) to ‘new’ governmental and political ways 
of reasoning and enacting the regulation of the individual and population 
does not reveal the conditions for the emergence of this crisis of the state 
and  the  new  way  of  reasoning  its  government.  Understanding  the 
emergence of this emergence will help us explain the emergence of self-
managing schools reforms. Part II of this thesis addresses this concern.  
  My approach to this problem is informed by Foucault’s proposition 
that the welfare state crisis reflects a “crisis of liberalism” (Foucault 2008, 
69).  What  did  Foucault  take  this  to  mean?  How  does  this  relate  to 
governmental rationalities and technologies? What is its implication for our 
understanding  of  self-managing  reform  in  education?  To  answer  these 
questions,  it  is  necessary  to  examine  elements  of  Foucault’s  novel 
genealogy  of  the  historical  formation  of  the  modern  governmental s t a t e  
(Foucault  1988a;  Foucault  2007;  Foucault  2008).  These  have  not  been 
extensively used in education research so I want to elaborate upon them in 
some detail and then draw out their analytical significance for inquiries into 
education reform.  
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A genealogy of the modern liberal state 
 
Foucault  considers  the  liberal  welfare  state  in  his  1977-1978  lectures, 
Security,  Territory  and  Population  (Foucault  2007),  in  his  1979-1879 
lectures,  The  Birth  of  Biopolitics  (Foucault  2008),  and  in  his  Tanner 
Lectures at Stanford University (Foucault 1988a). The subject matter of 
Foucault’s lectures and writings are not confined to the welfare state. The 
welfare state is only a fragment in an inquiry that spans the pre-modern and 
modern eras and which has purchase on broader concepts such as the state, 
government and political power. Notwithstanding, Foucault’s explication of 
modern  government  and  the  state  and  his  remarks  on  the  welfare  state 
provide a diagnosis of the 1970s and 1980s crisis of the welfare state. What 
is this diagnosis and how does he arrive at it? 
 
Foucault’s genealogical method 
 
Let  us  begin  by  considering  the  methodology  that  rendered  Foucault’s 
diagnosis of crisis into existence. The method employed by Foucault and 
others engaged in ‘histories of the present’ is described as genealogical 
(Foucault 1980a; Kendall and Wickham 1999). The ethos of this work does 
not involve plotting a history of the welfare state with ‘the state’ the subject 
of  history.  These  investigations  eschew  an  understanding  of  the  present 
based upon using grand theories, structuralist frameworks, or finding single 
origins or causes. It does not presuppose that there is a true and timeless 
meaning of an object with essential properties or hidden meanings that once          
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revealed can explain that object. Neither does it involve uncovering the 
great  meta-narratives  underpinning  human  history.  So,  what  does  the 
genealogical method do? 
  The genealogical method takes current forms of being and truth as 
the objects of historical investigation, presupposing truth and the style of 
our being are humanly invented and products of contingencies, including 
historical and political contingencies. This method involves investigating 
the complex and fragmented group of relations across a dispersed field that 
provide  the  conditions  of  possibility  for  the  formation  of  rationalities, 
concepts,  objects  and  practices  that  constitute  the  basis  of  our  current 
concepts, truths and practices. In so doing, it provides a new point of view, 
along with innovative concepts, through which the present and its taken for 
granted truths and norms can be rendered knowable differently, and new 
forms of political action offered up (Dean 1999). This is one reason that 
Foucault’s analysis did not assume the existence and nature of the state, 
especially as an a priori (Lemke 2007). 
  Researching  the  complex  of  practices,  knowledge  and  truths 
through  which  the  existence  of  the  modern  state  and  government  were 
made  possible,  the  Foucauldian  genealogy  of  the  modern  liberal 
government moved beyond the modernist discourse of the state through 
which political thought and analysis had predominantly occurred (Rose and 
Miller  1992).  Foucault’s  studies  do  not  take  for  granted  the  concepts 
indebted  to  political  thought  from  nineteenth  century  liberal  political 
philosophy.  The  state  is  not  construed  as  a  totalitarian  monster.  The 
contract  does  not  define  the  relationship  between  the  state  and  the          
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individual. Civil society cannot be accepted as an a priori reality distinct 
from the state. The citizen is not narrowly defined as a juridical-political 
subject of rights. Indeed, rather than conducting his studies from the grand 
texts of political philosophy from which these notions might be derived, 
Foucault’s insights on political power were generated by a focus on “the 
more  minor  texts  of  political  thinkers,  polemicists,  programmers  and 
administrators” (Rose et al. 2006, 86). Where, then, did his research of 
government and politics lead him? 
The genealogical method led Foucault to trace the regularities in the 
practices and thoughts of those who reflected on and acted upon all sorts of 
problems of political power, the state, the economy, the population, and so 
on.  The  study  of  ancient,  pre-modern  and  modern  rationalities  and 
practices,  led  Foucault  and  his  colleagues  at  the  College  de  France 
(including  Ewald  1991;  Pasquino  1978)  to  illuminate  in  the  most 
innovative way the various historical trajectories constituting the modern 
state’s  formation.  In  particular,  and  pertinent  to  the  diagnostic  ethos  of 
genealogy,  these  studies  rendered  intelligible  the  historical  formation  of 
key elements of political thought which inhere as deep foundations of the 
rationalities, values and techniques of government today, and consequently, 
what causes the welfare state grief. What are the key elements identified in 
Foucault’s analysis? 
  In these genealogies Foucault makes the argument that the liberal 
welfare state is a product of the formation of ways of thinking about and 
enacting  political  power  beginning  in  the  seventeenth  century.  As  I 
mentioned in the previous chapter, termed ‘governmentality’, this refers to          
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a  specific  mode  of  the  exercise  of  political  power,  one  in  which  “the 
conduct of the totality of individuals becomes implicated in the exercise of 
sovereign power” (Dean 1999, 46). Governmentality brings into existence 
the  governmental  state  wherein  the  population  that  inhabits  the  state  is 
rendered  into  an  object  of  government  through  political  and  intellectual 
technologies (such as statistics and school systems) for the achievement of 
the state’s security and prosperity. Governmentality, therefore, refers to the 
“certain way of thinking and acting embodied in all those attempts to know 
and  govern  the  wealth,  health  and  happiness  of  populations”  (Rose  and 
Miller 1992, 174). 
  Foucault draws attention to a dilemma at the core of the exercise of 
this  political  power.  Because  it  is  fashioned  from  two  ancient  and 
incompatible models of governing (termed the city-citizen and shepherd-
flock games), and the doctrine of reason of state and the science of police 
(1988a,  1988b,  2007),  the  governmental  state  assumes  a  pastoral 
responsibility. However, a tension is created in this amalgam because this 
pastoral function occurs within a rationality of the state. This imbues the 
governmental state with an ‘individualising’ and ‘totalising’ potential and 
effect. That is, one of caring for the welfare of individuals, yet acquitting 
this role in relation to a more global concern for the security of the state. 
Exploring this dynamic and the tensions it produces is the subject of Part II.  
  In the following chapters I examine: 
•  how  our  current  ways  of  thinking  and  enacting  government  are 
shaped  by  this  pastoral  role  of  the  state  and  its  antagonist          
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relationship  with  a  liberal  modality  of  government  that  seeks  to 
produce freedom for the individual and the economy; 
•  the  transformation  in  governmental  technologies  and  rationalities 
beginning  in  the  1970s  as  a  manifestation  of  this  inherent 
problematic at the heart of the governmental state.  
   
Part III will return us to the analysis of recent education reform.  
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Chapter 4: The Roots of the Pastoral State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines what Dean characterises as Foucault’s tracing of the 
“deep but obscure foundations of the values and ideals encapsulated in our 
twentieth century welfare state” (Dean 1999, 74). This is an important task 
because the critique and crisis of the welfare state was not merely generated 
from the pressures of the brute reality of contemporary life. As Foucault 
elucidated, this period of crisis of the modern liberal welfare state has just 
as much to do with economic downturn and industrial conflict of the 1970s 
and 1980s as it does the historical formation of political government and 
our beliefs about what it means to govern. It is the task of this chapter to 
explore the roots of the modern liberal state by tracing key elements and 
thoughts of Foucault’s genealogy of political rationality, and in particular          
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his examination of the doctrine of reason of state and the science of police 
as its key constitutive trajectories. 
  It  is  not  my  intention  to  draw  immediate  conclusions  about  the 
significance of Foucault’s genealogy to the problems of the welfare state. 
This will be done in chapter six. Instead, in this chapter I highlight our 
current state’s indebtedness to the historical emergence of ‘the state’ as a 
means for rationalising the exercise of political power, and its marriage to 
pastoral forms of government. I argue that this signifies the emergence of 
the state as a form of pastoral power, and this pastoral role is a fundamental 
element of the modern liberal state.  
 
The shepherd-flock and city-citizen games 
 
According to Foucault (Foucault 1988a; Foucault 1997), two ancient and 
incompatible models of governing inhere in the modern state, which has 
shaped how we rationalise and enact the exercise of political power. Let us 
consider these in more detail. 
  The first is the Old Testament notions of pastoral power modelled 
on  the  shepherd-flock  relation,  what  Foucault  terms  the  shepherd-flock 
game (Foucault 1988a). In Hebraic accounts, the shepherd must secure the 
salvation of the souls of members of the flock while exercising power over 
them. There is an individualising tendency in this art of governing because 
the  shepherd  must  maintain  constant  individualised  attention  over  the 
flock’s members. The shepherd’s duty is to do what is good for the flock 
and this requires the shepherd getting to know the flock both in detail and          
  101 
as a whole. The shepherd must exercise vigilant surveillance without rest, 
ensure that the flock’s needs are met and they are properly cared for, and 
that they are protected from danger. The shepherd, as in today’s image of 
the politician, must more or less guide them.  
  This  image  of  the  shepherd-flock  game  was  reconstituted  in 
Christian  thought  from  the  fourth  to  sixteenth  century  and  this  prevails 
today. Christian notions of pastorship changed the relationship between the 
shepherd and the flock. The relationship was between God, the pastor and 
the flock. In Christian thought the individual was to contemplate his or her 
existence  and  to  evaluate  it  according  to  external  moral  codes.  The 
individual  was  compelled  to  confess  to  the  shepherd  who  required a  
detailed knowledge of “the contents of their soul” (Dean 1999, 75). The 
individual was to renounce their existence to a higher will or authority such 
as God or the Church, on whom they would be dependent. Salvation would 
be  a  product  of  obedience,  self-transformation  and  the  exercise  of  self-
control in light of established moral codes.  
  The second model of government comes from Greek antiquity and 
its Athenian notions of the polis, termed by Foucault the city-citizen game 
(Foucault 1988a). In the city-state the shepherd rule relation existed but this 
was markedly different. The image of the individual was legal and political. 
The individual citizen was equal to everyone else, exercising their freedom 
and  rights  within  a  juridical-political  structure  of  the  community.  The 
important  relationship  was  that  between  the  individual  citizen  and  the 
whole community set in the framework of the city.           
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  This model of government is unlike the Christian pastorate in which 
care  was  the  responsibility  of  the  shepherd.  The  leader  does  not  make 
individual citizens the object of government by caring for them or fostering 
their l i f e .  Rather,  the  leader  pilots  the  state  like  captain  piloting  a  ship 
(Foucault 2007), which means providing for the city-state conditions for 
interaction and living, and securing the city’s unity. “The political leader 
was  to  quiet  any  hostilities  within  the  city  and  make  unity  reign  over 
conflict” (Foucault 1988a). In the city, the individual was free and to this 
extent  responsible  for  his  own  care  and  conduct  as  a  matter  of  choice: 
obedience involved self-cultivation, self-mastery and austerity through the 
application of reason. 
  Here,  then,  we  have  two  influential  and  incompatible  models  of 
governing  (Dean  1994;  Dean  1999).  The  shepherd-flock  relationship 
illustrates a long trajectory of pastoral power concerned for every member 
of the community in his or her life, death and existence. To the extent that 
this  model  of  governing  and  its  practices  are  concerned  with  each 
individual member of the flock, these involve processes of individualisation 
and  administration.  By  contrast,  the  city-citizen  game  conceives  of  the 
ruler’s power and the conception and government of the community rather 
differently. The Athenian city-citizen game models the exercise of power 
on  a  notion  of  the  free,  self-governing  political  community.  Here, 
governing pertains to the survival and wellbeing of the city and therefore 
citizens are governed as legal-political citizen with rights and obligations 
indexed to the city. This model represents an act of totalisation insofar as          
  103 
the significance of each individual is understood in relation to the wellbeing 
of the city.  
  As these are described, neither of these models of governing are 
images of governing a state so it is difficult to make direct correlations to 
our current modern state. However, this does not mean these are irrelevant 
to  the  current  organisation  of  governmental  and  political  power.  These 
ancient models constitute enduring conceptions of government:   
 
Among all the societies in history, ours – I mean, those that came 
into  being  at  the  end  of  Antiquity  on  the W e s t e r n  s i d e  o f  t h e  
European continent… they alone evolved a strange technology of 
power treating the majority of men as flock with a few shepherds. 
They thus established between them a series of complex, continuous, 
and paradoxical relationships. (Foucault 1988a) 
 
Foucault’s claim is not that today’s government and politics are direct heirs 
of these models, however, these models of governing have undergone a 
series of displacements and modifications and therefore continue to have an 
enduring relevance to the contemporary organisation of politics and the life 
of people.  
  Foucault spent time exploring the relationship between these two 
models  of  government  and  the  historical  formation  of  our  own  modern 
government.  He  was  deeply  concerned  with  how  their  instantiation  into 
political  reasoning  transferred  into  today’s  thinking  and  enactment  of 
government  both  totalising  and  individualising  capacities  and  effects.  A 
cursory glance at contemporary government indicates the instantiation of 
this individualisation and totalisation in modern political discourse. This is          
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evident  in  that  the  welfare  of  individual  human  beings  is  an  object  of 
concern and administration to the state, yet this pastoral role co-exists with 
a form of government also concerned with exercising sovereign forms of 
power for the protection of the state, which also includes the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of citizens. How does this tension manifest today, 
and especially in relation to the crisis of the liberal state? 
  Before  we  consider  Foucault’s  apprehension  about  this 
individualising/totalising  dynamic,  we  must  firstly  trace  the  series  of 
displacements  and  modifications  of  these  models  in  the  formation  of 
today’s  modern  liberal  state.  Foucault  understands  these  modifications 
through examining the historical emergence of two constitutive trajectories 
of  our  secular  liberal  state  and  the  governmental  form  of  policy:  the 
doctrine of raison d’Etat (reason of state) and Polizeiwissenschaft  (science 
of police). Our current governmental and political life is indebted to their 
formation  because  each  offers  to  political  rationality  key  elements  that 
endure today.  
 
Reason of state 
 
The first object of Foucault’s (1988a, 1988b, 2007) investigation was the 
doctrine of reason of state, which can be traced to a number of Italian, 
German and French political writers from the late sixteenth century and 
seventeenth  century.  Both  Foucault  and  notable  Machiavelli  scholar 
Quentin  Skinner  (2000)  agree  that  the  emergence  of  reason  of  state’s 
conception of political power and the state occurred between Machiavelli’s          
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The Prince and reactions to it. This doctrine formed out of two increasingly 
problematised traditions. 
  The first is a notion of sovereign power and the state embodied in 
Machiavelli’s  The  Prince.  According  to  its  translator,  Guillaume 
d’Auvergne,  The  Prince  was  written  so  as  to  “teach  the  powerful  (the 
seigneur Politiq) how to conserve and augment their domain” (Kelly 1970, 
549). For Machiavelli, the objective of rule was maintaining the strength of 
the relationship between the prince, his territory and his subjects. In this 
form of rule the wealth of nations was measured according to the size and 
successful protection of the principality and the prince’s interests, and the 
personal fortune of the sovereign. The problem for the prince, however, 
was that the relationship between him and his territory was not automatic 
and certainly not assured (Dean 1999). Indeed, it was tenuous because the 
prince was external to it, having secured it either through conquest, treaty 
or inheritance.  
  A particular conception of the exercise of political rule flows from 
this problematic. It required the need to identify the external and internal 
threats  to  the  sovereign’s  rule,  and  concomitantly  the  development  of 
techniques for ensuring the protection of the sovereign’s territory and his 
rightful rule and ownership of things. Therefore, the prince’s power was 
exercised in order to strengthen the bond between the prince, his territory 
and his subjects, of which making the prince’s subjects obedient was key:  
 
The sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right 
to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life 
only through the death he was capable of requiring. The right which          
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was formulated as the “power of life and death” was in reality the 
right to take life or let live. (Foucault 1998, 136) 
 
The second increasingly problematised tradition from which reason of state 
emerges  is  the  Christian  and  judiciary  traditions  of  government  as 
‘essentially just’. This required rulers to respect “a whole system of laws: 
human laws; the law of nature; divine law” (Foucault 1988a, 75). Such 
Christian notions of rule shaped Machiavelli’s thought, which reflected the 
orthodoxy that the sovereign’s power was divinely ordained:  
 
The  king’s  government  of  his  kingdom  must  imitate  God’s 
government of nature; or again, the soul’s government of the body. 
The king must found cities just as God created the world; just as the 
soul gives form to the body. The king must also lead men towards 
their finality, just as God does for natural beings, or as the soul does, 
when directing the body. (Foucault 1988a, 75) 
 
Here, the sovereign’s rule was to be directed to the ends of divine laws, to 
transcendental principles, heavenly bliss, to the service of the sovereign’s 
greatness and to leading “their subjects to their natural and divine purposes 
and ends” (Dean 1999, 85).  
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, this tradition of 
political thought was increasingly displaced by forms of government more 
familiar to us. Foucault notes that at this time the doctrine of the prince, 
sovereign power and territory were increasingly absent from discussions of 
rule and instead a range of political and administrative writers began to 
scrutinise these orthodoxies and pose questions concerning ‘government’.          
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They asked: what does governing consist of? Who can govern? Who or 
what can be governed?  
While  the  primary  concern  found  in  descriptions  of  sovereign 
political rule was the prince’s power and his relationship to his principality, 
the  scope  of  rule  was  broadening  to  mean  the  government  of  things, 
humans and their relationship. The Renaissance scholar Guillaume de La 
Perriere recalls “that we also talk about “governing” a household, souls, 
children, a province, a convent, a religious order, and a family” (Foucault 
2007,  93).  Similarly,  Francois  de  La  Mothe L e   Vayer’s  typology  of 
government in 1653 included the government of oneself (morality), the art 
of governing a family (economy), and the science of governing the state 
(politics). 
Another breach to the sovereign notion of rule was the descriptions 
of  a  diversity  of  specific  ends  to  government,  or  “specific  finalities” 
(Foucault  2007,  99).  La  Perriere’s  1567  definition  that  government  was 
“the right disposition of things, so arranged to lead to a convenient end” 
(La Perriere quoted in Dean 1999, 73) was emblematic of this emerging 
way of thinking about the ends of rule. Foucault took this to mean that 
unlike  the  theory  and  practice  of  sovereign  monarchical  rule  associated 
with the mechanisms of constitutions and laws, the ends of government 
were immanent to things themselves. That is to say, the ends of government 
are “internal to the things it directs” (Foucault 2007, 99). 
This indexing of rule to the ‘disposition of things’ represented a 
significant  attack  on  the  abovementioned  Christian  doctrine  on  wise 
government.  The  latter  conceived  sovereign  rule a s  e m e r ging  from  the          
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‘cosmo-theological’ order where divinity, nature and law were the reason 
and justification of government. However, the descriptions of political rule 
in  terms  of  the  ‘disposition  of  things’  meant,  firstly,  that  the  ends  of 
government were to be immanent to the world, such as health and wealth. 
That  is,  proper  rule  is  to  be  ‘secular’  rather  than  transcendental  (Dean 
1999).  Secondly,  it  also  meant  that  the  prince’s  right  to  rule,  through 
enforcing subjects’ submission to law, could no longer constitute the ends 
of  the  exercise  of  sovereign  power.  Instead,  the  plurality  of  objects  of 
government  required  the  mobilisation  of  a  diverse  range  of  tactics  for 
‘arranging things’ as they should be. 
  Gradually given form through these developments was an object 
that would become integral to our contemporary understanding of politics 
and  government.  This  was  the  governmental  state.  In  the  anti-
Machiavellian and administrative literature, the state began to emerge as 
the principle rationality for the deployment of the above diversity of tactics 
and ends. Put simply, political rule was to be exercised for reason of state. 
This meant that the ends of political rule began to be thought about in terms 
of those things important to the strength and wellbeing of the state, such as 
its  wealth,  natural  resources,  fertility,  accidents,  famines,  means  of 
subsistence and epidemics. Government was to concern itself with things 
that  sustain,  augment  or  threaten  life  (Foucault  1998;  Foucault  2003; 
Foucault 2008), hence, “Government will have to ensure that the greatest 
possible amount of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with 
sufficient  means  of  subsistence,  and  that  the  population  can  increase” 
(Foucault 2007, 99).           
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  With no external purpose to ruling or reliance on wisdom, prudence 
and divine knowing, rule increasingly depended upon a “concrete, precise, 
and measured knowledge” (Foucault 1988a, 76). This rational knowledge 
of  the  state,  political  statistics  or  political  arithmetic  (Hacking  1990), 
rendered naked to the eye of rulers the worldly forces within the state, and 
the properties of the state and their interrelationships. With this knowledge 
governors could ensure the ‘right disposition of things’ within the state, 
meaning  that  the  multiplicity  of  things  could  be  arranged  in  the  state’s 
image,  that  is,  to  ensure  the  state’s  strength,  its  internal  peace  and  its 
economic wellbeing. This constituted a “perfect knowledge of the means by 
which states are formed, preserved, strengthened, and expanded” (Botero 
quoted in Foucault 2007, 288). Political authorities, therefore, were to act in 
light of this rational knowledge, and this undoubtedly proved indispensable 
for the rational government of the state and its survival to the present. 
  While the anti-Machiavellian literature attacking sovereign power 
and divine right are given significant coverage in Foucault’s analysis of the 
emergence  of  the  rationality  of  the  state,  the  emergence  of  the 
“‘worldliness’  or  mundanity  of  the  administrative  state’s  political 
objectives” (Hunter 1994, 41) was linked to another trajectory that others 
believe has been given short shrift by Foucault (Hunter 1998; Wickham 
2006). Drawing upon the historical analysis of Koselleck, Hunter insists 
that reason of state, or the political drive for the survival and security of the 
state itself, emerged as a “circumstantially driven instrument for ending 
religious slaughter and imposing civil peace” (also Dean 1999; Dean and 
Hindess 1998; Hunter 1994, 41-42; Koselleck 1988).           
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  In Europe during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the 
vicious  religious  civil  wars  waged  between  and  within  rival  Catholic, 
Lutheran and Calvinist confessional states were fuelled by the notion that 
the  state  was  to  pursue  the  will  of  God,  absolute  moral  principle  and 
spiritual  perfection  (Koselleck  1988).  This  conflict  and  carnage  led 
statesmen,  administrators  and  intellectuals  to  question  the  legitimacy  of 
basing  government  on  spiritual  politics  that  construed  the  sovereign  as 
God’s representative, and the state as an expression of divine law. In his 
analysis, Hunter draws upon Hobbes’ account of reason of state, a political 
thinker Foucault shunned: 
 
He understood that its capacity to put an end to religious civil war had 
allowed the state’s pursuit of its own security and prosperity to float 
free of ‘higher’ religious and philosophical justification. (Hunter 1994, 
41) 
 
New  conceptions  of  the  state  emerged,  such  as  that  found  in  Henning 
Arnisaesus’s  political  science,  where  the  state  was  not  “born  to  combat 
human sinfulness” but “it was the empirical form in which the order of 
domination in any society was maintained” (Hunter 1998, 253).  
  Hunter  therefore  redresses  Foucault’s  absence  of  a  thorough 
analysis  of  the  ambition  of  reason  of  state  to  pacify  warring  religious 
factions  by  the  ‘moral  neutralisation  of  politics’.  Hunter’s  reference  to 
Arnisaesus’s political science, where the objectives and activities of the 
sovereign and the administration of the state were not the pursuit of moral, 
philosophical or spiritual ends, illustrates how a new political expertise that          
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was  available  to  anyone  regardless  of  religious  persuasion  could  secure 
civil  peace  and  security
4.  This  innovation  almost  certainly  consolidated 
“the idea that the state had properties and objectives of a kind that did not 
depend on disputed theological justifications” (Hindess 1996a, 108).  
   
 
Police 
 
The second constitutive trajectory of the rationalities of the modern state, 
according  to  Foucault  (1988a;  Foucault  2007),  was  the  technology  of 
police, which was “put to work and used and developed in the general 
framework of the reason of state” (Foucault 1988b, 153). But by police I 
refer to its seventeenth and eighteenth century meaning and not as it is 
conceived  today.  Prior  to  the  nineteenth c e ntury,  police  was  not  an 
institution or quasi-military body made up of uniformed officers who went 
about detecting crime and apprehending criminals in the interest of keeping 
the peace and maintaining the law (for example, Colquhoun 1806b). This 
defines the constabulary notion of police that dominates today. However, 
dating back to at least the sixteenth century police has variously designated 
a  community,  association  or  society  governed  by  public  authority,  the 
                                                 
4 Hunter describes this as a ‘deconfessionalisation’ of politics which involved “a 
protracted and incomplete process – beginning in the early seventeenth century, 
gaining strength in the wake of the Thirty Years War, and continuing today – in 
which  the  instruments  of  political  governance  were  intellectually  and 
constitutionally  separated  from  the  instruments  of  religious  discipline,  and  the 
state was reconstrued as the political apparatus of a secular civil order” Hunter, I. 
(1998). "Uncivil Society: Liberal Government and the Deconfessionalisation of 
Politics",  in  M.  Dean  and  B.  Hindess,  (eds.),  Governing  Australia:  Studies  in 
Contemporary  Rationalities  of  Government  Melbourne:  Cambridge  University 
Press.          
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assemblage  of  actions  for  governing  these  communities,  as  well  as  the 
product of good government (Foucault 2007; Pasquino 1978; Dean 1999; 
Neocleous 2006).  
  In  spite  of  the  varied  forms  and  usages  of  police,  there  is  no 
doubting  their  regulatory  intent  and  effect.  Seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
century  police  involved  monitoring  and  regulating  literacy,  household 
behaviour, the circulation of goods, the necessities of life, work, commerce 
and commodities, the prices of goods, weddings, cleanliness, health, habits, 
the wearing of extravagant clothing, diet, security, blasphemy, vagrancy, 
idleness,  cursing,  perjury,  roads,  bridges,  town  buildings,  behaviour  of 
servants, families and their domestic problems, and it sought to minimise 
law breaking and harm, increase wealth and wellbeing and maintain good 
order (Dean 1991; Dean 1999; Foucault 2007; Neocleous 2006; Oestreich 
1982; Pasquino 1978).  
  Foucault (1988a; Foucault 2007) takes as exemplary of police texts 
Nicolas  Delamare’s  compendium,  Traité  de  la  Police,  and  Turquet  de 
Mayerne’s La Monarchie Artisto-démocratique. The former compiled the 
police regulations of the kingdom of France, while the latter proposed a 
police  administrative  arrangement  to  the  Dutch  State  General  in  1611. 
These covered the monitoring and intervention in cultural rites, production 
techniques,  intellectual  life,  religion,  education,  morals,  supplies,  roads, 
highways,  public  safety,  the  liberal  arts  and  science,  trade,  factories, 
manservants  and  labourers.  Mayerne’s  proposal  included  making  people 
useful  and  employable,  determining  and  recording  their  aptitudes  and          
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tastes,  as  well  as  ameliorating  negative  aspects  of  life  by  providing 
assistance to the poor, widowed and the aged.  
  With such a catalogue of regulations, it is tempting to analyse police 
as an aberration to the formation of liberal government, or as a “regulatory 
mania” for the purpose of social control (Oestreich 1982, 157). However, 
police is much more than this. Sure its regulatory horizon complemented 
and embraced the already established judiciary, army and exchequer, and it 
did  have  an  eye  to  the  conditions  of  life,  everything  people  do,  or  the 
‘details’  as  Catherine  II  put  it  (Foucault  2007).  However,  police  made 
important contributions to political reasoning and government as we know 
it  today  because  it  attempted  to  fabricate  an  order  through  an  art  of 
government  indexed  to  the  rationality  of  the  state.  Hence,  rather  than 
perceive  police  in  terms  of  the  pejorative  notion  of  ‘police  state’, 
Neocleous (2006) suggests police might be thought about in terms more 
aligned with today’s use of the term policy, or seeking to know, order and 
strengthen the state from within.  
  Take, for example, the emergence and effect of the methods and 
body  of  knowledge  now  indispensible  to  modern  government  called 
statistics. Statistics, etymologically the science of the state, was integral to 
the organisation of police and bureaucratic administration (Hacking 1990), 
although rather than being the inductive form of statistics we know today, 
this was more an “inventory science” (Curtis 2002, 325). It was a collection 
of information on the state, its properties, its regularities and probablities
5 
                                                 
5 P a s q u i n o  refers  to  this l i n k  b e t w e e n  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  t h e  s t a t e ’ s  
wellbeing by quoting Montchrestien (1615), “One thing alone is lacking to you, O          
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(Pasquino 1978), such as von Justi’s Elements of Police which effectively 
drew  up  a  grid  through  which  the  state  could  be  observed  through 
categories such as territory, goods and individual conduct and their sub-
categories, which include the population, the army, its natural resources, 
production and commerce and monetary circulation. As Pasquino remarks, 
a technology like censura renders life into discourse; it is a “great general 
and uninterrupted confession” (Pasquino 1978, 49). 
  Like today’s ‘policy’, this information was collected for the purpose 
of recording and calculating the state’s resources and “constitutive forces” 
(Foucault 2007, 315). This represented an attempt to combine a description 
of  the  state  with  the  art  of  government.  By  rendering  phenomena  and 
certain regularities related to the co-existence of individuals visible, such as 
the nature of the circulation and distribution of goods, persons and money 
between  households,  police  rendered  intelligible  the  form,  properties, 
capacities, strengths and weaknesses of the state in order to improve its 
conditions, wealth and health (Tomlins 1993).  
  These attempts to know and regulate individuals, their co-existence 
and their relationship brought into existence the population or populousness 
(Curtis 2002) as an entity or object of administration (Dean 1999; Foucault 
2007; Pasquino 1978; Rose 1996). Foucault distinguishes this rudimentary 
notion of the population from the biopolitical sense he identifies emerging 
in  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  (Dean  1999;  Foucault  1998, 
                                                                                                                          
great state, the knowledge of yourself – and the image of your strength”, and 
Moheau (1778), “There can be no well ordered political machine, nor enlightened 
administration in a country where the state of population is unknown” Pasquino, 
P. (1978). "Theatrum Politicum. The Genealogy of Capital - Police and the State 
of Prosperity." Ideology & Consciousness, Autumn(4), 41-54.          
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2003,  2008).  The  notion  of  the  population  in  police w a s  often 
circumscribed to its categorisation according to basic information such as 
ages, sexes, births, deaths, size and occupations (Pasquino 1978), but also 
to  certain  ‘incalculables’  of  living  resulting  from  this  co-existence,  for 
example, epidemics
6.    
  The point of this description of statistics and its capacity to think 
about and calculate at the level of groups, communities or population, no 
matter  how  inaccurate  and  rudimentary  (Sir  William  Petty  relied  upon 
simple averages) (Redman 1997), is to draw attention to the fact that police 
and its technologies is irreducible to regulation for the sake of control or 
survival.  Rather,  as  it  is  described  by  one  of  its  proponents:  “The  sole 
purpose of the police is to lead men to the utmost happiness to be enjoyed 
in his life” (Delamare quoted in Foucault 1988a, 81). In police, happiness 
and the goodness of the soul and the body are principal concerns. These are 
products of living in a ‘society’ and therefore keeping good order, keeping 
individuals  useful  and  improving  their  living  through  regulation w a s  a  
means  to  ensuring  the  happiness  of  individuals.  Police’s  concern  for 
religion, public peace, manufacture, sumptuary law, the theatre, games and 
the care and discipline of the poor encompasses, therefore, an aspiration to 
ensure  the  happiness  of  each  individual  by  seeing  to  their  living,  by 
                                                 
6  Moreover, c o n c e r n s  for  the  population  were  narrowly  defined  in  terms  of 
maximising  the  state’s  resources  and  wealth,  ascertaining  the  number  of 
individuals or households in a community, understanding the circulation of trade, 
goods and money and identifying groups according to the degree of danger they 
posed to social order, especially in relation to idleness, such as the poor, domestic 
labourers,  prostitutes  and  the  young.  Neocleous,  M.  (2006).  "Theoretical 
Foundations of the "New Police Science"", in M. D. Dubber and M. Valverde, 
(eds.), The New Police Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
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regulating  society,  by  caring  for  the  individual’s  soul  and  body,  and 
ensuring each individual’s industriousness (Pasquino 1978).  
  This objective of securing ‘happiness’ was not ideological or the 
obfuscation of control by a state hell-bent on subjugating, dominating and 
securing obedience. Sure, police was regulatory, however construing it in 
terms  of  control  and  domination  ignores  the  partnership  that  these 
rationalities,  techniques  and  practices  of  police  forged  between  the 
individual and the state. Police writers including Justus Christoph Dithmar, 
Delamare and von Justi, distinguished Politik as a negative task in which 
the  state  fights  against  its  internal  and  external  enemies  for  the  state’s 
security, from Polizei, which was a positive form of regulation concerned 
with fostering the lives, peace and happiness of citizens so as to strengthen 
the benefits of living in a society (Tribe 1980). For von Justi: 
 
Police is the set of laws and regulations that concern the interior of 
the state, which endeavour to strengthen and increase its power, to 
make  good  use  of  its  forces…  and  procuring  happiness  of  its 
subjects. (von Justi quoted in Foucault 2007, 327) 
 
As it is described here, the technology of police, or Polizei, rendered the 
happiness and wellbeing of the individual commensurate with enlarging the 
internal power of the state. Through maintaining good order and securing 
the  wellbeing  and  happiness  of  individuals,  political  power  was  to  be 
wielded  to  supply  individuals  with  “a  little  extra  life”  and  in  doing  so 
“supply  the  state  with  a  little  extra  strength”  (Foucault  1988a,  79).  In 
Foucault’s estimation, therefore, police was a political technology for:          
  117 
 
integrating men’s activity into the state, into its forces, and into the 
development of these forces, and it will have to ensure that the state, 
in turn, can stimulate, determine, and orientate this activity in such a 
way that it is in fact useful to the state. (Foucault 2007, 323) 
 
  In  summary,  then,  the  administration  envisioned  and  enacted  by 
police utilised the individual as an instrument for securing prosperity at the 
level of the population, that is, the wellbeing of each and therefore all, 
omnes et singulatim (Foucault 1988a). Here, the activities of individuals 
were to be rendered productive and useful to the state through a general 
‘disciplinarisation’ (Foucault 1977). In light of this rationality, from the end 
of  the  sixteenth  century,  individualising  procedures  developed  for 
identifying, combining, increasing and developing human and non-human 
forces within the state proliferated in the form of disciplinary technologies, 
such  as  workshops,  schools,  and  the  army.  Through  working  on  the 
physical, cognitive, moral and affective attributes of individual members of 
the  population,  this  specific  mode  of  power  would  be  exercised  for 
attaining the common good measured in terms of the state’s strength and 
order.  
  This individualisation also served the very pressing purpose Hunter 
(1998) described earlier, that is, of securing civil peace. The disintegration 
of feudal ties and religious networks weakened the traditional modalities 
for  shaping  individual  moral  conduct.  Now,  amidst  secularisation,  the 
shaping of morals, respectability and obedience became mapped onto the 
political  sphere.  The  internal  security  and  peace  of  the  emerging          
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secularising state increasingly depended upon an attentiveness to policing 
social  morality,  respectability,  manners,  conduct  and  other  minutia  of 
human interactions: 
   
In this respect, police ordinances could be viewed as an intensive 
‘coaching’ of citizens in how to behave in towns and regions that had 
become more populous, in which feudal structures of authority were 
giving way to more centralized forms of internal sovereignty, and in 
which ecclesiastical authority had ceased to hold sway. (Dean 1999, 
91) 
 
In other words, police performed an important function of managing the 
civil peace of the state by integrating members of the population into civic 
and  pacific  forms  of  existence  (Oestreich  1982),  a  task  increasingly 
performed  by  public  and  non-public  authorities  such  as  philanthropic 
organisations emerging within this new state (Hindess 1996a). 
 
Political rationality 
 
We may well ask to what extent this exploration of the ‘deep but obscure’ 
foundations of the liberal state, from the shepherd-flock and city-citizen 
games to reason of state and police, has unnecessarily detoured us from the 
current crisis of the state. I would suggest the contrary; that these have 
made a significant contribution to the formation of political rationality and 
the  organisation  of  political  and  governmental  life  today,  including  to 
political reforms such as self-management. Let me explain.           
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  By positing the state, its strength, peace and security as the object 
and goal of political rule, reason of state broke from the traditions of the 
sovereign.  Reason  of  state  introduced  an  “autonomous  rationality  of 
government not reducible to a reflection on the personage of the prince or 
the  principles  of  the  divine  order”  (Dean  1999,  84;  also  Hindess  1997; 
Skinner 1989): 
 
raison d’ Etat carves out a new division, or even introduces a radical 
break, the state, which looms up and reveals a new reality with its own 
rationality. There is therefore a break with the old naturalness that 
framed  medieval  political  thought.  There  is  a  non-naturalness,  an 
absolute  artificiality,  if  you  like,  at  any  rate  a  break  with  that  old 
cosmo-theology, which brought the reproaches of atheism. (Foucault 
2007, 349) 
 
  To  the  extent  that  the  state  is  government’s  unique  rationality, 
reason of state also instantiates into modern political rationality the city-
citizen game described at the outset of this chapter. The polis or res publica 
as a self-governing politically united community found in the city-citizen 
game is reformulated in reason of state in the form of the secular state. 
Sovereign power is to be exercised in the name of this community, ‘the 
state’. This would involve securing its internal weaknesses, checking its 
external threats and ensuring the wellbeing of its citizens, but only to the 
extent that this has significance for the state. 
  By comparison, police was a governmental technology subject to 
the principles of reason of state. Its concern was with developing a detailed 
knowledge of governed reality coupled with an aspiration to intervene in          
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that  reality.  This  brought  the  population  into  the  field  of  visibility  and 
action  of  political  authorities,  effectively  freeing  Europe  from  the 
Machievallian limitations of political thinking that posited the sovereign as 
the end of government (Gordon 1991). Here, the strength and wealth of the 
state was no longer equated with securing obedience to the sovereign but in 
securing the felicity and wellbeing of each individual.  
  It is this individualised attention to the population that sets police 
apart  from  reason  of  state  and  its  city-citizen  game.  Unlike  the  more 
detached relationship between the ruler and citizen in the city-citizen game, 
police  exercises  an  individualised  attention  for  each  member  of  the 
population, or flock. This involves getting to know in detail their personal 
existence and co-existence, as well as guiding and caring for individual 
members. But this is not altruistic benevolence. The state is adopted as its 
principle of regulatory activity, and therefore police involves acting upon 
the  population  of  individuals  to  achieve  the  state’s  objective.  Police, 
therefore, is a “government which defines itself as being ‘of all and of 
each’” (Gordon 1991, 12), that is to say, public authorities assume their 
roles  as  shepherds  overseeing  the  flock  so  as  to  extend  the  happiness, 
productivity and wellbeing of all. 
 
The state as pastoral power 
 
For  Foucault,  there  is  much  to  be  concerned  about  in  this  “alliance  of 
bureaucratic and pastoral technologies” (Hunter 1994, 64). It illuminates 
how the political reasoning of our state of policy possesses totalising and          
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individualising roots and effects. Firstly, through reason of state, the state 
emerges as a centralising power insofar as it constitutes a form of reasoning 
that  encompasses  a  responsibility  for  securing  the  state’s  survival  and 
strength. Here, the ruler governs the state like a captain piloting a ship. By 
comparison, police’s technologies bring to the government of the state an 
individualising  power.  Human  beings  are  construed  and  acted  upon  as 
things  to  be  known,  improved,  corrected  and  regulated  for  securing  the 
quality  of  life  within  the  state.  Here,  the  ruler  is  a  husbandman  and  a 
shepherd  who  governs  as  much  as  cares  for  the  welfare  of  his  flock 
(Hindess 1996a). 
  In effect, the knitting together of reason of state and police enabled 
the state to emerge as a “new form of pastoral power” (Foucault 1982, 
334). That is to say, pastoral power is generalised beyond ecclesiastical 
confines  through  the  formation  of  a  state  that  cares  for  its  population. 
Unlike the theological form of pastoral power, however, the care for the 
welfare of the individual by the state occurs according to a rationality of 
state. Here, processes of individualisation are correlated with the logic of 
state totalisation. This means the individual cannot escape the scope of the 
state’s  fledgling  governmental  power  and  its  statist  rationality,  not  only 
because the citizen is encompassed by a sovereign form of power that aims 
to secure the state’s existence and ensure citizens meet their obligations. 
But also because there is now a pastoral responsibility for the state and its 
rulers that involves developing “those elements constitutive of individual’s 
lives in such a way that their development also fosters that of the strength 
of  the  state”  (Foucault  1988a,  82).  What  are  the  consequences  of  this          
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dynamic for today’s state and the exercise of political and governmental 
power?  And  what  are  the  consequences  of  this  dynamic  for  our 
understanding of self-managing reforms? 
    
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the historical formation of how we reason and 
enact government, specifically tracing two of its constitutive trajectories: 
reason  of  state  and  police.  I  have  drawn  attention  to  how  these  have 
instantiated into political rationality two ancient models of governing, and 
how  this  has  shaped  how  we  conceptualise  and  enact  the  exercise  of 
political and governmental power. Specifically, the state has totalising and 
individualising roots and effects, and their correlation has given rise to a 
state that has assumed pastoral responsibilities.  
  It  is  the  task  of  the  next  chapter  to  give  greater  contemporary 
relevance to this phenomenon by examining how reason of state and police 
relate to the formation of liberal government. This, I argue, has entailed 
combining an extensive pastoral technology of discipline and security with 
the government of a political community of free, self-governing citizens. I 
argue  that  this  precipitates  ongoing  political  and  governmental  tensions 
because the liberal state will govern for freedom and free processes, yet it 
will also maintain its interventionist pastoral role.           
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Chapter 5: Liberal Governmental Rationality 
and its Dilemma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This  chapter  follows  the  line  of  modification  of  the  political  rationality 
discussed in the preceding chapter and its twin games as they arise in the 
political  and  governmental  formation  we  call  liberalism.  This  is  an 
important task because our present governmental rationalities, techniques 
and practices, or how our society has come to think and act both politically 
and  governmentally,  are  underpinned  by  the  development  from  the 
eighteenth century of liberal governmental rationality. Gordon writes, “the 
whole  governmental  history  of  our  society  can  be  read  in  terms  of  the 
successive  topological  displacement  and  complications  of  this  liberal 
problem-space” (Gordon 1991, 16). Therefore, if we are to understand the 
crisis of the welfare state, and self-managing reforms, as a transformation 
in the modalities of governing, then we must understand liberalism.           
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  I follow Foucault’s argument that liberalism signifies a new way of 
reasoning and enacting government than that provided by reason of state 
and  police.  But  it  is  not  my  argument  that  liberal  government  restored 
freedom from the clutches of state power represented by reason of state and 
police.  Rather,  having  adopted  political  rationality,  which  correlates 
individualisation with a logic of state totalisation, liberalism invents novel 
concepts, artefacts and forms of government that limited state power in 
some respect, but in others accelerated its extension. This chapter opens to 
examination two linked domains. The first is these innovative concepts and 
artefacts  of  liberal  government,  and  the  second  is  the  tension  between 
freedom and security that besets this liberal modality of government.  
   
Liberalism 
 
Liberalism can be characterised as a shift in the eighteenth century from 
governing focused on sovereign power and family economy to an ‘arts of 
government’ focused on political economy. Foucault (2007; Foucault 2008) 
refers to three key elements shaping the emergence of liberalism as an art 
of government. Firstly, conceptions of the economy found in the work of 
the  économistes  and  political  economists  from  the  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth  centuries,  who  included  Francois  Quesnay,  Adam  Smith  and 
David  Ricardo.  The  second  influence  is  notions  of  the  population  as 
possessing  its  own  laws,  characteristics  and  regularities,  which  emerge 
from economic analysis and disciplinary and social interventions. The third 
key element is the discovery of the domain of civil society. I address these          
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in order. This examination begins with an excursus through the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century and the domain of grain production and circulation.  
 
The economy 
 
Police forms of government were particularly interested in the population’s 
relationship  to  the  processes  of  production,  market  and  trade  (Pasquino 
1978; Tribe 1980). Foucault observes:  
 
If governmentality of the state is interested, for the first time, in the 
fine materiality of human existence and coexistence, of exchange 
and circulation, if this being and well-being is taken into account for 
the first time by the governmentality of the state, through the town 
and  through  problems  like  health,  roads,  markets,  grains,  and 
highways, it is because at that time commerce is thought of as the 
main  instrument  of  the  state’s  power  and  thus  as  the  privileged 
object of a police whose objective is the growth of the state’s forces. 
(Foucault 2007, 339) 
 
Commerce was seen as a key instrument for maintaining and extending the 
strength of the state and it was in the image of the market town that police 
ordered and regulated the activities of individuals so that the market could 
function and goods and monies circulate. For this reason, mercantilism, or 
the  governmental  theory  and  practice  of  commerce  heavily  weighted  to 
police intervention, was inseparable from police (Tribe 1980). But by the 
early eighteenth century, this model of police was breached by a series of 
developments beginning with Quesnay’s conceptualisation of the economy 
as a quasi-natural order.           
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  It  was  the  policing  of  marketing,  scarcity  and  circulation  that 
provided a fundamental basis of criticism of the mercantilist approach of 
police. Économistes called into question key tenets of police’s approach to 
the  production  and  circulation  of  goods.  Put  simply,  under  mercantilist 
policy there must be plenty of grains in order that prices are kept low, 
wages are kept low, grains can be sold abroad and all this will enable the 
importation of the greatest amount of gold. Here, economic activity occurs 
in a rigid sovereign system and it must be regulated to ensure that prices are 
kept  low  and  the  scarcity  of  supply  is  eradicated.  For  économistes, 
however, avoiding the scarcity of grain meant making sure that it was well 
paid for and this was to be achieved not through regulation. Rather, cost 
must be an index of supply and demand, or the balance between scarcity 
and consumer desire (Higgs 1968). If prices are high farmers will sow as 
much as they can to secure the greatest profit, and this will ensure a greater 
harvest and less temptation to accumulate the grain for future scarcity. This 
‘just  price’  thesis  of  the  économistes’  analysis  called  into  question 
regulation, the desired mode of intervention of police.  
  The économistes’ argument was premised on the assumption that 
there is a “certain course of things” (Foucault 2007, 345; Higgs 1968) or a 
naturalness  in  economic  activity  that  cannot,  indeed  should  not,  be 
artificially modified lest negative consequences ensue. Foucault refers to 
Louis-Paul  Albeille’s  analysis  of  scarcity,  which  combined  most  of  the 
physiocrats’  positions  (Marcil  and  Pressman  1999).  Albeille’s  analytical 
scope  is  broad,  encompassing  processes  of  production,  the  market,  and 
detailed  knowledge  of  peasants,  their  behaviours,  motivations  and  their          
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calculations of possible situations. Albeille concluded that grain scarcity is 
not an inevitable outcome of living in an unpredictable world with finite 
resources.  Rather,  scarcity  is  artificially  constructed  on  account  of  the 
state’s intervention into the market.  
  Albeille argued, for instance, that regulating the price of grain to 
prevent its dearness leads people to stockpile their grain and therefore the 
more  prices  are  lowered  the  more  scarce  grains  will  become.  For 
économistes,  this  occurs  because  production  and  the  market  operate 
according  to  natural  self-regulating  principles.  For  example,  prices  will 
stabilise and be ‘true’ when the relationship between the cost of production 
and demand are allowed to naturally occur. Accordingly, the problem of 
mercantilist  policy  was  that  in  attempting  to  control  scarcity  through 
regulating the price of goods, their circulation, how they were sold, where, 
when and by whom, it introduced artificiality into this natural system and 
this consequently distorted its natural functioning, or ordre naturel. What, 
then, makes this reality natural and self-regulating in the first place?  
  For économistes and subsequent political economists, the motor of 
this  self-ordering  is  the  “spontaneous  bond”  (Foucault  2007,  352)  that 
occurs with the coexistence of persons (Gordon 1991). This spontaneity 
signifies  that  there  is  a  naturalness  that  obtains  in  the  interactions  and 
exchanges between autonomous people that is independent of any willing 
or intervention of the state (Ferguson 1995; Smith 1976). The motor of this 
spontaneous  bond  is  individual  and  collective  interests  and  unfettering 
these  renders  the  market  into  a  self-regulating  natural  system.  Interest, 
therefore, reveals itself to be the basis of ‘true’ market activity because it is          
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only when private individuals naturally compete for their best interests by 
seeking their maximum advantage that things will be ascribed their ‘true’ 
price.  
  This  should  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  economic  theorists  were 
ideologically  captured  by  the  image  of  the  free  individual,  or  that  their 
theories were obfuscations for the extension of economic power for the 
capitalised classes. Rather, de-regulating economic activity and enabling 
individuals to pursue their interests was conceived as conducive for the 
health of the economy and the population at large based upon the analysis 
of the economy
7. This is because as Smith made clear, obtaining the true 
price of things is profitable for the seller and buyer as constant fluctuation 
of prices enables sellers to independently adjust to situations so as to attain 
maximum  profit  while  buyers  incur  minimum  expense  (Smith  1976). 
Therefore, from the eighteenth century economists reached the consensus 
that with both exchangers seeking their best in the context of competitive 
free exchange, the free economy is not a zero-sum game because through 
the  action  of  the  invisible  hand  it  creates  possibilities  for  “mutual 
enrichment” (Foucault 2008, 54).   
  I have used the term ‘natural’ to describe how the économistes and 
political economists thought about the economy. This is important because 
naturalness supports a belief in non-interventionism. But this naturalness 
                                                 
7 F o r  économistes,  the  exercise  of  freedom  within  the  state  is  not  justified 
philosophically or morally. “It means, simply, that [government] arm its politics 
with a precise, continuous, clear and distinct knowledge of what is taking place in 
society, in the market, and in the economic circuits, so that the limitation of its 
power  is  not  given  by  respect  for  the  freedom  of  individuals,  but  simply  by 
evidence of economic analysis which it knows it has to be respected. It is limited 
by evidence, not by the freedom of individuals” (Foucault 2008, 62).           
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was not an ideology of a rising bourgeois class that enabled the obfuscation 
of reality and the extension of their power. Rather, this non-interventionist 
reasoning was supported by a belief in the economy’s naturalness and its 
attendant  ‘science  of  man’,  developed  by  économistes  and  the  Scottish 
enlightenment thinkers such as Adam Smith, and shaped in part by Isaac 
Newton, his empirical method and his natural law theory (Redman 1997). 
Newton and natural law theory heavily taught in the time of the classical 
political  economists  such  as  Smith  and  eighteenth  century  philosophers 
who employed Newton’s methods to the science of human behaviour, or 
moral philosophy. Newton’s discovery of the laws governing the order and 
harmony of the material universe led philosophers to reason that “disorder 
must be man-made and could be averted by studying human nature and 
ascertaining the natural laws or connecting principles that govern society” 
(Redman  1997,  111).  Consequently,  philosophers  searched  for  the 
immutable  laws,  principles  and  regularities  of  governing  society,  the 
universals  of  human  nature,  and  the  mental  state  of  human  being  as 
mirrored by the natural history of the physical universe. 
  The methodological approach to this moral philosophy was natural 
history because the science of human behaviour and the human and social 
world was seen to derive from the natural history of humanity. “Once these 
basic common elements – certain characteristics of human nature – were 
determined,  human  development  could  then  be  traced  through  time” 
(Redman 1997, 114). Smith, influenced by natural history (Redman notes 
the large number of books he owned on the topic), attempted to find a 
natural  order  of  things.  It  was  posited  that  change  was  natural,  slow,          
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progressive and predictable, and the history of humanity and society was 
thought to be natural and leading towards perfection. Importantly, because  
 
…progress was natural and anticipated, it was not the conditions under 
which progress takes place but the obstacles hindering a natural course 
of  development  that  became  the  Scots’  focus.  The  study  of  the 
improvement of society consisted in investigating the causes that had 
hitherto impeded the progress of mankind toward happiness and then 
examining the effects of the total or partial removal of these causes. 
(Redman 1997, 126) 
 
Based upon this methodological premise of the naturalness of regulation 
and progress, Smith and other Scottish enlightenment thinkers concluded 
that the balance and order of self-regulating systems, such as the economy 
and society as expressions of natural order, come about through individual 
self-interest, free will, and a legal structure ordained by nature, and not 
through the workings of centralised political government (also see Poovey 
2002).   
  As a consequence of this methodological premise of naturalness, 
économistes  and  political  economists  displaced  the  police  model  of 
economic activity with the free economy. The basis of the police model of 
economic regulation was the household and the circulation of goods and 
money  between  households,  and  this  was  maintained  by  incessant 
regulation. By comparison, with interests the basis for an elaboration of a 
‘physics’ of market activity, in the late seventeenth century and eighteenth 
centuries the ‘economy’ emerges as a life of its own. It becomes a quasi-
natural reality subject to natural processes, described by Dean as a “bio-         
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economic  reality”  (Dean  1999,  115).  This  reconceptualisation  of  the 
domain  of  economic  activity  by  physiocrats  such  as  Turgot,  Quesnay, 
Albeille,  and  political  economists  such  as  Smith,  Ricardo  and  Malthus 
brought to the thought and actions of governors the economy as a naturally 
existing,  spontaneously  ordered,  self-regulating  entity  (Foucault  2007; 
Ohara 1999; Redman 1997). 
  Therefore,  the  lesson  for  governors  or  those  who  aspired  for  a 
rational and effective government was that, through a free economy, “a 
regulation  based  upon  and  in  accordance  with  the  course  of  things 
themselves must replace a regulation by police authority”
 (Foucault 2007, 
344). To do otherwise is pointless and harmful because intervention into 
free  exchange  invalidates  the  economy  and  the  proper  functioning  of 
things, which is why Albeille argued scarcity is a product of an intervention 
that  disrupts  the  spontaneous  regulation  of  things  that  would  naturally 
prevent  scarcity.  This  emerging  axiom  of  naturalness,  of  a  social  order 
ordained by nature, also began to pertain to the notion of the population, 
and conceptualisations of its government in the interest of the state.  
 
The population 
 
This analysis of economic activity and the interactions of individuals mark 
the emergence of a new conceptualisation of the population, what Foucault 
(2007)  says  is  the  second  major  influence  shaping  the  emergence  of 
liberalism.  Let  us  recall  first  police’s  approach  to  the  population.  For 
police,  the  population  as  the  co-existence  of  individuals  was  important          
  132 
mainly in terms of its numbers and how this related to production and the 
strength of the state. Why? The greater the population, the more people 
were productive, which resulted in lower wages, which resulted in a lower 
cost  of  goods,  and  a  stronger  state.  What  matters  in  this  notion  of 
population  is  the  number  and  not  so  much  the  biological  attributes  and 
regularities  of  the  species.  In  the  analyses  of  économistes  and  political 
economists, however, the population was not merely the sum of productive 
individuals  inhabiting  a  territory,  or  political-juridical  subjects  of  the 
sovereign  to  be  employed  in  the  state’s  production  machine  (Burchell 
1991). It was something natural and variable. 
In the economic rationalities and practices that developed from the 
eighteenth  century  the  population  appeared  to  have  its  own  natural 
regularities determined more or less by modifiable circumstances of a given 
place.  For  example,  the  population  moves  and  diminishes  according  to 
wages,  prices,  and  the  availability  of  work,  consumable  goods,  natural 
resources and means of subsistence. Perceiving phenomena and effects at 
the level of the population led to the problematisation of the economy of 
police that existed under the sovereign, as this was largely based upon the 
household and the family and therefore Cameralism was imperceptible to 
phenomena at the level of the population. In comparison, the analyses of 
subsistence and the supply of grains for the population by Ricardo, Malthus 
(Redman  1997)  and  Albeille  (Foucault  2007)  introduced  a  host  of 
relativities into the economy through the population, whilst a whole host of 
relativities were introduced into the notion of population through economic 
factors;  for  instance,  that  the  population  is  attracted  to  high  wages  and          
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when  these  stabilise  population  growth  ceases,  or  Ricardo’s  theory  of 
wages (Redman 1997).   
  What is particularly remarkable about the notion of population as it 
was used in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is that it is no longer 
intelligible merely as a composition of households, communities or even 
individuals  motivated  by  private  interests  who  make  rational  economic 
calculations and decisions. Instead, the population is rendered visible in its 
economic,  biological  and  social  dimension,  and  these  have  a  reality 
perceptible at the level of the population rather than merely at the level of 
the  individual.  To  the  extent  that  the  population  possesses  biological 
regularities and natural phenomena that are dependent upon a multiplicity 
of  variables, i t  too  attains  in  rational  analysis  a  degree  of  naturalness 
comparable to the nature of wealth
8.  
  Interestingly,  this  economic  analysis  of  the  population  as  quasi-
natural  mirrors  the  rendering  of  the  population  as  a  set  of  natural 
phenomena  by  these  social  rationalities  and  techniques  directed  at  the 
problems of urban living. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there 
was a proliferation of apparatuses of social/moral statistics, calculation and 
regulation. Social reformers, philanthropists, doctors, teachers and public 
hygienists  concerned  with  social  order,  morals,  pauperism,  theft, 
criminality,  hygiene,  disease,  insanity,  wealth  and  general  wellbeing 
collected information on these (Foucault 1977, 1984b; Hunter 1994; Rose 
                                                 
8 Foucault notes: “It is the naturalness of those mechanism that ensure that, when 
prices rise, if one allows this to happen, then they will stop rising by themselves. It 
is the naturalness that ensures that the population is attracted by high wages, until 
a certain point at which wages stabilize and as a result the population no longer 
increases” (Foucault 2007, 349).          
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1999a, 1999b). Supported by the emerging fields of social medicine, public 
hygiene, statistics and demography, these processes of inquiry, inscription, 
calculation, analysis and intervention created new ways of conceiving the 
population as a biological and bio-social object.  
  Like  the  economy  in  economic  analysis,  the  population  had 
discernable  biological  and  social  regularities,  constancies,  averages, 
probabilities, effects and phenomena. With its own norms and regularities, 
the population was rendered intelligible as a natural entity, a life of its own, 
subject to natural processes and phenomena that shaped or were shaped by 
a multitude of variables (Foucault 2007). Consequently, and departing from 
police’s rudimentary use of population as something primarily linked to 
order and strength, from the eighteenth century the features and effects of 
the human species and its collective existence were rendered into an object 
of governmental concern: what was its condition, its health and its wealth? 
The  population  became  something  that  should  enter  into  political 
calculation and strategy, what Foucault termed biopolitics (Foucault 1998; 
Foucault 2008). 
  The approach subsequently taken to the population was informed by 
the discovery of its putative naturalness. Like the approach to the economy, 
if  the  state  was  to  take  responsibility  for  the  population,  it  would  be 
circumscribed to acting upon it as a “set of processes to be managed at the 
level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes” (Foucault 2007, 
70). This explains the increasing significance of the technical ‘norm’ to 
human and social inquiry and to the rational approaches to government. For 
Hacking, one can “use the word ‘normal’ to say how things are, but also to          
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say how they ought to be. The magic of the word is that we can use it to do 
both  things  at  once”  (Hacking  1990,  163).  In  other  words,  the  norm 
represented the natural features or processes of the population, yet it also 
gave  access  to  the  population,  its  processes  and  phenomena,  and  to 
individual  bodies.  So,  for  example,  the  intellect,  psyche,  personality, 
morals,  behaviour  and  bodies  of  members  of  the  population  could  be 
measured,  judged  and  intervened  in  so  as  to  optimise  the  wellbeing, 
productivity, wealth and health of the individual and the population.  
 
Civil society 
 
The  economy  and  population  were  increasingly  conceptualised  as 
coexisting  in  a  single  domain,  namely,  society  (Ferguson  1995).  For 
economic  theorists  such  as  Ferguson  civil  society  was  “‘as  old  as  the 
individual’” (Ferguson quoted in Burchell 1991, 134). But this is not the 
politico-juridical conception of society, that is to say, where society is the 
product of juridical-political subjects consenting to be governed through a 
social contract involving the surrender of their natural rights and freedoms 
for the mutual benefit of the individual and the state. In the economic and 
social analyses and interventions conducted by the disciplines, reformers, 
administrators and governors from the latter half of the eighteenth century, 
society  designated  a  realm  of  existence  composed  of  natural  processes, 
economic  and  non-economic  interests,  bonds  and  relationships  resulting 
from humankind’s life in common (Burchell 1991).           
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  No doubt this still contained the legal-political sphere and the legal 
subject of rights, but it was also a container for a range of separate spheres 
and quasi-natural processes, such as the economy, the population and the 
mechanisms of government.  
 
This new object, society, is made up of the concrete exchanges of 
the  economy,  of  the  lives,  infirmities,  frailties  and  death  of 
individuals, of the occupations, customs, habits, patterns of family 
life and modes of communication of the population, of the quest by 
the  population  for  subsistence,  and  of  the  ensuing  distribution  of 
wealth.  It  is  a  domain  of  harmony  and  conflict,  with  its  own 
historical forms of development, its own origins. (Dean 1999, 125-
126) 
 
To  the  extent  that  these  elements  were  pertinent  to  government,  civil 
society  became  the  new  domain  for  a  series  of  problematisations  of 
government and the elaboration of the instruments, tasks and objectives of 
government. 
  However, although civil society now became that concrete thing to 
be governed, it also established a limit to liberal governmentality. As the 
constituent elements of civil society were putatively naturally ordered, or 
contained  quasi-natural  processes  of  the  economy  and  population,  it 
appeared as something that was not the product of the state but in fact 
naturally  separate  from  it.  It  was,  for  instance,  composed  of  natural 
processes,  of  the  biological  dimension  of  human  kind’s  collective 
existence,  and  the  self-regulating  activities  of  the  economic  subject  of 
interest.           
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  Conceiving  civil  society  as  a  domain  consisting  of  naturally 
occurring rules and regularities and therefore separate from the artifice of 
the state, meant that it could not possibly be fully known or fully directed 
by  governors.  Effectively,  then,  the  économistes’  identification  of  this 
“object-domain of government as possessing a naturalness of immanent, 
self-regulatory mechanisms and processes… make the sovereign’s despotic 
imposition of regulations both futile and harmful” (Burchell 1991, 126). 
For  the  économistes  and  political  economists  the  exercise  of  political 
sovereignty must respect civil society and its natural processes in order that 
the natural dynamics of the market and the collective benefit of its free play 
are optimised.  
  Now, we have covered the key elements of liberalism that we can 
identify in contemporary governmental rationalities: the market economy, 
the  population  and  civil  society.  I  have  also  emphasised  how  each  is 
thought about as natural. How, then, might these be understood in terms of 
the rationality of liberal government? How does freedom get instantiated in 
the mode of government known as liberalism? 
 
The governmental rationality of liberalism 
 
Liberalism was not rendered into a functioning rationality of government 
by  the  canonical  texts  of  the  philosophy  of  natural  liberty.  Rather,  it 
emerged from the many attempts to reason and govern those aspects of 
living that confronted collective human existence. An important feature in 
the  development  of  this  new  way  of  reasoning  was  the  creation  of  the          
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domain of civil society and within it the population and economy. It was 
the  ascription  of  a  naturalness  to  these  domains,  in  antipathy  to  the 
artificiality of ‘the state’, that was a key influence in the instantiation of 
freedom in the rationality of liberal government. This naturalness defined 
for liberalism the limit to the exercise of an interventionist political and 
state power. 
Liberal  government  conceived  of  civil  society  as  a  domain  of 
existence  beyond  the  state  and  political  authority.  This  realm  was 
conceived as being constituted by natural and self-organising properties, 
entities and processes. This meant that civil society required freedom in 
order that the self-regulating processes, such as the market economy, could 
occur unimpeded. Consequently, with its free and natural processes, civil 
society was outside of the scope of direct political activity. In fact, civil 
society would function as an “instrument of critique” (Burchell 1996, 28) 
because government was to respect that which obtains in civil society.  
This limit represents a break from reason of state and police. These 
were embedded with the principle that government is its own end and that 
the reason for government is securing the existence and strength of the 
state.  The  techniques  of  police  aspired  to  a  totally  administered  world, 
conceiving that the state’s actions were necessary for securing everyone’s 
wellbeing, the happiness of each and all. Directed towards maximising the 
happiness and strength of the state enabled the maximisation of government          
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and  regulation  without  limitation
9.  Liberal  political  rationality  displaced 
these dreams and schemes.  
However, this did not mean that police’s concerns for the order of 
the state and the link between the state’s security and its internal welfare 
was subsumed under a dogged pursuit of freedom. This belief would lead 
us to incorrectly define liberalism as a “passive abstentionism” (Gordon 
1991, 17), or reduce liberalism to a constitutional form of government that 
simply sets the juridical framework for protecting and enabling individual 
liberty and economic exchange. This may appear to be the case when we 
consider liberalism’s embrace of free enterprise, or when we find historical 
examples such as that in the early nineteenth century when governmental 
policy  involved  abolishing  the  legal  right  to  public  assistance  so  as  to 
ensure the economic independence of the population and the self-regulating 
mechanisms  of  wealth  creation  (Beeson  and  Firth  1998).  However,  the 
conditions  of  liberal  self-limitation  imposed  by  the  constraints  of  the 
natural order, self-regulating systems and freedom, produced a novel art of 
government.  
That is, for liberal political rule, welfare, security and order were to 
be obtained by respecting and maintaining that which is natural to civil 
society. Liberalism, therefore, sought to govern with the grain of things by 
securing  the  automatic  and  optimal  functioning  of  the  natural  processes 
contained in civil society. This involved respecting the freedom of society’s 
                                                 
9 As Foucault puts it, the principle underpinning police was: “Not enough attention 
is being given to things, too much escapes control, too many domains lack rules 
and regulation, order and administration are lacking. In short, there is too little 
government” (Foucault 2008, 318).            
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properties and processes to be naturally, and allowing these to define the 
limit  of  the  government  of  the  state.  For  liberalism,  therefore,  it  was 
“necessary to arouse, to facilitate, and to laissez faire, in other words to 
manage and no longer control through rules and regulations… to ensure 
that the natural and necessary regulations work” (Foucault 2007, 353).  
Circumscribing its task to “fostering the self-organizing capacities 
of civil society” (Rose and Miller 1992, 179), liberalism has been aptly 
described as an ‘economic government’. Not only because of its orientation 
to  the  market  but  also  because  its  use  of  governmental  authority  and 
methods were to be economical and frugal (Burchell 1991), demarcating 
certain domains as not within the scope of state power. For example, fear of 
disrupting their natural and autonomous functioning, the market, the family 
and individual free will were privatised in the sense of placing them outside 
of  the  direct  reach  of  state  activity,  and  only  subject  to  the  law  (Rose 
1999a). 
 However,  “liberal  government  offers  the  most  fundamental  and 
enduring  extension  of  the  power  of  the  government  of  the  state  so  far 
witnessed” (Dean 2007, 100). This is because, perhaps paradoxically, the 
objective  of  securing  society  and  its  natural  processes  in  their  freedom 
generated a need to know society’s domains, objects and its processes in 
their  naturalness  so  that  the  natural  laws  and  logics  governing  these 
domains  would  be  allowed  to  occur  undisturbed  (Burchell  1991;  Dean 
2007). 
  This represents an important innovation of liberalism: it resulted in 
a  growth  in  the  techniques  and  processes  of  individualisation  and          
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regulation.  Liberalism  propelled  the  expansion  of  institutions  and 
disciplines concerned with inquiring into the properties, phenomena and 
mechanics  of  civil  society,  such  as  the  human  and  social  sciences  in 
universities (Reueschmeyer and Skocpol 1996). A swathe of disciplines, 
experts and professionals were empowered by political rule to engage in 
objectifying civil society, economic processes and the population in order 
to acquire knowledge of these. This enabled regulatory intervention to be 
modelled on the ‘natural’ regulations, processes, expectations, norms and 
values (‘the normal frame of life’) uncovered of civil society, the economy 
and the population (Dean 2007). Respecting the limits of the state and the 
autonomy  of  society,  those  mechanisms,  agencies,  experts  and 
organisations existing in civil society (rather than direct political actors) 
would undertake this regulation (Rose 1993). 
  Does this explosion in the administrative apparatus actually reveal 
that freedom in liberal governmental reason is an illusion or an ideological 
means  for  exploiting  the  various  classes  of  society?  In  an  innovative 
interpretation  of  liberalism,  Foucault  (2008)  argues  that  the  liberal 
rationalities and techniques of government were not antithetical to freedom 
but sought to instrumentalise it. Économistes and political economists, for 
example, did not construe freedom to be a threat to order and government 
because  they  believed  the  market-exchanging  conduct  of  individuals 
enabled  the  natural  and  optimal  functioning  of  the  market,  and  by 
implication  the  accrual  of  social  and  economic  benefits  to  one  and  all 
(Burchell 1996). Therefore, the importance of liberalism is not that it was 
an ideological ruse for the advancement of economic interests or that it          
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“first recognised, defined or defended freedom as a right of all citizens. 
Rather, its significance is that for the first time the arts of government were 
systematically linked to the practice of freedom”
10 (Rose 1999b, 68). 
  Therefore, having established this relationship between the freedom 
of  individuals  and  the  achievement  of  order,  liberalism  conceives  the 
exercise of governmental power in terms of shaping the exercise of that 
freedom, so as to ensure “the proper use of liberty” (Burchell 1991, 139). 
The ‘proper use of liberty’ was defined according to the characteristics of 
the normal, natural and optimal functioning of individuals, the population, 
the  economy,  and  civil  society  developed  through  the  abovementioned 
social and human inquiries and interventions (Hindess 1996a).  
  Hunter’s (1988; 1994) genealogy of the popular school is exemplary 
of this government through freedom. State administered schooling emerged 
from practical concerns about the population’s moral and social wellbeing, 
which  included  problems  of  idleness  and  crime.  Through  its  teachers, 
organisation,  curriculum  and  pedagogical  techniques,  schools  brought 
expertise  and  their  normalising  knowledges  into  the  realm  of  child 
development. Through schools, the behaviours, morals and affects of the 
nation’s children could be monitored, supervised, corrected and equipped 
with the capacities required to govern themselves according to society’s 
norms.  Schooling,  therefore,  was  a  training  ground  for  the  responsible 
                                                 
10 Foucault writes: “Government... did not only cover the legitimately constituted 
forms of political or economic subjection, but also the modes of action, more or 
less considered and calculated, which were destined to act upon the possibilities 
of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the field of 
action of others” Foucault, M. (1982). "The Subject and Power", in J. D. Faubion, 
(ed.), Power. New york: The New York Press..          
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exercise of freedom, and it was increasingly crucial for securing peace, 
order and greater freedom within the liberal state.  
  Therefore,  administrative  technologies  and  practices  were 
increasingly  employed  by p olitical,  social  and  economic  rulers  to  align 
individual self-government, or how people exercised their freedom, with 
the natural regularities, tendencies, values and truths of civil society and the 
individual  (Dean  2007).  This  involved  transforming  the  knowledge  of 
biological  processes,  productivity,  education,  delinquency,  personal 
hygiene, public health, poverty, and much more besides, into social and 
political programs so as to “structure the possible field of action of others” 
(Foucault 2000, 341). 
 
An internal dilemma for liberalism 
 
In the constitution of the free economy, population and civil society that 
has taken place over the past three or so centuries there is a tension that has 
developed  at  the  heart  of  liberalism,  and  which  has  contemporary 
relevance. If freedom is the principle of liberal governmental thought and 
practice, how can benefit accrue to the state and the total population where 
the exercise of freedom by individuals, especially in increasingly populous 
and urbanised territories, may produce parlous effects? How can liberalism 
ensure  public  order,  peace,  thriving  markets  and  responsible  citizenship 
whilst  also  respecting  the  naturalness  and  freedoms  of  the  market, 
population and the individual?           
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  For  Foucault,  at  the  heart  of  liberal  government  is  a  “mobile 
problematic relationship between the production of freedom and that which 
in the production of freedom risks limiting and destroying it” (Foucault 
2008, 64). Personal or collective interests and the autonomous activities of 
individuals  potentially  pose  a  danger  to  the  wellbeing  and  security  of 
property,  the  state,  practices  of  government,  or  the  population  (Hindess 
1997). This is indicative of a tension in liberal government between the 
“dangers of governing too much with the dangers of not governing enough” 
(also Miller and Rose 1990; Rose 1996b, 69; Rose and Miller 1992), or 
determining between, in Jeremy Bentham’s imprecise terms, the agenda 
and non-agenda of government (Gordon 1991).  
  Isaiah Berlin (1979) rationalised this problematic by distinguishing 
between negative freedom, where individuals are left to their own devices, 
and positive freedom, in which authorities intervene in people’s lives in 
order that personal freedom may be fully realised. In creating and setting 
the  conditions  for  freedom,  liberalism  finds  itself  engaged  in  seemingly 
illiberal  activities,  for  instance,  enforcing  compulsory  education  for  its 
young.  But  the  tension  here  is  not  the  product  of  a  philosophical 
inconsistency as Berlin suggests. Rather, this dilemma sheds light on the 
fact that liberalism is not the realisation of the philosophical principle of 
liberty,  but  that  it  constitutes  an  ‘arts  of  government’  linking  the 
government of the state with the government of the individual through their 
freedom. 
  Liberal government, therefore, is beset by a seemingly paradoxical 
situation  in  which  it  must  secure  freedom  and  the  effects  of  too  much          
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freedom (Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008). On the one hand, freedom is a 
condition for the security of the state. Therefore, liberal government must 
secure  enough  freedom  to  enable  the  natural  self-regulation  of  human 
activity, thereby securing the social order and averting the corruption of the 
market  and  the  debasement  of  the  mind  (Hindess  1996a).  On  the  other 
hand, security is a product of a government that regulates populations and 
individuals, and what happens within states, in ways that avert the abuse of 
their freedom. Hence, in his advocacy for the panopticon Bentham argued 
regulatory mechanisms are a condition of liberty (Dean 1999). In both of 
these instances, governmental power is called upon to exercise constant 
vigilance  and  activity  in  order  to  secure  civil  society,  the  state  and  the 
rights and freedoms of individuals.  
  To  conventional  liberal  political  philosophers,  including  Berlin 
(1979), this issue plays out in the form of the juridical protection of rights, 
liberty, property and contracts, the employment of regulatory techniques 
aimed at the juridical-political subject or those who contravene the law, and 
the disciplinary techniques such as education for training the citizen-subject 
in  their  rights  and  responsibilities.  No  doubt  these  are  important 
interventions  that  proliferated  with  liberal  government  but  in  liberal 
government  the  complex  apparatus  that  developed  from  the  eighteenth 
century for investigating, normalising and correcting human bodies, minds 
and affects has become central to securing civil society and the state. This 
pastoral role, inherited from the pastoral role derived from the confluence 
of reason of state and police, was mentioned above in relation to securing          
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the proper exercise of liberty through cultivating normalised and prudent 
self-government. 
  So,  in  relation  to  the  twin  pressures  of  security  and  freedom, 
liberalism has come to depend upon cultivating self-governing citizens that 
can discharge their freedoms responsibly for the good of the welfare of all 
within the state. Through the elaboration of individualising technologies, 
the  individual’s  personality,  habits,  disposition,  psyche,  conduct,  affect, 
bodies  and  desires  are  shaped  according  to  the  standards  and  norms 
characteristic of the rational, autonomous, responsible and self-governing 
individual derived from the inquiries into the population, civil society and 
economic  activity  (Hindess  1996a).  For  example,  nineteenth  century 
governmental  and  disciplinary  practices  of  correction  and  improvement, 
such as education on child-rearing, parental roles and savings (Donzelot 
1978),  equipped  individuals  with  the  necessary  norms,  knowledge, 
attributes and skills for assuming their obligations to the social contract as 
responsible, free and self-governing citizens: 
 
These  mechanisms  and  devices…  seek  to  produce  the  subjective 
conditions,  the  forms  of  self-mastery,  self-regulation  and  self-
control, necessary to govern a nation now made up of free citizens. 
(Rose 1993, 289) 
   
Those not fitting the normative range were subject to more coercive forms 
of  biopolitical  management  as  they  were  either  deemed  incapable  of 
exercising  their  liberty  responsibly  or  it  was  thought  their  exercise  of 
liberty threatened the security of civil society and its domains and natural          
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processes.  Many  of  these  transgressors  were  regarded  as  anti-social, 
degenerate, feeble-minded and subject to incarceration, medical treatment, 
correction and supervision.  
  This represents an obvious dilemma for liberalism.  
  On  the  one  hand,  the  state i s   subject  to  scrutiny  to  ensure  the 
protection and strengthening of the political and civil rights of individuals 
as autonomous, self-governing and political-juridical subjects of rights and 
freedoms (Hindess 1996a). On the other hand, the security of the liberal 
state and the possibility of a liberal government of free individuals have 
come to depend upon liberal government’s capacity to order, care for, and 
administer  individuals  and  society.  Critical  to  this  endeavour  was 
effectively  integrating  individuals  into  the  collective  through  cultivating 
self-governing citizenship defined and policed according to the ideals of the 
population and civil society. Because of this dual role, Dean estimates that: 
 
Liberalism is a particular form of articulation of the ‘shepherd-flock 
game’ and the ‘city-citizen’ game, of a pastoral power that takes the 
form  of  a  bio-politics  of  the  administration  of  life  and  form  of 
sovereignty  that  deploys  the  law  and  rights  to  limit,  to  offer 
guarantees, to make safe and, above all to legitimate and justify the 
operations of bio-political programs and disciplinary practices. (Dean 
1999, 132) 
 
  An agonistic dilemma for liberalism, therefore, is that while it seeks 
to enable individuals to assume their role as individuals engaged in their 
own self-government, it also assumes responsibility for cultivating the free 
individual  self  whose  attributes  are  shaped  by  governmental  norms  and          
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ideals  indexed  to  the  population,  civil  society  and  state  security.  This 
dilemma  exists  because  liberalism  has  inherited  a  responsibility  for  the 
pastoral care of the individual, and this invariably occurs within a totalising 
state rationality. And while liberalism subjects the pastoral role of the state 
and  its  sovereign  legitimation  to  continual  scrutiny  and  calls  for  its 
limitation,  it  also  construes  its  pastoral  role  and    technologies  of 
government as a condition of freedom. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have examined how the liberal rationality and its arts of 
government emerge as a general critique of the early forms of government 
known  as  reason  of  state  and  police.  However,  against  conventional 
political theory, these forms of government were not subject to critique and 
replacement  by  reflections  and  meditations  of  moral  and  social 
philosophers  based  on  juridical  protection  of  human  liberty  and  rights 
against the encroachments of the state and rejection of regulation. Indeed, 
économistes  and  not  jurists  first  made  criticisms  of  the  police  state. 
Liberalism emerged as a critique of how to regulate the biological lives of 
humans within a system that accentuates respect for legal subjects and free 
enterprise. While the liberal state acts upon its citizens as self-governing 
individuals  who  belong  through  a  system  of  rights  and  freedoms  to  a 
political  and  civic  community,  individualising  technologies  of  the 
disciplines  and  government  have  subsequently  developed,  especially  in 
relation to the totalising concerns of the state.           
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  Liberalism generates great distrust of the state and political power, 
inserting  freedom  into  its  modalities  of  rule.  But  because  security  is  a 
condition of freedom, liberalism generated a novel art of government that 
seeks to shape the free conduct of individuals by shaping and normalising 
their  wills,  personalities,  habits,  values,  to  dispense  their  liberties 
reasonably.  The  objective  of  securing  the  self-governing  political 
community  in  whose  name  political  power  is  exercised  has  become 
tethered  to  mechanisms  for  securing  the  population’s  welfare  under  the 
condition  of  freedom.  Hence  liberalism  is  just  as  concerned  with 
normalising  and  integrating  individuals  so  as  to  shape  their  exercise  of 
freedom as much as guaranteeing their rights and freedoms.  
  I venture to add that this history of the pastoral governmental state’s 
formation and the tension that has developed between the ‘register of social 
administration’ and the ‘register of freedom’ (Popkewitz 2000c) may be 
shaping contemporary governmentality. For instance, this tension appears 
to exist in the seemingly contradictory situation where, on the one hand, the 
state and government powers have been vociferously attacked for being 
paternalistic and diminishing the freedom of its citizens. And yet, on the 
other hand, the liberal state has also been condemned for failing to protect 
the welfare of its most vulnerable citizens, or to protect ‘normal citizens’ 
from the abnormal or incompetent. While I do not claim that this tension 
between freedom and administration is the ‘essence’ of our contemporary 
welfare state problem, it does support the analysis of the welfare state crisis 
as a crisis of liberal governmentality.          
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Chapter 6: The Crisis of Liberalism: From 
Welfare to Advanced Liberalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I examined the formation of the modern liberal state 
and the political reason from which it is formed and which continues today. 
This  opened  up  to  examination  two  distinct  domains.  The  first  was  the 
space of liberal government and its rationalities and techniques. These were 
a product of modifications from earlier forms of governmental rationalities 
and  technologies,  in  particular  reason  of  state  and  police.  The  second 
domain pertains to a dilemma in governmental rationality on account of the 
state’s historical formation as a pastoral power. In the liberal state, this 
dilemma circulates around the problem of securing freedom and securing 
order. The following explores how this dilemma manifests in the 1970s as a 
crisis of the rationalities and modalities of rule within the welfare state. 
  This chapter begins by outlining an understanding of the welfare 
state as a social liberal rationality and modality of rule. This was a pastoral          
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form  of  government  of  the  nation  that  like  liberalism  was  pegged  to 
governing through people’s freedom. However, while the welfare state was 
concerned with securing freedom in the face of conditions and events that 
threatened  it,  its  socialisation  of  the  economy,  social  processes  and 
insecurity and the centralisation of state power that this required became an 
object of liberal critique. This critique and the governmental rationalities 
associated with it, known as neo-liberalism and advanced liberalism, sought 
to  diminish  the  totalising  power  of  the  state  and  restore  personal  and 
economic freedoms. This transformation from social to advanced liberal 
government designates the crisis of liberalism
11, and this was the condition 
of possibility for contemporary self-managing school reforms. 
 
Liberalism and the welfare state 
 
The welfare state is central to the transformation of the rationalities and 
technologies  of  rule  that  has  beset  many  Western  liberal  democratic 
countries. So, what is the welfare state? Assessments of the welfare state 
vary.  Some  have  argued  that  the  welfare  state  is  an  ideological 
mystification  performing  an  ideological  function  for  controlling  the 
working class under the guise of humanism (Gough 1979). For others, the 
welfare state and its associated bureaucratic apparatus resemble a socialist 
and authoritarian form of government that tends to be undemocratic and 
illiberal  (Buchanan  and  Wagner  1977).  These  characterisations  are 
                                                 
11 Foucault (2008) uses the terms “crisis of governmentality” (2008, 68), “crisis of 
the apparatus of governmentality” (2008, 70) and “crisis of liberalism” (2008, 70) 
interchangeably in his January 1979 lecture.          
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countered  by  the  welfare  state’s  construal  as  an  expression  of  social 
democratic ideology. That is, it is an expression of a settlement between the 
working  and  capitalist  classes  (Offe  1984)  whereby  the  social  and 
economic domains are intervened in so as to protect individuals’ welfare, 
citizenship rights and social equality, not unlike Marshall’s sense of the 
welfare state (Marshall 1964). With such variations in the understanding of 
the welfare state, where should our analysis begin? 
  A desirable place to begin is with the notion that the state is not a 
unified  social  actor  whose  acquittal  of  policy  merely  depends  upon  its 
internal will, a point I have made earlier. This is because government, as an 
activity  or  set  of  techniques,  is  constituted  by  ad  hoc,  heterogeneous, 
pragmatic  and  coincidental  institutional,  expert,  professional  and  local 
knowledges and technologies. This means we should not assume the state is 
a  centralised  actor  that  dispenses  government  under  the  influence  of 
coherent ideologies, philosophies or doctrines (Hindess 1987a). This top-
down conception of government assumes “there is an essential unity to the 
practical  strategies  of  political  practice  which  can  be  described  as  their 
ideological  determinants”  (Burchell  1994,  325).  This  is  the  kind  of 
assumption that leads one to reduce liberalism to means the doctrine of 
laissez faire and rule of law, and the welfare state to signify citizenship and 
care. 
  Therefore, an examination of the welfare state and its contemporary 
relevance must begin with the premise that like liberalism it is foremost 
constituted  by  a  multitude  of  regulatory  agents  and  governmental 
programmes scattered throughout the social field, each pursuing specific          
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objectives, through a variety of limited technical methods and with a range 
of  criteria  of  assessment  (Hindess  1987a).  Moreover,  these  cannot  be 
analysed as if readily amenable to political rule or political ideologies (of 
welfare or social democracy) because although political authorities seek to 
govern at a distance through this multitude of authorities, these too “have 
sought to govern economic, familial and social arrangements according to 
their own programmes and to mobilize political resources for their own 
ends” (Rose and Miller 1992, 181).  
  What, then, is the formula of rule constituting the welfare state, or 
the  patterns  of  regulation  that  make  the  welfare  state  discernable  as  a 
specific kind of political object? While the concerns and practices of liberal 
government characteristic of the eighteenth and nineteenth were grounded 
in  the  putative  natural  laws  of  society,  market  and  the  self-interested 
individual,  as  a  mutation  of  liberal  rationalities  and  technologies  of 
government,  the  welfare  state  shares  with  liberalism  a  commitment  to 
political  and  economic  freedom,  and  an  ambition  to  understand  and 
improve the condition of the people and the economy and to secure the 
state.  Moreover,  political  authorities  still  govern  at  a  distance  by 
authorising a range of expertises, disciplinary knowledge and technologies 
that  aspire  to  govern  the  freedom  of  individuals  in  responsible  and 
productive  ways  remains.  However,  the  ‘regulatory  regularity’  to  the 
dispersed  mentalities,  technologies  and  programs  of  government  of  the 
welfare state is that it enacts a ‘social liberalism’ (Hindess 1996b). That is 
to say, the welfare state’s formula for governing was refracted through a          
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notion  of  the  ‘social’,  meaning  governmental  questions  were  asked  and 
answered from the “social point of view” (Rose 1999b, 130). 
    
The emergence of social government 
   
The welfare state emerged when the social not only came into being as an 
object  of  government  but  also  became  wedded  to  political  thought  and 
action. But the social did not come to government ready-formed. Philip 
Abrams noted in his seminal text, The Origins of British Sociology, that 
nineteenth century social science lacked sociology but was suffuse with 
stultifying  moralism  (Driver  1988).  That  is  because  throughout  the 
nineteenth century it appeared to governors and agents of rule that that 
which harms the freedom of individuals and the order of society can be 
found  in  the  moral  dimension  of  existence  (Hunt  1999;  Rose  1999b; 
Valverde 2008).  
  London  Magistrate  Patrick  Colquhoun  in  1806  in  a  New  and 
Appropriate System of Education for the Labouring People wrote of the 
need for: 
 
guiding and properly directing the early conduct of the lower orders 
of  the  community...  giving  a  right  bias  to  their  minds...  The 
prosperity  of  every  state  depends  on  the  good  habits,  and  the 
religious and moral instruction of the labouring people. By shielding 
the minds of youth against the vices that are most likely to beset 
them, much is gained to society in the prevention of crimes, and in 
lessening  the  demand  for  punishments.  (Colquhoun  quoted  in 
Donald 1992, 21) 
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Colquhoun was concerned for the rapidly declining morals of the ‘inferior 
classes’  and  this  required  instructing  them  in  their  religious  and  moral 
duties. Informed by contested ethical and theological principles, reformers 
such as David Stow (1850) and Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth (1862) coded 
problems such as disease, criminality, pauperism and indigence in a moral 
form; these were problems of character, degeneration and demoralisation 
(Dean 1999). It was the moral that explained and shaped individual conduct 
and attitudes, and therefore it was the moral dimension of existence that 
was  the  sphere  of  regulatory  activity  of  politicians,  churches, 
philanthropists,  doctors,  moral  statisticians  and  educationalists.  Rose 
writes: 
 
The  term  ‘moral’  here  referred  to  a  set  of  phenomena  that  seem 
confused to our eyes but which once had a characteristic unity. The 
moral  was  a  kind  of  plane  of  intersection  between  experience, 
inheritance,  conscience,  character  and  conduct,  located  within  a 
wider space of the character of a people as a whole. (Rose 1999b, 
103) 
 
  The  moral  cannot  be  readily  transposed  onto  the  social  because 
governmental  intervention  was  directed  to  shaping  the  character,  moral 
civility,  will  and  conscience  of  ‘moral  subjects’  (Collini  1991).  This 
reflected  a  specific  problematisation  and  objective  of  government; 
countering  the  corrupting  “dense  working-class  enclaves  created  by 
industrialization and urbanization” (Donald 1992, 23), and vices posed in 
respect  to  sexuality,  disease,  will,  purity  and  virtue.  The  state,  it  was 
reasoned, should be concerned with the “virtues of character – self-reliance,          
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sobriety,  independence,  self-restraint,  respectability,  self-improvement” 
(Rose 1999b, 105), for as Colquhoun suggests, “If the morals of the inferior 
orders of society are not of the highest importance to the state and to the 
country, it is difficult to discover in the various ramifications of political 
economy what is really important” (Colquhoun 1806a, 68).  
  Technologies such as pauper and monitorial schools, reformatory 
prisons,  washhouses,  the  psy  disciplines,  friendly  societies,  and  even 
libraries and museums sought to cultivate the habits of personal hygiene, 
introspection and obedience, “foresight, prudence and planful relation to 
the future”, and new regimes of the intellect such as literacy and numeracy 
(Rose 1999b, 104; Valverde 2008; Wohl 1984). Schooling as a means for 
securing the moral condition of the population, and especially the working 
class,  became  the  subject  of  intense  inquiry  and  debate  (Cousins  1838; 
Horner  1840;  Stow  1850).  Inspector  of  Schools,  Joseph  Fletcher, 
envisioned  a  schooling  system  for  cultivating  the  young  with  “physical 
strength,  intellectual  vigour  and  passions  and  affections”  for  making  its 
recipients “good and wise” (Fletcher 1851; Silver 1994, 23). 
  Given  that  moral  government  encompassed  a  concern  for  the 
environmental context of individual behaviour (Driver 1988), it is probably 
not  a  surprise  that  these  moral  problems  of  government  were  ripe  for 
reframing in a way more familiar to us; that is, in terms of ‘the social’. 
While  the  use  of  the  terms  ‘social’  and  ‘society’  was  not  new  to  the 
nineteenth century, what was novel was the invention of the social as an 
objective sector of reality to be targeted for inquiry and regulation (Poovey 
2002). A labour of inquiry, documentation, statistics, censuses and surveys          
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into phenomena or problems related to the conditions and health effects of 
factories, unemployment, casual employment, poverty, criminality, illness, 
suicide, and the dangers of civil unrest particularly around the meaning of 
citizenship, rendered the moral domain thinkable, knowable and calculable 
differently.  In  these  attempts  to  calculate  about  and  regulate  reality, 
regularities and characteristics were construed as attributes of collectivities 
and indicative of social rather than individual causal factors (Reueschmeyer 
and  Skocpol  1996).  Here  emerged  the  social  as  a  specific  domain  of 
collective existence that possessed its own natural rules and phenomena 
irreducible to the individual (Dean 1999; Deleuze 1978; Donzelot 1978; 
Poovey 2002; Rose 1996b). 
  Previously political or moral problems such as unemployment now 
appeared as social problems with significance to the social whole. When an 
individual was out of work, for example, this was not just a problem for the 
individual but also for the health and wellbeing of society or the social 
whole, conceptualised in terms of social efficiency, social wastage, social 
promotion,  social  mobility  and  social  rights.  Fin  de  siecle  Australian 
education  reformer,  Peter  Board,  was  concerned  with  educational  and 
social wastage and its effects on the welfare of the social whole:  
 
It is as a city problem that the subject of the training for industrial 
efficiency  of  the  youths  of  the  city  who  now  drift  aimlessly  and 
wastefully in what should be the most educative period of their lives, 
has to be considered in its bearing upon the welfare of the state as a 
whole. (Board quoted in Campbell and Sherington 2006, 30) 
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Where once the moral order was a grid that encompassed nations, bearing 
upon  the  character  and  habits  of  individuals  and  something  shaped  by 
individual stock, habits and conduct, it increasingly appeared that people’s 
experiences  were  enframed  by  a  national-social  architecture.  People 
belonged to a society and were principally social beings, and that this was 
formative of individual character and attributes and a source of individual 
and collective problems. The social, therefore, was a domain of problems 
that  beset  the  proper  government  of  individuals,  the  population  and  the 
state, and therefore it was a “problem space within which one must pose a 
range of questions and struggles about the matter of life, of conduct, of 
powers and authority” (Rose 1999b, 114). 
  Interestingly,  while  philanthropic,  medical,  educational  and 
working-class associations were proselytising the importance of the social 
and engaged in albeit dispersed, provisional and partial social policy (Dean 
2008;  Rose  1999b,  130),  liberal  political  authorities  were  not  easily 
converted to this social point of view. For the welfare state to emerge these 
social  rationalities  and  modalities  needed  to  be  inscribed  in  political 
rationalities. This occurred when the state and political authorities could no 
longer resist not intervening into society and social processes. What caused 
this?  
  While  there  is  no  single  causal  factor  to  be  found,  there  were 
influential factors. One was that the descriptions of the “ills, problems and 
risks” (Dean 2008, 30) posed by social, economic and industrial processes 
generated a growing appreciation by social liberals and social democrats of 
the limits of political economy to remedy the maladies of modern living.          
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Civil unrest in the mid nineteenth century raised questions about the role of 
the state. Evidence mounted that much phenomena that had significance to 
the wellbeing of the nation and population were social in character. In the 
“face  of  rising  political  unrest  and  evidence  of  the  malign  effects  of 
irregular employment, poor living conditions and squalor”, demands for 
extensive  social  intervention  to  “mitigate  what  were  now  seen  as  the 
inevitable social consequences of capitalist economic arrangements” (Rose 
1999b, 118) gained traction in the political domain. 
  By  the  early  twentieth  century  the  relatively  unsystematic  and 
haphazard array of social devices for addressing specific sectors, issues or 
problems became linked into the formal political apparatus. This was a sign 
that  politicians  increasingly  accepted  that  “at  least  some  aspects  of  this 
social  domain  should  be  added  to  the  responsibilities  of  the  political 
apparatus and its officials” (Rose 1999b, 117). It was here, when political 
rationalities became indexed to ‘the social problem’, when ‘society’ took 
responsibility for the individual, and the diverse agents of rule were more 
tightly knitted into the political machinery, that governmental modalities 
gained a level of consistency such that we could name it the welfare state.  
 
The governmental rationality of social liberalism 
 
Political authorities now perceived that the optimisation of the life of the 
population, national wellbeing and its prosperity were inextricably tied to 
the  health  and  wellbeing  of  the  processes  of  the  social  domain,  to 
preventing social fracture and fragmentation, neutralising social threats and          
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to securing social cohesion, social responsibility, social promotion, social 
stability,  social  solidarity  and  the  collective  destiny  (Dean  1999;  Rose 
1999b;  Wittrock  and  Wagner  1996).  In  other  words,  the  welfare  state, 
although still committed to the liberal government of the people, involved 
reasoning liberal government and its objectives, means and objects around 
‘the social’. 
  This capacity to assume responsibility for governing society and the 
social  was  undoubtedly  a  consequence  of  the  pastoral  role  of  the  state 
inherited from its historical formation. Signified by the term ‘welfare’, it 
reflected a pastoral form of government that liberalism itself invoked in the 
elaboration  of  biopolitical  rationalities  and  technologies  of  government. 
With the welfare state, however, the pastoral role of the state intensified.  
  In the domain of the economy, social democrats and social liberals 
argued that laissez faire and the economy’s boom and bust cycle created 
the  problems  of  unemployment,  social  fragmentation,  exploitation, 
economic insecurity and isolation. Political authorities sought to mitigate 
the negative effects of the economic machine by regulating it, or harnessing 
it to the interests of the nation and social wellbeing through its regulation. 
During the period 1850 to 1950, political authorities took responsibility for 
economic planning, making investments on the state’s behalf, providing 
benefits for individuals struck by unemployment or disability, regulating 
contracts,  working  hours,  safety  and  work  conditions,  child  labour,  the 
regularity  of  employment,  effectively  socialising  risk  and  insecurity  by 
guaranteeing a social wage and protecting workers from the potential loss 
of their labour power through accidents and illness (see for example Carney          
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2007;  Donzelot  1988;  Ewald  1991;  Miller  and  Rose  1990;  Rabinbach 
1996). Put simply, political authorities sought to socialise economic life in 
the name of collective security and the rights of citizens as social beings. 
  The social state’s pastoral responsibility was also extended to social 
regulation. With the state assuming responsibility for society, the number 
of areas of existence that had public and political significance multiplied. 
The  social  life  in  families  and  workplaces,  for  instance,  had  growing 
significance to the wellbeing of society and the nation. Political authorities 
authorised  a  brigade  of  social  experts  to  intervene  into  these  civil  and 
‘private’  relations  for  the  purposes  of  correction,  optimisation  and 
education in the pursuit of social health and wellbeing (Donzelot 1978; 
Rose 1993), supported by the human and social sciences that were linked 
into  these  new  political  imperatives  (Reueschmeyer  and  Skocpol  1996). 
The insolent employer, the ignorant parent, the maladjusted child, the lazy 
employee and the poor were targets of preventative and reactive strategies 
of  social  workers,  social  assistants,  social  scientists,  sociologists, 
statisticians, industrial experts and other agents that flourished around the 
imperative  for  proper  social  rule,  social  stability  and  social  adjustment 
(Miller and O'Leary 1989; Rose 1996b; Rose 1999a).  
  One clear example of the leading role taken by political authorities 
and  its  bureaucratic  apparatus  is  in  the  expansion  and  management  of 
education. In the name of care of society and the social citizen, Peter Board 
argued in 1910 that education should en masse cultivate individuals with 
the  capacities  and  attributes  for  a  productive  citizenship  that  would 
contribute to national efficiency, prosperity and wellbeing. Board argued:          
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The conception of a nation as merely an aggregation of units, each 
struggling for its own selfish ends, has carried with it the elements of 
national  decadence.  On  the  other  hand,  in  contrast  to  this 
individualism, it is the development of corporate responsibility, the 
partial  merging  of  the  individual  in  the  community,  the 
subordinating of personal freedom to the welfare of the State which, 
added to the personal progress of the individual with regard to his 
own private interests, has produced the most stable and contented 
communities. (Board quoted in Meredyth 1997, 289) 
 
  Linking  education  to  fostering  economic  efficiency  and  social 
welfare prescribed for the social state a central role in expanding education 
and its administration (Donald 1992; Harman 1990; Hunter 1994; Meredyth 
1997).  This  is  because,  as  Board  indicates,  individual  self-interest  and 
personal  ambitions  were  to  be  subordinated  to  corporate  responsibility, 
integration and cohesiveness. There was now a responsibility in the name 
of state security to reduce social and educational wastage by “smoothing 
out  the  unevenness  due  to  inherited  disadvantages”  (Board  quoted  in 
Meredyth  1997,  288),  compensate  for  social  and  familial  disadvantage 
(Hunter 1994; McCallum 1990; Smith 1990), develop individuals’ “ability 
to enter into satisfactory relations with one’s fellows” (Howie 1960, 67), 
and enable economic participation in the industrialising economy.  
  For education reform of the twentieth century, the achievement of 
these  objectives  were  reasoned  by  many  in  terms  of  the  systematic 
expansion  of  public  primary  and  secondary  schooling,  a  standardised 
education  involving  standard  routines,  common  school  and  classroom 
facilities  and  environment,  and  standardised  curriculum  and  forms  of          
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assessment  (Meredyth  1997).  Although  supporting  individual  freedom 
remained a key concern, the injunction for political authorities was clear; a 
proper  education  system  required  immense  political  and  bureaucratic 
activity, which included centralisation (Partridge 1968). 
  Take  the  case  of  the  monopoly  held  by  education  bureaucracies 
over parental choice of school. Post World War Two, political authorities 
became  committed  to  the  standard  neighbourhood  school,  which  local 
children were obliged to attend for the benefit of society at large (Campbell 
and Sherington, 2006). This was at least partly because the neighbourhood 
school was a microcosm of society, and therefore the interaction of the 
diversity  of  children  meant  every  child  would  develop  respect  for  the 
“talents of a different order from his own, and comes to know that the on-
going life of a free community requires the pooling of many individual 
contributions” (Howie 1960, 78). The monopoly of school choice could be 
justified  by  the  ambition  to  achieve  social  solidarity  and  cohesion  by 
providing  a  standard  education  and  training  for  all  members  of  the 
population  in  the  attributes  and  capacities  of  respectful  and  productive 
social citizenship (Hunter 1994; Silver 1994). 
 
Troubling trends of the social state 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising, given that the pastoral role of the state is a source 
of dilemma for liberalism, that the social rationalities and technologies of 
government which evinced the totalisation of state power, including the 
interventionist economic and social policies of John Maynard Keynes and          
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William Beveridge, produced reforms that activated classical liberalism’s 
sceptical vigilance of the state and government. 
  On  the  one  hand,  social  government  fostered  a  plethora  of 
professionals, experts and bureaucracies empowered by political authorities 
to care for, educate, research, regulate and responsibilise individuals and 
their relationships (Rose 1993). This swathe of experts executed an ever-
increasingly refined and detailed surveillance, inquiry and intervention into 
people’s personal and social lives, keeping political authorities abreast of 
the state of the nation, like a shepherd being kept informed of its flock (for 
example  Central  Advisory  Council  for  Education  1967;  Commission  of 
Inquiry into Poverty 1976; Jackson and Marsden 1966). This expansion in 
expert regulatory knowledges and activity redrew the supposedly natural, 
or at least taken for granted, boundaries between the private and public 
established  under  liberal  government.  It  brought  the  nation’s  economy, 
work,  education,  sexual  behaviours,  parenting,  health,  families, 
communities and psyche into the realm of public interest, and therefore 
detailed political programming and regulation.  
  On the other hand, this use of expertise and professionals to achieve 
society’s  wellbeing  represented  an  affront  to  individual  autonomy  and 
precepts  of  political  liberal  democracy.  It  enabled  experts  to  establish 
expansive  bureaucratic  and  professional  centres  of  calculation  with  a 
monopoly  over  the  authoritative  production  and  use  of  knowledge  and 
truth.  As  much  as  the  intensive  surveillance  of  the  population  drew 
criticism from liberals and critics, so too did the perceived insulation of 
these  expert  enclosures  from  individual  and  community  influence,  who          
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were becoming more enmeshed in the complex network of social regulation 
(Rose 1993).  
  Moreover,  this  extensive  professional  and  expert  network  was 
perceived  to  strengthen  the  power  of  political  authorities.  With  these 
networks integrated into bureaucratic and political calculations (Rose 1993; 
Rose and Miller 1992), the centralising and totalising power of the state 
flourished more than it had under pre-twentieth century liberalism: 
 
In Britain and most European nations, this array of social devices for 
the government of insecurity, poverty, employment, health, education 
and so forth would increasingly be connected up and governed from a 
centre.  New  links,  relays  and  pathways  were  to  be  established  to 
connect political aspirations, calculations and decisions to events at a 
multitude of local points – in households, educational establishments, 
health clinics, courtrooms, benefits offices, workplaces and the like. 
(Rose 1999b, 131)  
 
The strengthening of these networks meant that political authorities attained 
a  legitimated  capacity  to  centrally  direct  and  intervene  in  the  economy, 
society, and the details of life in the homes and workplaces of citizens, with 
a goal of adapting individuals to society, often in the name of protecting the 
social framework.  From the point of view of liberalism, this growth of 
the  power  of  professionals,  expertise,  public  bureaucracies  and  political 
authorities  was  a  worrying  sign  of  the  incremental  loss  of  economic, 
political and personal freedom. Akin to the shepherd who leads his flock, 
centres of political and administrative calculation assumed a central role in 
steering society rather than allowing the free play of individuals to direct 
society. By orchestrating and directing social and economic processes to          
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politically calculated ends, such as social progress, social promotion, social 
responsibility,  the  protection  of  social  rights  and  social  solidarity,  the 
welfare state took charge of the levers of destiny and control over society’s 
future. Consequently, it increasingly appeared less as “a power protecting 
society’s solidarity but as the positive manager of its progress, the agent of 
its destiny” (Donzelot 1978, 242). From where did this problematisation of 
social  government  emerge?  Was  it  simply  a  reactivation  of  classical 
liberalism?  
       
Reactions to the welfare state and social government 
 
This  kind  of  criticism  and  problematisation  of  the  social  state  was 
increasingly  mounted  throughout  the  twentieth  century  by  a  growing 
number of intellectuals, administrators, social movements, economists and 
political actors. A small group of these became known as neo-liberals and 
their scrutiny of the welfare state can be traced to the 1930s, although it 
was  not  until  the  1970s  and  1980s  that  their  themes  gained  significant 
currency in social, economic and political circles in Europe, the United 
States  and  Australia,  where  they  were  employed  in  emergent  political 
programmes.  Who  are  the  neo-liberals,  from  what  political  and  social 
milieu did they emerge, and what vision of society and government have 
they propagated?  
  No doubt these questions could form the basis of an entire thesis on 
its own, so I will limit myself to an examination of the programmatic vision 
elaborated in neo-liberal thought and practice in response to state power.          
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Neo-liberals are especially concerned with the excesses of the welfare state 
and its social government, especially in relation to its effect on the freedom 
of the market and individuals. Their response to these perceived threats 
involved both the elaboration of new ways of reasoning the relationship 
between the state, government and the people, and new ways of enacting 
government. In order to grasp their relevance to contemporary government 
and the crisis of liberalism, my examination follows Foucault’s analysis of 
the  emergence  of  German  neo-liberalism  and  American  neo-liberalism 
from a deep seated “state-phobia” (Foucault 2008, 187).  
   
German neo-liberalism and the market 
 
Neo-liberals  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  asked:  what  were  the  costs, 
measured economically and in terms of freedom, of the social state? Did 
the Keynesian form of intervention into the social and economic domains 
ultimately pose a threat to freedom? Neo-liberal criticism and reform took 
aim at the social and welfarist interventions occurring from at least the 
1930s largely in response to the Great Depression and World War Two, and 
pursued up until the 1970s. These interventions included the Beveridge and 
Keynesian  programmes,  Roosevelt’s  New  Deal  and  the  Johnson 
administration’s War on Poverty. However, Foucault draws attention to the 
kind of innovation in governmental rationality produced by German neo-
liberals’  (the  Ordo-liberals)  critique  of  Nazism  and  the  post-war 
reconstruction of Germany.             
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  According to Foucault, Nazism constituted for German neo-liberals 
their analytical “field of adversity” (Foucault 2008, 106) inasmuch as it 
delineated  the  borders  of  their  political,  social  and  economic  analysis, 
providing it with enemies and obstacles that needed to be overcome. For 
instance,  while  many  such  as  the  critical  theorists  blamed  the  rise  of 
Nazism on the rapacious logic and activity of the capitalist market, German 
neo-liberals took a different stance. As they saw it, Nazism was able to gain 
a foothold into Europe because of state intervention into the functioning of 
the market and the regulation of economic and social life to state-defined 
ends. In particular, they referred to the Keynesian-style interventions such 
as protectionist policies and the planned economy, some of which were part 
of political and economic life in Europe prior to the twentieth century. 
  German neo-liberals used this analysis of the rise of Nazism in the 
analysis of Soviet planning and the welfare programs of the United States 
and the United Kingdom. And what they concluded worried them about 
Europe’s political system. These neo-liberals concluded that there appeared 
to be a principle of attraction between Keynesian policies and Nazism. That 
is, National Socialism and a super state were eventual outcomes of illiberal 
Keynesian  interventionism,  central  planning  and  the  protection  of  the 
economy, hence Wilhelm Ropke, Professor of Economics and advisor to 
the German government, claimed the English Beveridge plan was Nazism: 
“English Labour party socialism will lead you to German-style Nazism” 
(Foucault  2008,  110-111).  As  the  growth  in  state  power  diminished 
economic  and  personal  freedom,  it  was  concluded  that  “the  collapse  of 
democracy in Germany is not caused by a functioning market economy but          
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rather the consequence of the fact that such an economy did not exist” 
(Lemke 2001, 193). 
  Because it was reasoned that  it  was  not  the  market  that  had 
destructive and defective effects but the intrinsic defects of the state, it is 
not surprising that in transforming the German economy from a war footing 
to  peace,  its  administrators  and  advisors  such  as  Wilhelm  Ropke  and 
Ludwig Erhard, held great suspicion about using domestic planning as a 
principal instrument in German reconstruction, as advocated in Marshall’s 
European Recovery Program. Instead, an alternative orthodoxy was being 
established. In 1948, the Scientific Council that formed alongside the new 
German economic administration for the rebuilding of the German state 
accepted unanimously that economic processes should be directed by the 
price mechanism rather than price control by the state.  
  In relation to this, Erhard, who had responsibility for the post-war 
economic administration of the Anglo-American zone, made an interesting 
remark that gives an insight into the governmental thinking of the time. He 
suggested that this deregulation of prices on food and industrial products 
was needed to “free the economy from state control… only a state that can 
establish both freedom and responsibility of the citizens can legitimately 
speak in the name of the people” (Erhard quoted in Foucault 2008, 81). 
Occasioned by the context of German reconstruction, in Erhard’s assertion 
that  the  legitimate  state  is  one  that  can  establish  both  freedom  and 
responsibility  of  citizens,  Foucault  detects  a  concern  for  how  to  found 
economic freedom and a state in the context of an occupied and divided 
state with no claim to juridical legitimacy or sovereignty. In other words,          
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these proposals were not merely a revival of conventional liberal concerns 
for  market  deregulation.  It  reflected  a  radically  different  way  to  pose 
questions of the market and state than classical liberals had.  
  Classical liberalism, you see, was confronted with the problem of 
what freedoms the state would leave for the economy or how to establish 
market freedoms within an already existing state. By comparison, the post-
World War Two circumstance meant the problem for German neoliberals 
was reframed around how to found a state on economic liberty; that is to 
say, “how to create a state that did not yet exist on the basis of a non-state 
domain  of  economic  liberty”  (Lemke  2001,  196).  This  was  a  problem 
created  by,  not  only  the  German  state’s  annihilation  but  also  the  deep 
suspicion of the state’s power and role, for the dark shadow of National 
Socialism  and  its  totalitarian  attempts  at  securing  progress  towards  an 
historical end remained. For Foucault, the implication for policymakers was 
that  they  needed  to  make  the  state  “acceptable  to  those  who  most 
mistrusted it” (Foucault 2008, 117). 
  This extraordinary circumstance led neo-liberals to demand more 
from  the  market  economy  than  even  classical  liberals.  As  Foucault 
interprets  it,  in  creating  a  space  for  economic  freedom  wherein  every 
individual  had  the  opportunity  for  exercising  freedom,  this  exercise  of 
freedom would give implied consent to those decisions taken to secure this 
economic freedom. Political and administrative actors therefore believed 
that the freedom of the economy would have a “state-creating function and 
role” (Foucault 2008, 95), effectively being a siphon or point of attraction 
for “the formation of a political sovereignty” (Foucault 2008, 83). In other          
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words, so long as the republic’s institutional framework was circumscribed 
to securing this economic freedom it would be acceptable to its citizens.  
  Therefore,  the  circumstance  of  German  reconstruction  and  the 
scepticism of state power created an extraordinary reversal in governmental 
thought  that  remains  relevant  today.  That  is,  the  market  was  not  the 
problem to be governed, supervised or limited by the state as it was in 
social  government,  but  in  fact  the  state  was  to  be  placed  under  the 
supervision  of  the  market.  Free  prices  and  markets  constitute  “the  only 
economic order compatible with human freedom, with a society and state 
which safeguard freedom, and with the rule of law” (Ropke 1960, 5). This 
would guarantee that the state’s legitimacy was to be founded on economic 
liberty  and  the  state’s  role  was  not  transcendental,  such  as  pursuing  an 
historical  mission  for  racial  purity.  Instead,  the  activities  of  political 
authorities must be delimited to securing the rules of economic exchange 
and securing economic prosperity through economic growth.  
 
German neo-liberalism and competition 
 
This is not the only contribution by German neo-liberals to the critique of 
the social state and to the formation of contemporary governmentality more 
attentive to freedom. Neo-liberals did not believe as classical liberals did 
that the market is a natural, spontaneous and autonomous existence to be 
respected by the state. This is because neo-liberals believed competition 
ensures market rationality by regulating prices and choices and so it, and 
not free exchange, was the principle of the market. Although this notion          
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can be found in late nineteenth century liberal economic theory, German 
neoliberals  do  not  agree  with  their  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century 
predecessors  that  laissez  faire  was  the  principal  requirement  of 
competition.  This  reflected  a  “naïve  naturalism”  (Foucault  2008,  120) 
because it assumes incorrectly that the market and competition are quasi-
natural  and  spontaneous  creations  with  their  own  laws  that  rise  to  the 
surface under conditions of freedom.  
  By contrast, German neo-liberals thought that competition was not 
“a natural game between individuals and behaviour” (Foucault 2008, 120) 
but  a  product  of  the  structures,  mechanisms,  institutional  practices, 
techniques or economic processes that constitute it. It is a “formal game 
between  inequalities”  (2008,  120).  Consequently,  if  market  competition 
possesses formal properties then there must be certain required conditions 
for  competition  to  produce  its  optimum  effects,  and  therefore  these 
conditions must be carefully constructed. Therefore, neo-liberalism did not 
embrace  market  laissez  faire  because  neo-liberals  believed  that  “market 
mechanisms  and  the  impact  of  competition  can  arise  only  if  they  are 
produced by the practice of government” (Lemke 2001, 193).  
  An obvious problem arises for these neo-liberals by thinking that 
market competition requires an “active governmentality” (Foucault 2008, 
121).  If  the  German  neo-liberals  sought  to  place  the  state  under  the 
supervision  of  the  market  yet  market  competition  required  certain 
conditions that needed to be contrived and sustained in and by government, 
then what is to limit the exercise of state power that neo-liberals so feared?          
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Would not this extend the power of the social state, which they were so 
keen on dismantling? 
  The  German  experience  of  excessive  state  power  was  fructuous 
territory  for  advocating  an  active  governmental  policy  that  would  be 
circumscribed  to  securing  economic  freedom  by  creating  and  sustaining 
entrepreneurial  competition  and  markets.  In  other  words, m arket 
competition must be the rule for defining governmental conduct, not in the 
sense  that  one  must  govern  because  of  the  market  but  rather  one  must 
govern  for  the  market.  Pegging  liberal  government  to  the  prevention  of 
monopolies and the creation of entrepreneurial competition in the market 
signified a radical departure from the welfare state and social government. 
For German neo-liberals, the social field is composed of a multiplicity of 
differentiated  enterprises  acting  freely  and  guided  by  tactics  and 
calculations of objectives and planning, creating and pursuing projects: 
 
…the whole ensemble of individual life [is to] be structured as the 
pursuit of a range of different enterprises: a person’s relation to his or 
her professional activity, family, personal property, environment… are 
all to be given the ethos and structure of the enterprise-form. (Gordon 
1991, 42)  
 
In this ‘enterprise society’ (Foucault 2008; Gordon 1991), individuals could 
be governed economically, or as enterprises. Economic and social policy 
could be grounded on the economic mechanisms of supply, demand and 
competition,  according  to  which  social  relations  could  be  modelled. 
Therefore, rather than state power crafting society, and this leading to the 
entrenchment of social rationalities and the centralisation of political, state          
  174 
and  bureaucratic  power,  state  power  must  instead  respect  economic 
freedoms and foster entrepreneurship.  
  But  this  was  not  to  be  a  return  to  the  harsh  and  cold  economic 
relations of previous generations that provoked social forms of government. 
Alexander  Rustow  reasoned  that  promoting  “the  conditions  of  the  free, 
entrepreneurial conduct of economically rational individuals” (Dean 1999, 
156) would be an antidote to all that threatened economic freedom, such as 
Fascism, the appearance of competition as harsh and cold, and labour as 
monotonous and meaningless (Rose 1999b). Enterprise would create a life 
worth living, where people could be empowered to shape their lives, to 
experience  themselves  as  self-actualising,  and  thereby  give  a  reason  for 
individuals to invest in personal and political freedom. Through the notion 
of entrepreneurial competition, neo-liberals provided both a critique of and 
alternative form of society than that of social liberalism.   
   
American neo-liberalism and entrepreneurship 
 
But  a  more  radical  contribution  to  this  emerging  governmentality  of 
enterprise  came  from  the  American  neoliberals  of  the  Chicago  school. 
Economists such as Gary Becker (1983) and Milton Friedman (1968), as 
well as economist and public choice theorist John Buchanan (1968), were 
influential  in  the  formulation  and  promulgation  of  the  image  of  the 
individual as an entrepreneur, particularly through their application of a 
mode of analysis that rendered human behaviour intelligible as basically 
economic. These economists applied an economic grid of intelligibility to          
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all  purposive  human  choices  and  actions,  and  all  behaviours  whether 
rational  or  not  that  responded  systematically  to  changes  in  environment 
(Gordon 1991; Lemke 2001). Their objective was to bring “to light the 
calculation – which, moreover, may be unreasonable, blind, or inadequate – 
through which one or more individuals decide to allot given resources to 
this  end  rather  than  another”  (Foucault  2008,  223).  Their  effect  was  to 
bring  into  existence  an  entrepreneurial  form  of  the  human  that  while 
congruent with the German neo-liberals’ notion of enterprise was also far 
more radical.  
  Take,  for  example,  their  theory  of  human  capital.  In  short,  this 
schema  posited  that  individuals  were  human  capital,  a  composition  of 
genetic/natural make up and environmental influences, or an individual’s 
acquired investments, such as education or nutrition. Although not a new 
concept (Marginson 1993; Marginson 1997c), mid to late twentieth century 
human  capital  theory  construed  the  human  not  as  merely  a  cog  in  the 
economic machine but as an ongoing capitalisation that could be personally 
developed  and  traded  in  the  market.  Individuals  make  strategic  choices 
about how to use the means available to him or her. For instance, choices 
related to investment in knowledge and skills are calculable in terms of a 
rate of return on their decisions, such as on an individual’s earning stream 
(for example, Becker 1983).  
  Because this human capital grid of intelligibility renders all human 
behaviour rationally economic and calculable, the economic domain is cast 
as “one social domain among others with its own intrinsic rationality, laws 
and environment” (Lemke 2001, 197). The social sphere is made identical          
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to the economic domain, or it becomes “a form of the economic” (Gordon 
1991, 43). This created a new imperative for government more state-phobic 
and radical than those derived from the German neo-liberals. As individuals 
were basically ‘entrepreneurs of themselves’ in an economic domain, there 
was no need to govern society. Society does not exist, at least not as an 
organic, cohesive, integrated and fragile matrix of solidarity through which 
each  needy  and  frail  individual  should  be  connected  and  their  destiny 
linked  (Rose  1996a).  For  neo-liberals,  the  individual  is  positive  and 
enterprising  and  society  is  “regarded  less  as  a  source  of  needs  that  are 
individually  distributed  and  collectively  borne  and  more  as  a  source  of 
energies  contained  within  individuals’  exercise  of  freedom  and  self-
responsibility” (Dean 1999, 152). Therefore, governmental reason is to be 
pegged to a form of economic government of the rational choice-making 
individual,  because  choice  was  perceived  as  a  universal  and  principal 
faculty of human behaviour above and beyond social and anthropological 
categories and frameworks (Gordon 1991). 
  This government of the entrepreneurial individual required creating 
the conditions for individuals to exercise their entrepreneurial freedom to 
make capital or investment decisions. Believing that the state should not 
manage a collective security but instead seek to install a new set of ethical 
and cultural values that accord individuals the power to shape and secure 
their own lives, political authorities have sought to remove constraints on 
people engaging in competitive market behaviour (Beeson and Firth 1998; 
Hilmer 1993). From the 1980s, national and state policy in Australia, for 
example, has been increasingly organised so as to foster opportunities for          
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human  capital  formation.  Previously  non-economic  domains,  such  as 
healthcare,  childcare  and  education,  have  been  linked  into  economic 
circuits  through  the  creation  of  markets,  removing  constraints  that  may 
limit the individual’s capacity to act and choose freely in their process of 
capitalisation  (Marginson  1993;  Lauder  1991;  Brown  and  Lauder  1996; 
Marginson 1997a; Spring 1998).  
 
The dilemma of freedom and security  
 
This sketch of neo-liberalism goes some way to explaining the critique of 
the  welfare  state  and  the  concerted  attempts  in  Europe,  Canada,  New 
Zealand and Australia over the past three decades to discard or transform 
the social rationalities and technologies of government established over the 
past century in order to secure society. The social modality of government 
was construed as a problem in that it signified the excessive power of the 
state, the diminution of personal and economic freedom, and it hindered 
industrial competition and competitive behaviour. We can use this notion of 
‘transformation’  to  understand  the  emergence  of  policy  steered  in  the 
direction of deregulating the national economic infrastructure, privatising 
government-owned  utilities,  downsizing  and  breaking  up  central 
bureaucracies  into  competing  agencies  and  departments,  and  instituting 
competitive mechanisms across a range of industries in order to optimise 
the national economy. However, while the above descriptions enable us to 
understand  these  policies  and  reforms  in  terms  of  a  transformation  in          
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governmental modalities, it also illuminates why the welfare state crisis 
resembles a crisis of liberalism, or a crisis of governmentality.  
  On the one hand we have the social state whose pastoral role leads 
to  securing  freedom  and  society  through  the  augmentation  of  political 
power,  the  socialisation  of  economic  life,  interventionist  social  policies, 
and the expansion and centralisation of public bureaucracy and experts of 
the social and human conduct. On the other hand we have a critique of this 
government  from  the  social  point  of  view.  Neo-liberals  were  highly 
suspicious of this kind of state interventionism, particularly honing their 
criticisms  on  the  management  of  the  economy,  the  expansion  of  public 
bureaucracies and the vast administration of social life by the authority of 
bureaucrats,  professionals  and  experts.  Neo-liberals  asked  about  the 
economic cost of the exercise of freedom and the costs to freedom incurred 
by the use of devices intended to produce freedom. For example, although 
the Keynesian compensatory policies of the social state were designed to 
maintain  the  individual’s  purchasing  power  within  the  economy,  such 
policies  risked  producing  the  opposite,  such  as  excessive  bureaucratic, 
professional and disciplinary intervention into the lives of people and the 
market.  
  For  those  who  governed  from  the  social  point  of  view,  these 
interventions  and  mechanisms  of  social  government  were  a  means  to 
securing greater economic and political freedom of individuals in the face 
of too much freedom and too little attention paid to the wellbeing of society 
as a condition of that freedom. But viewed from a different pair of eyes, 
these  represented  ‘illiberalism’.  Neo-liberals,  such  as  public  choice          
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theorists, saw policymakers, bureaucrats, experts and politicians as taking 
the  reigns  of  economic  and  social  processes a t  t he  expense  of  personal 
liberty, now to be understood in terms of autonomy, enterprise, competition 
and choice. This lay behind the analysis of the public sector and public 
bureaucracies by neo-liberals and public choice theorists. 
  In  the  welfare  state,  the  bureau-professional  bureaucracy  was 
oriented to public service and welfare, it was routinised and had predictable 
outputs, and it relied upon professional technical knowledge in decision-
making  (Clarke  and  Newman  1997).  For  neo-liberals  such  as  Friedrich 
Hayek, the public bureaucracy associated with the welfare state represented 
the worst excesses of the social state and a threat to freedom. One evil of 
bureaucracy lies in its ‘social engineering’, inasmuch as it was the state that 
was to determine what social and economic policies should be pursued and 
to what ends drawing upon its regulatory instruments to these ends. This 
did not conform to Hayek’s ontological presupposition that the ordering of 
society’s affairs should be the product of the spontaneous forces of society 
(Hayek 1960). It was in this sense that Hayek lamented the diminution of 
personal freedom and feared that this growth in public administration may 
well come to define the end of politics, ‘a road to totalitarianism’ (Hayek 
1945). 
  By the 1960s, major technical in-roads were made into the criticism 
and  analysis  of  the  public  sector  and  this  would  reform  the  public 
bureaucracy in accordance with neo-liberal principles. With deep suspicion 
of  centralised  planning  and  bureaucrats  becoming  the  new  “political 
masters” (Ostrom 1973, 129), public choice theory in particular rendered          
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the  public  services  intelligible  through  neo-classical  economic  theory. 
Presupposing humans as rational, economic and possessing the capacities 
for entrepreneurship, and believing market competition to be the desirable 
means for providing goods and services to efficient and just ends, public 
choice theorists lambasted the conventional model of public bureaucracy, 
their  monopoly  in  the  provision  of  goods  and  services,  and  their 
relationship  to  politics  (Buchanan  and  Wagner  1977;  Niskanen  1971; 
Niskanen 1973).    
  Public  choice  theorists  asserted  that  the  organisation  of 
bureaucracies  was  not  congruent  with  the  rational,  entrepreneurial 
individual who sought personal advantage and utility maximisation. The 
lack of competitive market mechanisms of incentives and rewards fostered 
decision-making  by  bureaucrats  that  led  to  inefficient  organisational 
performance,  undemocratic  and  illiberal  conduct,  particularly  evident  in 
their unresponsiveness to the interests of clients by effectively presenting 
the market with “all-or-nothing choice” (Niskanen 1971, 25). Indeed, neo-
liberals asked how politicians could be trusted to make rational and fair 
choices in the distribution of scarce resources while being subject to the 
influence of electoral politics? Congruent with Hayek’s concerns, public 
providers had grown into illiberal monolithic monopolies that determined 
what  was  right  for  society  and  the  economy,  while  the  politicians, 
bureaucrats  and  experts  who  were  ensconced  in  public  bureaucracies 
sought self-advancement, insulated from accountability.  
  Such criticism questioned the merit of a key rationality of social 
government; that there was a collective good (Foucault 2008; Olssen et al.          
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2004).  This  was  because,  firstly,  bureaucrats  in  fact  operated  like 
competitive enterprises in a market of competing interests and therefore 
could  not  be  relied  upon  to  devise  and  pursue  the  public  good,  and 
secondly, the collective good could not be calculated, “at least, not within 
an economic strategy” (Foucault 2008, 279). Instead, as it was believed that 
private enterprise and individuals were best placed to make economically 
efficient decisions regarding their lives and best placed to determine and 
pursue  their  interests,  then  the  organisation  of  the  bureaucracy  and  its 
provision  of  public  goods  and  services  should  be  modelled  on  the 
competitive market.  
  This  above  diagnosis  of  the  problems  with  central  planning  and 
public  bureaucracies  generated  reform  that  reconfigured  governmental 
rationalities  and  technologies  along  the  lines  of  individual  autonomy, 
choice and freedom. Accepting and instrumentalising human nature, and 
therefore political and bureaucratic actors, as innately entrepreneurial and 
economic,  the  public  sector  was  to  be  re-modelled  on  entrepreneurial 
economic  exchange.  This  entailed  privatisation  and  dismantling  large 
departments  into  autonomous  organisations  competing  for  government 
funds and private custom. Here, the relationship between the provider of 
public  goods  and  the  citizen  was  to  be  consumer  based,  for  “producer 
efficiency in the absence of consumer utility is without economic meaning” 
(Ostrom 1973, 62). Therefore, this transformation in the regulation of the 
public  sector  sought  to  secure  the  liberal  state  and  its  prosperity  and 
wellbeing  by  freeing  the  bureaucrat  (to  be  free  to  manage          
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entrepreneurially),  freeing  departments  (devolved/quasi-autonomous)  and 
freeing citizens (to be empowered consumers). 
  What  does  this  description  suggest  about  the  crisis  of  liberal 
governmentality  represented  by  the  neo-liberal  transformation  of 
governmental  rationalities  and  technologies?  It  suggests  that  that  the 
objects, means and ends of liberal government were being contested, that 
much of this contestation occurred around the problematic of freedom, and 
that  this  was  occasioned  by  the  inherent  tensions  in  the  governmental 
rationality  and  arts  of  liberalism,  that  is,  between  the  generation  of 
technologies of security and those that seek to limit these, paradoxically, in 
the name of freedom and the aversion of danger. While the security of the 
state once depended upon securing society, strengthening the bonds of the 
individual to the social whole and regulating the social and the economy in 
the interest of the society, neo-liberalism now construed the social state and 
its governmental rationalities and technologies as over-stepping the, albeit 
labile, threshold between freedom and un-freedom, consequently presenting 
a danger to individual freedom and the security of the liberal state. This 
crisis of liberal governmentality also explains the broader reform that has 
occurred in many Western liberal democracies.  
 
Advanced Liberalism 
 
I want to conclude this chapter by considering the broader context of this 
transformation in the rationalities and technologies of government, or crisis 
of  liberalism.  It  would  not  be  accurate  to  suggest  neo-liberalism          
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exhaustively constitutes the field of modern governmental rationalities and 
modalities.  While  neo-liberalism  more  specifically  refers  to  a  political 
programme  of  market  creation,  there  was  a  broader  assemblage  of 
governing rationalities and practices that neo-liberalism sits within. Rose 
terms this new modality of government which has social and cultural reach, 
‘advanced liberalism’ (Rose 1999b; Rose 1999c).  
  Arguably,  the  most  notable  example  of  this  social  and  cultural 
reform is that propelled by the New Right in the 1980s, of which Margaret 
Thatcher was its poster child. Presupposing an image of the individual as 
active,  autonomous  and  enterprising,  the  New  Right’s  criticisms  of  the 
welfare  state  circulated  around  the  political  aspiration  to  cultivate 
individuals who were active, enterprising, autonomous, responsible, self-
motivated  and  self-reliant  (Hall  1986;  Heelas  and  Morris  1992).  The 
welfare state was accused of treating individuals as passive recipients of 
handouts  and  fostering  a  deleterious  culture  of  dependency  in  which 
individuals expected the state to satisfy their every need (Mead 1986). This 
criticism  linked  the  wellbeing  of  the  nation  to  empowering  citizens  to 
exercise their freedom entrepreneurially and to take responsibility for their 
own self-government. 
  Now, compare this image of the citizen and political government 
with the presuppositions of personhood elaborated by the alterative side of 
the  political  spectrum.  During  the  1960s  and  1970s,  a  whole  range  of 
domains became targets of the Left and social progressives. Representative 
democracy came under attack as an inadequate form of democracy, with 
one criticism being that it largely rendered individuals politically passive,          
  184 
save for electoral participation (Almond and Verba 1965; Pateman 1970). 
Others were far more critical and pessimistic about the welfare state in 
particular. The welfare state and its supposedly Kafkaesque bureaucracies 
were variously characterised as alienating, paternalistic, masculine, agents 
of social control, dehumanising and disempowering (Gough 1979; Hummel 
1977; Whitlam 1972; Wilson 1977). 
  Criticisms also targeted the monopoly over professional knowledge 
held by professionals, increasingly seen as servants of power that unduly 
reinforced  their  authority  at  the  expense  of  empowering  the  individual 
(Illich 1971; Rogers 1977; Schon 1983). This criticism also operated in the 
opposite  direction.  Alternatively,  professionals  were  themselves 
disempowered by bureaucracies because bureaucratic management disabled 
them from being genuine “autonomous practitioners” (Schon 1983, 337).  
  The  proponents  of  a  politics  of  voice,  recognition  and  identity 
argued  that  a  robust  civic  and  political  culture  required  a  participatory 
democracy  in  which  citizens,  even  workers,  were  active  in  their  own 
government, the authority of expertise detached from the apparatuses of 
political  rule,  and  social  authorities  oriented  towards  empowering 
individuals  (Rose  1993;  see  for  an  example  Royal  Commission  on 
Australian Government Administration 1976).  
  We can discern from this comparison between the New Right and 
the  Left  that  while  the  bloc  of  social  progressives  and  the  Left  were 
critically hostile towards the neo-liberal change in political rationality, they 
nevertheless engaged in the formation of new rationalities of government 
that were mapped onto the neo-liberal critique of government. Both the          
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Left and the Right plotted their critiques and projects along the conceptual 
coordinates  of  state  control,  active  citizenship,  autonomy  and  self-
determination. This occurred not because the former had come under the 
ideological  spell  of  the  latter,  but  because  both  were  connected  to  a 
common problematisation of government based on many premises of neo-
liberalism:  a  distrust  of  the  state,  a  cultural  revival  of  freedom  and 
emancipation, a rediscovery of a “culture of the self and its actualization” 
(Dean 1999, 155), and a belief that individuals were enterprising, active 
and self-determining with the capacity to be “potentially active in their own 
government” (Rose 1999b, 142).  
  Interestingly, the progressive movement is largely ignorant of its 
positive  connection  to  neo-liberalism.  Arguably,  this  is  because  it  only 
dimly  grasps  how  key  notions  of  its  theories  and  programs,  such  as 
individual  agency  and  empowerment,  are  “inserted  into  a  system  of 
purposes” (Dean 1999, 168), and how the ‘free subject’ is deployed as a 
“technical  instrument  in  the  achievement  of  governmental  purposes  and 
objectives” (Dean 1999, 155). Today, for instance, the empowered, self-
actualising and autonomous citizen who is potentially active in their own 
development and government is central to the rationalisation of neo-liberal 
government  and  the  profusion  of  advanced  liberal  governmental 
technologies. Therefore, a radical politics based upon an empowered, free 
individual f a i ls  to  see  that  across  the  political  spectrum,  practices  of 
government have become concerned with “structuring, shaping, predicting 
and making calculable the operation of our freedom, and of working off          
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and through diagrams of free subjects constituted by forms of governmental 
and political reasoning” (Dean 1999, 166).  
  A caveat to this description of advanced liberalism is that it should 
not be taken as a ready-formed or coherent political rationality that has 
been or is being implemented by Western democratic countries. This is 
because the formation of mentalities of rule is an “utterly contingent and 
pragmatic affair driven by what is thought might work [and only] over time 
does a process of systematization generate government rationalities” (also 
Larner 2000; Peters et al. 2000, 111; Rose 1999b). Therefore, we should 
avoid  construing  advanced  liberalism  as  a  universal  and  totalising 
rationality and instead recognise that as a governmental rationality it is a 
contingent, mobile and ad hoc lash up of thought and action continually 
being invented and reconfigured.  
   
Conclusion 
 
The  crisis  of  liberalism  refers  to  the  transformation  of  governmental 
rationalities and technologies that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. To call 
it a crisis of liberalism is to gesture towards the roots of this transformation 
in the endogenous dilemma of liberalism. The historical formation of the 
state as a pastoral power enabled it to take ever-increasing responsibility for 
the care, welfare and administration of the population. Yet this created a 
tension  with  the  rationalities  of  liberalism,  which  sought  to  secure  the 
freedom of individuals. Throughout the course of the twentieth century, 
social government, although a liberal form of government that sought to          
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keep citizens free, was seen to have erred in its centralisation of power and 
its regulatory ambitions. The rise of advanced liberalism and neo-liberalism 
may therefore be construed as attempts to arouse and manufacture freedom 
in the face of that which was perceived to threaten it. From de-regulating 
the economy and creating markets in new sectors of reality, such as in 
health  care,  to  fostering  the  regulatory  role  of  non-government  and 
voluntary  organisations,  advanced  liberalism  sought  to  re-organise  the 
conditions in which individuals could be free to pursue their interests. 
  What, then, is the relationship between this crisis of liberalism and 
the  self-managing  reforms  described  in  Part  I?  Part  III  of  this  thesis 
specifically  examines  self-managing  reforms  in  education  as  a 
manifestation of this crisis of liberalism.   
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Introduction 
 
Part  II  canvassed  some  implications  of  the  historical  formation  of  the 
modern state. In its formation from the early rationalities and practices of 
governing  in  reason  of  state  and  police,  the  modern  state  attained  an 
individualising and totalising power. Here, the state took responsibility for 
caring for the welfare of individuals and the population, while at the same 
time seeking to govern individuals as members of a common community of 
citizens. I then argued that this dynamic was translated into the rationalities 
and practices of the liberal state. Liberalism assumed responsibility for the 
welfare of individuals as members of a flock, a dynamic that evokes the 
title  of  Foucault’s  lectures  on  this  subject  matter:  omnes  et  singulatim. 
Importantly, under liberalism freedom is linked to the security of the state, 
and an extensive disciplinary and governmental apparatus has accompanied 
this. I concluded Part II by arguing the recent crisis of the welfare state is 
indicative of a tension at the heart of this governmental rationality, what 
Foucault describes as a “crisis of governmentality” (Foucault 2008, 68).  
  This  crisis  of  governmentality  involved  a  re-appraisal  of 
government around the question of freedom, and this has been pivotal to          
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the  emergence  of  new  projects  in  the  art  of  government  formulated 
immediately before and after the war in Germany (Foucault 2008). These 
projects  involved  a  transformation  in  the  political  and  governmental 
rationalities and technologies of many Western countries, a transformation 
often based around a discourse of freedom, emancipation, empowerment, 
self-determination, autonomy, choice, and self-actualisation (as well as a 
discourses  of  security,  threat  and  risk).  What,  then,  is  the  relationship 
between  this  transformation  in  the  rationalities  and  modalities  of 
government and self-managing reforms in education?  
  Part  III  of  this  thesis  addresses  this  question.  It  interprets  self-
managing school reforms as a ‘program of freedom’ in that it transforms 
the rationalities and technologies of government employed in the field of 
education  away  from  social  rationalities  of  governing  (which  gave 
emphasis  to  the  authority  of  the  state,  bureaucracies,  experts  and 
professionals)  and  towards  neo-liberal  and  advanced  liberal  ways  of 
conceptualising the world and enacting a ‘freer’ government of states. In 
relation to the field of education, I am thinking about this transformation 
specifically in terms of a shift away from the centralising, standardising and 
prescriptive  role  of  education  bureaucracies  towards  a  decentralised, 
marketised education system that ‘empowers’ school leaders, parents and 
communities. 
  My  argument  is  not  that  such  reforms  mean  that  school  leaders, 
parents, communities and students are free from the state and government. 
Rather, I use the term ‘program of freedom’ because the advocates of self-
managing  reforms  construe  it  as  a  sort  of  program  or  technology  of          
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freedom and empowerment. For me, this reasoning indicates that the crisis 
of liberalism defined and generated self-managing reforms. In other words, 
self-managing  reforms  reconfigure  the  relationship  between  the  pastoral 
role  of  the  liberal  state  and  the  ambition  of  liberal  rationalities  of 
government to secure and protect the freedom of individuals. Exploring this 
transformation is the goal of Part III. This will involve exploring: (1) the 
problematisation  of  the  domain  of  education  by  advanced  liberal 
rationalities  of  government;  (2)  the  instantiation  of  the  discourses  of 
freedom  and  empowerment  in  self-managing  reforms;  and  (3)  the  re-
regulation  according  to  advanced  liberal  rationalities  of  the  domain  of 
education and the state’s educational enterprise.  
  Because mapping and analysing the contemporary transformation in 
the  government  of  schooling  is  a  potentially  limitless  endeavour,  I  will 
limit my analysis to two case studies. The  first  is  the  reframing  of  the 
relationship between the family/home and the school around the notion of 
empowerment, and the second is the managerial and entrepreneurial reform 
of schools and teachers’ work. I have chosen these two cases because the 
family/school relationship and the internal administration of schools have 
been  focal  points  of  self-managing  reforms,  both  in  terms  of  providing 
justifications for reforms and in being sites of intervention. How, then, will 
the analysis of these two cases proceed?  
 
 
            
  193 
Analysing the link between government and self-
managing reforms 
 
Informed by the Foucauldian literature on government (Barry et al. 1996b; 
Burchell et al. 1991; Dean 1999; Rose 1999b), my analysis begins with the 
premise that how we have come to reason government is tied to how we 
have come to problematise reality, because how we problematise reality 
shapes how a range of authorities attempt to shape, intervene, program and 
improve reality. It is for this reason that Foucault remarks in an interview 
with  Paul  Rabinow,  “the  work  of  a  history  of  thought  would  be  to 
rediscover  at  the  root  of  these  diverse  solutions  the  general  form  of 
problematisation that has made them possible” (Foucault 1984a, 389). He 
continues: 
 
This development of a given into a question, this transformation of a 
group  of  obstacles  and  difficulties  into  problems  to  which  the 
diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response, this is what 
constitutes the point of problematizations and the specific work of 
thought… it is a question of a movement of critical analysis in which 
one tries to see how the different solutions to a problem have been 
constructed;  but  also  how  these  different  solutions  result  from  a 
specific form of problematization. (Foucault 1984a, 389)  
 
In this interview, Foucault insists that for action, behaviours or practices to 
enter into thought, they must be rendered uncertain, unfamiliar, a problem 
or difficult. This problematisation is a product of the intellectual processing 
of reality because it is the specific form of knowledge and truth that renders 
aspects of reality into thought and constitutes aspects of reality as certain 
kinds  of  problems.  It  is  the  production  of  a  general  form  of          
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problematisation from this intellectual processing that diverse solutions to 
purported problems are proposed.  
  In other words, problematisations develop “the conditions in which 
possible responses can be given; it defines the elements that will constitute 
what the different solutions attempt to respond to” (Foucault 1984a, 389). 
Therefore,  social  developments,  including  such  things  as  governmental 
practices, techniques, strategies or programs that purport to be solutions to 
determined problems, should not be approached analytically as inevitable 
responses  to  self-evident  difficulties  or  problems,  nor  as  effects  of 
‘fundamental’ transformations in culture or the economy. Rather, we must 
engage with these developments, such as education reforms, in terms of 
how the problems they were intended to solve are rendered into existence 
to begin with.   
 
Problematisations and government 
 
Foucault’s  emphasis  on  problematisations  (Marshall  2006)  is  consistent 
with the constructivism of Foucauldian studies of government. According 
to  Rose  and  Miller  (1992),  government  “is  a  problematizing  activity:  it 
poses the obligations of ruler in terms of the problems they seek to address” 
(1992, 181).  
 
It is these problematizations that accord the activity of politics its 
intelligibility  and  possibility  at  different  times;  it  is  these 
problematizations that shape what are to be counted as problems; 
what as failures and what as solutions. (Rose 1993, 286) 
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This  begs  the  question  of  how  governmental  problems  are  created.  The 
rejoinder is that this how governmental problems are created is related to 
how governed reality is rendered knowable. Illustratively, Foucault found 
in  his  studies  of  early  government  that  whether  “the  concern  was  the 
economy or the moral order, each was made thinkable and practicable by 
governors as a knowable and administrable domain” (Rose et al. 2006, 86). 
In  other  words,  when  those  who  sought  to  administer  the  state,  and  to 
govern through people’s freedom attempted to do so, they first sought to 
conceptualise and know the domains or phenomena to be governed.  
  This  twin  process  of  objectification  and  problematisation  can  be 
analysed in policy documents. This is because these are “as much about 
constructing  a  policy  problem  in  a  given  way,  as  about  anything e l s e ”  
(Porter et al. 1993, 232). However, analysis should extend beyond official 
policy texts. This is because liberal government does not simply depend on 
achieving goals articulated by policymakers in official policy documents. 
Rather,  government  is  made  possible  through  the  knowledges  and 
techniques  of  a  plethora  of  relatively  non-political  disciplinary, 
governmental  and  social  experts  who  have  taken  responsibility  for 
rendering reality knowable and administrable.  
  Representing to authorities, social agents and governors the reality 
to be governed, the expert knowledges of the human and social sciences, 
such  as  psychology,  make  it  possible  to  say  things  truthfully  and 
consequently,  “to  conceive  and  do  things  politically”  (Rose  1993;  Rose 
1999b, 275). For example, the discipline of psychology, with its particular 
language, theories, techniques and style of truth making, produces truths of          
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human  behaviour  and  psychology  that  shape  how  experts,  governors, 
political authorities and everyday citizens think about and act upon people 
and the world (Rose 1996b; Rose 1999a). Therefore, as the disciplines and 
experts  have  this  role  in  the  conceptualisation,  problematisation, 
organisation and regulation of liberal societies, the analysis of government 
must be attentive to what expertise and their knowledge claims associated 
with it can do and make possible, both politically and governmentally.  
  This also means being attentive to the complex relationship between 
expert  knowledge  and  the  political  realm.  Political  authorities  do  not 
merely use expert knowledge to their own ends, but they forge alliances 
with independent agents so as to link socio-political objectives to the expert 
conceptualisation,  problematisation  and  administration  of  life.  Rose  and 
Miller explain that experts: 
 
ally t h e m s e l v e s  w i t h  p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  f o c u s i n g  u p o n  t h e i r  
problems  and  problematizing  new  issues,  translating  political 
concerns  about  economic  productivity,  innovation,  industrial 
unrest, social stability, law and order, normality and pathology and 
so forth into the vocabulary of management, accounting, medicine, 
social science and psychology. (Rose and Miller, 1992, 188) 
 
So, for instance, while the disciplines of the human and social sciences give 
objects, techniques and strategies to political and non-political governors, 
the knowledge about human being/s developed within this discipline is also 
shaped by political reflections on the state. The liberal mode of governing 
that seeks to equip individuals with the knowledge and attributes for their 
self-government is made possible by the knowledges, strategies, techniques          
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and problems developed in fields such as psychology, and its related fields 
of behaviourism and management, enabling self-government to occur.  
  It is my task in Part III of this thesis to analyse this objectification 
and problematisation of the field of education that occurred in the latter half 
of the twentieth century. This involves examining how authorities, agents, 
programs  and  texts  have  rendered  the  domain  of  education  visible, 
knowable  and  problematic  such  that  school  autonomy,  devolution  and 
school  self-management  emerged  as  legitimate  policy  goals.  This  also 
requires  us  to  ask  how  these  problematisations  link  to  how  political 
authorities  have  themselves  “posed  and  specified  the  problems  for 
government” (Rose and Miller 1992, 177).  
  The background to this analysis has been described in the preceding 
chapter. I have indicated, for example, that advanced liberal rationalities of 
government  have  powerfully  shaped  the  objectification  of  domains  of 
government from the late twentieth century. What has this involved? In 
many  Western  liberal  democracies,  there  has  been  a  recalibration  of 
government  away  from  social  and  state-centred  rationalities  that  were 
associated with excessive regulation, welfare dependency, and the over-
extension of the authority of professional and expert authority. The crisis of 
liberalism  has  witnessed  a  shift  towards  regulatory  rationalities  and 
technologies that emphasise freedom, activity, entrepreneurship, autonomy, 
empowerment,  choice  and  responsible  self-government.  Government, 
politics, individuals and society are being thought about and acted upon 
differently  according  to  these  new  conceptualisations  (for  example, 
Business Council of Australia 1991c; Hilmer 1993; Industry Task Force on          
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Leadership and Management Skills 1995; Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration 1976).  
  If we accept these presuppositions, how, then, did advanced liberal 
rationalities recast the conceptualisation and problematisation of education 
within new political prerogatives of the 1970s and 1980s? How was the 
domain of education re-regulated as a result of the enactment of advanced 
liberalism and the crisis of liberal governmentality?          
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Chapter 7: Governing the Family-Education 
Nexus Through Empowerment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Building a strategic alliance between the family and the state’s educational 
enterprise has been an on-going political ambition for liberal government. 
Self-managing  reforms  are  not  exempt  from  this  problem.  In  fact,  the 
policies  of  devolution,  self-management  and  school  autonomy  are 
frequently justified with reference to the family. This chapter examines the 
relationship between self-managing school reforms and the family and the 
community of the child.  
  I begin with a discussion of how the family figures historically in 
liberal government and the nature of its relationship to education, and then I 
analyse how this pastoral relationship has been reframed contemporarily 
within the rationalities of advanced liberalism. I argue that within this way          
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of reasoning, building the strategic alliance between the family and school, 
in order to improve the educational and citizenship outcomes of schooling, 
was construed as a problem that called for de-bureaucratising the education 
system, according schools greater autonomy and empowering the family, 
child and community. I then canvass how this self-managing reform was to 
contribute  to  governing  the  education  of  citizens  now  construed  as 
empowered, autonomous and active.  
 
Sketching the persistent problem of the family and parenting 
 
Terms  such  as  devolution,  self-management  and  school  autonomy 
immediately invoke a sense of organisational reform, something done to 
organisations  to  improve  their  functioning.  Consequently,  social  and 
political  analysis  has  frequently  focused  on  how  self-management 
transforms teachers’ work, how system devolution and school autonomy 
improves  organisational  flexibility  and  efficiency,  and  even  how 
decentralisation produces centralisation at different levels, for instance, the 
political  use  of  accountability  regimes.  The  relationship  between  school 
self-management and the family has not been a major object of interest, 
particularly in how concerns for the latter have shaped the former. When 
this  relationship  is  canvassed,  analysis  often  circulates  around  the 
regrettable effects on the family of the competition between schools, or 
how the rhetoric of local participation actually obfuscates the reality that 
working  class  parents  and  communities  are  largely  excluded  from 
participating in school decision-making (Ball 1994; Gewirtz et al. 1995).          
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There is, however, an important relationship between the family and self-
managing reforms.  
  The family figures centrally in the Schools in Australia (Karmel 
1973)  report,  one  of  the  most  influential  early  reports  advocating 
decentralisation and greater school autonomy. This report was concerned 
with the strain on the administration and effectiveness of education systems 
and schools because of the expansion of educational provision post World 
War Two. Increasing levels of participation in education meant that young 
people of social backgrounds that had not previously been well represented 
in the upper years of schooling were now staying at school longer, and this 
was  increasing  the  cultural,  economic  and  intellectual  diversity  of  the 
student population. Importantly, this problem of diversity and the disparity 
in educational participation and outcomes was linked to the problem of the 
family and the child’s community. 
  The  report  contended,  for  instance,  that  student  backgrounds, 
specifically  low  socioeconomic  and  non-English  speaking  backgrounds, 
often militated against educational success. It claimed that many of these 
parents  were  ignorant  of  educational  matters,  that  many  students’  home 
dwellings did not support studious conduct and desirable habits, such as 
literacy  practices,  and  that  difficult  material  circumstances  were 
exacerbated  by  the  culture  of  the  home  and  the  attitudes  of  family 
members, such as parents’ negative attitudes to schooling and their low 
aspirations for their children. It reasoned that if schools were to improve the 
learning and life outcomes of these students, education policy must take 
into account students’ family life. The family, therefore, had pertinence to          
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the government of schooling and its outcomes, something that should be 
central to the concerns, activities and organisation of schools.  
  This is just one example of the significance accorded to the family 
in educational policy and decision-making. I want to suggest that given the 
significance of the Schools in Australia report and the important place it 
accords to the family and community in how it reasoned the organisational 
reform  of  education  systems,  further  investigation  of  the  relationship 
between  the  family  and  self-managing  reforms  is  warranted,  and 
particularly how the concern for the family has shaped school autonomy 
and self-management. 
 
Schooling and the family 
 
To begin this examination, I want to make a brief historical sketch of this 
political and governmental concern for the family. In the United Kingdom, 
the family was raised as an object of governmental concern in the inquiries 
and debates in the 1800s about how to protect the moral and social welfare 
of the working class and poor. For ‘pastoral technicians’ of the nineteenth 
century, such as Wilderspin (1840), Stow (1850) and Horner (1840), the 
moral  and  social  welfare  of  children  was  corrupted  by  their  economic 
exploitation by industry and their parents, by the vices of the street, and by 
the deficiencies within the family home. The state was increasingly called 
upon to protect the nation’s children.  
  In the mid 1800s, laws emerged dictating the legitimate ages and 
hours of child labour. As well, there was growing agreement that children          
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should  spend  at  least  part  of  their  time  being  educated,  reflecting  the 
growing  legitimacy  of  schooling  as  a  means  for  mass  social  and  moral 
governance. Inspector of Factories, Leonard Horner, wrote in 1837: 
 
To  put  the  necessity  of  properly  educating  the  children  of  the 
working classes on its lowest footing, it is loudly called for as a 
matter  of  police,  to  prevent  a  multitude  of  immoral  and  vicious 
beings, the offspring of ignorance, from growing up around us to be 
a pest and a nuisance to society; it is necessary in order to render the 
great body of the working class governable by reason. (Donald 1992, 
22-23)  
 
This education was to be “both gentle and reasonable, and, at the same 
time, most extensively, efficacious” (Horner 1840, 16). Through the school 
and classroom layout, its pedagogies and learning routines, and its pastoral 
regimes, the child’s moral, physical and social growth were to be placed 
into circuits of continual examination, and subjected to the normalising yet 
caring gaze and techniques of the agents of moral and social rule, such as 
teachers,  and  the  human  and  social  sciences  (Hunter  1994;  Jones  and 
Williamson 1979).  
  Hunter observes that schooling was to operate as a means by which 
“‘wild human beings’ would learn how to concern themselves with their 
own  conduct  and  acquire  the  moral  ability  to  conduct  themselves  in 
accordance  with  this  concern”  (Hunter  1994,  11),  although  it  was 
acknowledged by reformers that “one day’s teaching in schools was not 
equal  in  effect  to  six  days’  training  on  the  streets”  (Hunter  1994,  9). 
Schooling,  therefore,  represented  the  state  taking  responsibility  for          
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cultivating  productive  and  civilising  attributes  in  its  citizens  by 
compensating  for  and  protecting  young  people  from  the  corrupting 
influence of their families and the communities where they lived, worked 
and  had  their  recreation.  The  school  would  substitute  for  the  deficient 
family and in a sense “with its caring teacher, its domestic routines and its 
supervised spontaneity… provide a simulacrum of an ideal family milieu” 
(Hunter 1994, 123). 
  While the school was to correct or compensate for the problem of 
the family by cultivating productive and civil citizens, the effectiveness of 
the state’s educational enterprise was also dependent upon reforming that 
which  stifled  its  optimisation:  the  family.  Increasingly  the  order  of  the 
liberal state was perceived to be dependent upon the order of the family, or 
strengthening the family in its role of supporting the proper government of 
the population. From the nineteenth century the family constituted fecund 
territory  for  enacting  programs  and  strategies  for  the  moral  and  social 
regulation of the population (Donzelot 1978; Rose 1999a). This is because 
as greater demands were placed on the state in the nineteenth century to 
address civil problems such as pauperism, poor living conditions, disorder, 
unplanned  pregnancies  and  unemployment,  the  scope  of  inquiry, 
surveillance  and  intervention  by  public  authorities  and  a  range  of 
normalising disciplines expanded.  
  The composite of expertise, programs, techniques and social actors 
rising up around the child and the technology of schooling, from human 
and  social  scientists,  public  assistance  officers,  doctors,  philanthropists, 
educators and social workers, made the family amenable to all manner of          
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problematisation, surveillance, evaluation and intervention (Donzelot 1978; 
Hunter  1994;  Rose  1999a;  Smith  1990).  Of  particular  concern  was  the 
problem  of  child  rearing.  The  child’s  social,  intellectual  and  moral 
development, as well as their future prospects as adults, was linked to the 
environment  of  the  family  home.  The  intellectual  environment  and  the 
emotional  relationship  between  the  child  and  his  or  her  parents  were 
construed as pivotal to the child’s successful intellectual and psychological 
development. Rose explains:  
 
The  group  life  of  the  family,  its  relational  economy,  the 
dependencies,  frustrations,  jealousies,  attachments,  rivalries,  and 
frustrations that traversed it, became both the means of explanation 
of the troubles of childhood and the means of construing the ideal 
family. The processes of emotional development of the child within 
its  family  were  reconstrued  as  delicate  and  fragile,  liable  to 
distortions in so many directions that would produce the pathological 
child,  ranging  from  naughtiness  through  criminality  to  insanity. 
(Rose 1999a, 160) 
 
  Because  of  the  increasing  importance  given  to  the  child’s 
development  in  the  family,  optimising  the  moral,  social  and  citizenship 
outcomes of education required reforming the conduct, beliefs and attitudes 
within  the  family  home  so  that,  for  instance,  parents  and  their  children 
possessed  the  attitude  that  education  was  valuable  and  relevant  in  the 
modern world (Campbell and Sherington 2006). A line of communication 
between the family and the school was to be necessary for achieving this 
task, so that the school could communicate the state’s ambitions into the 
quasi-private  realm  of  the  family  home.  Donzelot  (1978)  observed,  for          
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example, that normalising techniques and knowledges, such as the norms of 
hygiene and behaviour, were taught in nineteenth century French schools 
with the expectation that the child would take this civilised teaching into 
the family home. Hence: 
 
Many reformers thus told the same (doubtless exemplary) story of 
the child who, returning from school imbued with the sweetness for 
which they should have been responsible, shamed and reformed its 
debauched parents. (Hunter 1994, 123) 
 
Effectively, the family home was to be put into the service of social rule 
through instilling in it the norms of education, the norms of behaviour, and 
the norms of psychological and social health. In so doing, the pursuit of the 
state’s pastoral role re-constituted the family and what was considered its 
desirable form.  
 
Strengthening the home-school link:  
disadvantage, compensation and socialisation 
 
In  more  recent t i m e s ,  the  post-World  War  Two  social  and  statistical 
mapping  of  the  population,  its  social  ills  and  patterns  of  education  and 
health outcomes, rendered these governmental concerns and rationalities 
into a problem around the ‘disadvantaged child’ (Rose 1999a). Post War 
studies  in  health,  education  and  psychology  drew  attention  to  the 
encumbrances of a culture of poverty and deprivation on the families and 
communities,  and  the  normal  development  of  the  disadvantaged  child 
(Central Advisory Council for Education 1967; Commission of Inquiry into 
Poverty / Fitzgerald 1976; Floud et al. 1956; Karmel 1973). These children          
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were  more  likely  to  experience  truancy,  drop  out,  maladjustment, 
disaffection, delinquency and criminality.  
  The  link  between  the  family  and  the  child  was  increasingly 
conceptualised  in  terms  of  a  ‘cycle  of  disadvantage’,  whereby  children 
inherited the disadvantage and deprivation of their parents through such 
things  as  dysfunctional  family  relationships,  poor  parental  attitudes, 
neglect, indiscipline and parental academic under-achievement. Identifying 
the  inequalities  and  disadvantages  that  children  and  families  were  to 
contend with led policy makers and governmental and social authorities to 
attempt  to  halt  and  compensate  for  the  deprivation  and  deficit  of 
‘disadvantaged’  parents  being  visited  upon  their  children  (for  example, 
Central Advisory Council for Education 1967; Karmel 1973). However, 
these  programs  of  compensation  were  not  an  attempt  to  equalise  the 
economic  and  social  conditions  of  the  entire  nation,  or  to  provide  the 
conditions  for  individual  self-realisation  and  full  human  development. 
Rather, these interventions were less principled and more worldly. They 
reflected the long-standing governmental aspiration for strengthening the 
family-school alliance.  
  According  to  Schools  in  Australia  (Karmel  1973),  the  cycle  of 
poverty,  ‘culture  of  deprivation’  and  the  influence  of  the  family  and 
community  on  the  child’s  development  constituted  a  problem  for  the 
development and socialisation of the child through schooling. Schools in 
Australia reasoned that, “Complete parental control over the educational 
welfare of their own children could limit the perspective of the school and 
deny the authority of teachers in professional matters” (Karmel 1973, 13).          
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This was an important issue because as the studies and interventions based 
around  compensation  and  disadvantage  revealed  (Central  Advisory 
Council for Education 1967; Coleman 1966; Commission of Inquiry into 
Poverty  1976),  disadvantage  was  not  only  a  problem  of  inequity  and 
individual and social waste, but also alienation and: 
 
the production of a group of children who were unwilling or unable 
to respond appropriately to the values, rewards, and expectations that 
formed the culture of the school, and the culture of the larger society 
for which school was a vital preparation. (Rose 1999a, 193)  
 
For Schools in Australia, then, when schools exert a limited influence on 
children, as they were increasingly perceived to, there is heavy reliance on 
social mobility through the socialisation provided by the child’s family and 
community. However, as the cultural capital of many parents was narrow, 
improving  the  educational  and  life  prospects  for  children  required 
strengthening  the  socialising  role  and  authority  of  teachers  and  schools. 
This was a way in which the child’s inheritance of disadvantage from the 
family and community could be disrupted and the valued norms of conduct 
of civil society cultivated in the child, home and community. 
  Because social background, the norms of family life and parental 
conduct  and  attitudes  shaped  the  interests,  intellectual  development, 
academic  attainment,  health  and  life  destinations  of  the  child,  the 
compensatory  strategies  and  programs  recommended  in  the  Plowden 
Report in the United Kingdom (and those developed under the banner of 
Head  Start  in  the  United  States,  such  as  pre-schooling  and  Child          
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Development  Centres)  attempted  to  institute  into  the  family  home  the 
normative attitudes, knowledge and behaviours that were perceived to be 
conducive to the early intellectual, emotional and social development of the 
child. The school was a vital relay for this: 
 
the  world  outside  the  school  was  to  be  utilized  in  the  service  of 
cognitive  development  and  school  motivation.  The  aspirations, 
values, and techniques of the school were to be channelled into the 
home. Mothers were to be encouraged to participate in the preschool 
schemes,  which  would  enable  them  to  be  more  or  less  subtly 
instructed  in  the  attitudes  and  responses  central  to  an  effective 
pedagogy. (Rose 1999a, 195) 
 
  Resembling  earlier  approaches  to  the  problem  of  the  family  and 
schooling,  compensatory  approaches  for  redressing  disadvantage  and 
inequality  involved  strengthening  the  home-school  link.  However,  the 
assumptions, objectives, language and priorities were specific to this new 
context. The objective was to optimise the family as a pedagogical machine 
for improving children’s early education, their psychosocial development 
and the cultural capital of the home. During the course of the twentieth 
century, increased responsibility was to be shared among: (1) parents and 
families who were to create a home environment conducive to the child’s 
social, emotional and intellectual development and success; (2) the state 
and  political  authorities  that  were  to  provide  massive  investment  in 
education and welfare, as well as increased monitoring of and intervention 
into  families  and  communities;  and  (3)  the  experts  of  social  and 
psychological  rule  that  would  provide  the  normative  knowledges  and          
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techniques through which this government of others and the self could be 
achieved (Rose 1999a).  
  Importantly, it was in the context of this ambition to strengthen the 
authority and effectiveness of schools in socialising children that a focus on 
the  bureaucratic  organisation  of  the  school  system  and  advocacy  for 
devolution  and  school  autonomy  were  championed  in  Australia.  What, 
then,  was  the  relationship  between  system  devolution,  school  self-
management  and  the  ambition  to  have  schools  exert  an  influential 
socialising  force  on  children  given  the  weight  of  the  overwhelming 
influence of his or her family and community? To answer this question, we 
need  to  first  ask  how  the  problem  of  the  family  and  its  relationship  to 
education was conceptualised in Australia in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.  I  argue  that  this  relationship  was  increasingly  problematised  in 
terms of the individual’s power and that this reflects the rendering of the 
domain of education into an object of advanced liberal government.  
 
Governing through empowerment  
 
At first glance, many official reports of the late twentieth century argued 
for the need for students from a range of backgrounds to have access to an 
education  that  would  overcome  the  constraints  of  family  background 
(Commission  of  Inquiry  into  Poverty  1976;  Karmel  1973).  This  was 
particularly  conceived  of  in  terms  of  enabling  all  students  to  have  the 
opportunity to fully participate in society and its opportunities. The Schools 
Commission writes:          
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in order to give them the opportunity for full participation in the 
society and access to its rewards it is important that children raised 
on the margins of the mainstream culture should be enabled to enter 
it. (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975, 8)  
 
Although construed by some as a social democratic ideology concerned for 
equality  (Dudley  and  Vidovich  1996),  this  ambition  to  “initiate  [all] 
children into mainstream society” (Karmel 1973, 92) merely signals a long 
standing objective articulated in nineteenth and twentieth century political 
rationality that through schooling individuals are to be provided with the 
knowledge,  skills  and  attitudes  that  enable  them  to  overcome  obstacles 
placed on them by their family background. 
  As  with  the  liberal  discourses  mobilised  by  education  reformers 
associated with nineteenth century descriptions of schooling, this was to 
take  the  form  of  cultivating  self-responsible,  self-reflective  and  self-
regulating liberal citizens (Hunter 1994). For the Schools Commission, this 
was conceived of in terms of an aspiration to imbue young people with the 
capacity  to  have  “power  over  their  circumstances”  (Commonwealth 
Schools Commission 1975, 6) so that they may “shape the character of their 
own  lives  and  participate  in  the  character  of  society”  (Commonwealth 
Schools Commission 1975, 7). The Schools Commission states:  
 
Greater  equality  of  educational  outcomes  begins  in  a  view  of 
schooling the aim of which is to pass increased responsibility over to 
the learner with his increasing competence, with the objective that he 
will ultimately take more responsibility for organizing himself and 
will  be  assisted  to  find  relevance  to  the  present  in  the  past          
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achievements  of  the  human  mind.  (Commonwealth  Schools 
Commission 1975, 8)  
 
The  Schools  Commission  perceives  that  in  cultivating  the  individual’s 
competencies schooling should be directed towards the ends of fostering 
independent, self-directing, autonomous and active selves, and this accrues 
benefit for the nation at large (Bartos 1993). 
  What is more specific to the contemporary context, however, is how 
this objective is conceived. Increasingly, this ambition for developing the 
basic knowledge, skills and competencies of the individual for their full 
social and economic participation was embedded with the notion that the 
individual was enmeshed in a complex network of influential psychosocial 
relations. It was argued that for the individual to shape his or her life, to 
optimise the outcomes for him or her self, and to work on his or her self 
and  their  environment,  the  individual  must  have  confidence,  goals,  a 
positive sense of self, self-efficacy and sense of power: 
 
We  also k n o w  t h a t  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  s o c i a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o n  
individual success is not only a direct one; it occurs also through 
intervening  variables  such  as  intelligence  and  motivation  for 
learning.  Motivation,  for  example,  is  influenced  by  expectations 
about the future, which in turn are influenced by what children see 
around  them,  most  concretely  in  the  success  or  failure  of  their 
parents  in  school  terms,  in  the  degree  of  control  which  children 
perceive their parents to have over their own circumstances and by 
the expectations which parents, teachers and peers have for them. 
(Commonwealth Schools Commission 1976, 11) 
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  Within the context of the United States, the Equality of Educational 
Opportunity  report  (Coleman  1966)  similarly  enacted  a  psychosocial 
problematisation of the individual and society. It argued that the success of 
schooling was confronted by the problem of the deleterious psychology of 
students. Student achievement was perceived to interact in complex causal 
relationships  with  students’  self-concept  and  their  sense  of  control  over 
their environment, or students’ perception of themselves and their abilities, 
and the degree students felt forces beyond their control determined their 
lives (Brookover et al. 1964; De Charms 1972; Purkey 1970). Coleman’s 
(1966) report stated: 
 
The  special  importance  of  a  sense  of  control  of  environment  for 
achievement  of  minority-group  children  and  perhaps  for 
disadvantaged  whites  as  well  suggests  a  different  set  of 
predispositional factors operating to create low or high achievement 
for  children  from  disadvantaged  groups  than  for  children  of 
advantaged  groups.  For  children  from  advantaged  groups, 
achievement  or  lack  of  it  appears  closely  related  to  their  self-
concept:  what  they  believe  about  themselves.  For  children  from 
disadvantaged groups, achievement or lack of achievement appears 
closely  related  to  what  they  believe  about  their  environment: 
whether  they  believe  the  environment  will  respond  to  reasonable 
effort,  or  whether  they  believe  it i s  i n s t e a d  m e r e l y  r a n d o m  o r  
immovable. (Coleman 1966, 320-321) 
 
This problem of student psychology was especially pertinent for students at 
disadvantage, whose family backgrounds and early childhood experiences 
militated against students fully capitalising on schooling’s offerings, and by 
implication frustrating the influence of the school.           
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Such a state of affairs could be expected to lead to passivity, with a 
general belief in luck, a belief that that world is hostile, and also a 
belief that nothing he could ever do would change things. He has not 
yet come to see that he can affect his environment, for it has never 
been so in his previous experience... Thus, for many disadvantaged 
children, a major obstacle to achievement may arise from the very 
way  they  confront  the  environment.  Having  experienced  an 
unresponsive environment, the virtues of hard work, of diligent and 
extended effort toward achievement appear to such a child unlikely 
to be rewarding. As a consequence, he is likely to merely “adjust” to 
his environment, finding satisfaction in passive pursuits. (Coleman 
1966, 321) 
 
  In contrast, by promoting the child’s sense of personal power over 
their  lives,  including  their  confidence,  self-esteem,  aspirations  and  their 
positive  self-image  as  learners  and  citizens,  the  individual  child  would 
perceive  themself a s   an  active  agent  capable  of e ffecting  change,  and 
responsible for their choices and life outcomes. The disadvantaged child, of 
every child really, could be self-activating, resilient and have the ability to 
“take personal responsibility in the whole range of contingencies facing 
people in industrial societies” (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975, 
7). At stake in failing to cultivate these competencies and psychological 
attributes  is  that  the  child  may  perceive  that  his  or  her  environment  is 
“capricious, random, or beyond his control” (Coleman 1966, 288) and this 
would risk self-debilitating alienation, victim-hood, learned helplessness, a 
culture  of  handouts  and  blame,  passivity  and  a  personal  sense  of 
powerlessness and futility (see Baistow 2000). These developments evince 
the re-regulation of the domain of education.           
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An advanced liberal orientation to governing  
 
This  form  of  reasoning  applied  to  the  educational  domain  marks  an 
important development in how this domain was conceptualised, rendered 
visible and acted upon governmentally. The psychosocial problematisation 
of the individual and society which centred on the individual and his or her 
sense of power, and which had the objective of enabling individuals to 
exercise increased control over their lives (Baistow 1994, 2000; Cruikshank 
1999; Rose 1996b, 1999a), aligned with a new conceptualisation of the 
individual and their proper government. Rose describes this individual as a 
self that:  
 
…is to aspire to autonomy, it is to strive for personal fulfilment in its 
earthly life, it is to interpret its reality and destiny as a matter of 
individual responsibility, it is to find meaning in existence by shaping 
its life through acts of choice. (Rose 1996b, 151) 
 
  This is a model of human nature associated with advanced liberal 
rationalities of government, which were gaining ground in governmental 
and political discourses of the New Right and neo-liberals in many Western 
countries. In tandem with this new ‘regime of subjectivity’ was a shift away 
from conceiving and administering society as unstable and self-fracturing 
and the individual as a social citizen whose needs were to be secured by the 
state. Instead, the assumption of the empowered individual of neo-liberal 
and advanced liberal rationalities and technologies of rule treated society as 
a “source of energies contained within the individual’s exercise of freedom          
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and self-responsibility” (Dean 1999, 152). This meant that the problems of 
government, and indeed their solutions, increasingly became a “matter of 
‘one’s self’” (Rose 1996, 150), with the proper exercise of governmental 
power  being  facilitating,  cultivating  and  maximising  the  individual’s 
autonomy,  sense  of  power, s e lf-realisation,  ambition,  initiative  and  self-
responsibility. 
  It is my contention that this way of reasoning the individual and the 
exercise of political and government power shaped how the educational 
domain was conceptualised and therefore acted upon. This is evident in 
how the concern for the psychology of the family and child, their negative 
attitudes to schooling, their experiences of alienation, their self-esteem and 
their sense of powerlessness (Bardsley 1976) challenged the authority of 
social  rationalities  of  educational  governance.  These  social  rationalities 
emphasised  needs  and  environmental  influences  on  behaviour  and 
educational  outcomes,  but  these  were  increasingly  characterised  as 
environmentally determinist. Proponents of these rationalities and programs 
were accused of representing students’ family and social backgrounds as 
debilitating albatrosses hanging around students’ necks (see for example 
Rutter et al. 1979).  
  In contrast, in the discourses of psychological empowerment, social 
forces are not conceived of as exerting a determining influence on the child 
because  these  are  mediated  through  variables  such  as  the  individual’s 
perceptions  of  themselves,  society  and  schooling  fostered  in  families 
(Commonwealth  Schools  Commission  1976;  Purkey  1970;  Rutter  et  al. 
1979).  Consequently,  sociological  explanations  of  disadvantage  and          
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educational  achievement  were  deemed  to  be  limited  not  only  in 
understanding  how  individuals  shape  their  personal  lives  though  their 
environment, but because their explanations could be construed as fostering 
passivity and the acceptance of failure, or the expectation that it was the 
state’s  responsibility  to  fix  their  problems.  Sociological  explanations 
underestimated the potential power embodied in every human being.  
  This problematisation of the social and the embrace of psychosocial 
discourse of empowerment and autonomy are described by Baistow (2000) 
as evidence of political programs converting problems located in the social 
domain, such as poverty and disadvantage, into problems located in the 
individual and his or her psychology. She writes: 
 
The inability of disadvantaged people to regulate their lives, located 
in  their  high  ‘externality’  and  ‘inefficacy’,  was  held  to  be  self-
debilitating,  personally  and  collectively  demoralizing,  and 
threatening to the social good in a number of ways. (Baistow 2000, 
111)  
 
In  other  words,  through  the  creation  of  psychological  concepts  such  as 
external and internal locus of control and self-esteem, new governmental 
realities were created. There was a relationship of causality between an 
individual’s experience of a sense of powerlessness, or the incapacity to 
perceive them selves as having the ability to positively act upon themselves 
and the world, and a range of deleterious personal and social effect, such as 
academic under-achievement and alienation.           
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  Baistow’s  analysis  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  this 
transformation in expert knowledges of the individual, society and their 
regulation was not a consequence of the objective and neutral development 
of  our  knowledge  of  these  entities.  It  was  complexly  related  to  the 
emerging  de-socialised  political  and  governmental  discourse  around,  for 
instance, individual activity and responsibility. The same assessment can be 
made of the above-described transformation in education.  
   Congruent  with  this  emerging  political  discourse  of  individual 
activity,  autonomy  and  responsibility,  the  regulatory  concern  with 
education  developed  around  the  psychological  dimension  of  individual, 
family  and  school  life,  the  individual’s  sense  of  power,  control  and 
autonomy, and those things that mediate the effect of social background 
and hinder individual development. In the domain of education, the health 
and  wellbeing  of  the  nation  was  perceived  to  rest  upon  empowering 
individuals and families, conferring power over individuals’ circumstances 
through developing the individual’s competencies and their positive sense 
of self, and supporting and facilitating self-development (Simons 2002). 
For example, the Schools Commission made a telling distinction between 
conventional welfare measures such as ‘handouts’, which it construed as a 
charity  exercise  that  fostered  individual  passivity,  and  schooling,  which 
constituted  a  positive  form  of  welfare  because  it  developed  the 
competencies of individuals (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975). 
The latter enabled individuals to relate to themselves and their communities 
as resources with the capacity to shape their lives as active, choice-making 
and autonomous beings.           
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  In summary, liberal government’s objective of building a strategic 
alliance between the family and the educational enterprise was increasingly 
conceptualised  from  the  late  1960s  in  terms  of  powerlessness  and 
empowerment. This problematisation of the family and its relationship to 
education construed the nature of human nature as innately powerful, active 
and autonomous, and government was to be pegged to this normative ideal. 
Education  policy  was  aligning  itself  with  a  political  discourse  that 
increasingly  construed  the  wellbeing  of  the  nation  as  dependent  upon  a 
modality  of  government  directed  towards  such  things  as  removing 
constraints  on  individual  autonomy,  fostering  the  individual’s 
empowerment, and supporting their capacity to self-govern. It was expected 
that  individuals  were  to  take  personal  responsibility  for  improving  their 
social  and  economic  position  in  society  rather  than  expect  the  state  to 
guarantee  their  position  through  redistributive  means  (Commonwealth 
Schools Commission 1976). This meant effectively giving every child the 
opportunity of an “equal starting point in the educational race” (Marginson 
1997a, 55) from where they will determine their own destiny. 
 
Liberating parents from bureaucracy 
 
This governmental reasoning around empowerment and the autonomous, 
self-directing  individual  rendered  problematic  the  existing  bureaucratic 
organisation of schooling. As I have just described, since the late twentieth 
century individual conduct was increasingly problematised in terms of their 
power, activity and capacity for autonomy, and in this logic those things          
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that  constrain  personal  autonomy  were  assessed  as  disempowering  and 
requiring reform. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that this “wish to 
restore control to the citizen as a free individual” in work organisations and 
production  processes  (Miller  and  Rose  1995,  453)  led  to  a  critique  of 
bureaucratic management and the public bureaucracies that had expanded 
with  the  growth  of  the  social  liberal s t a te.  Public  bureaucracies  were 
assessed  as a   contributor  to  the  sense  of  powerlessness  experienced  by 
many individuals and communities.  
  As  I  have  described  in  Chapter  6,  in  the  late  twentieth  century 
bureaucracies  and  bureaucratic  management  associated  with  the  welfare 
state and its regulatory excess, were increasingly portrayed pejoratively as 
monolithic organisations essentially antipathetic to the individual human 
being, their needs and desires. They were variously described as rule and 
process  driven,  authoritarian,  insufficiently  flexible,  and  lacking  the 
incentives  that  would  drive  improved  individual  satisfaction,  motivation 
and  performance.  Critical  theorists  inveighed  against  the  state’s 
administration on account of its instrumentalist rationality and its supposed 
diminution  of  the  individual’s  autonomous  subjectivity  (Blake  and 
Masschelein  2007).  Public  choice  theorists,  social  progressives  and 
philosophical  libertarians  criticised  public  bureaucracies  for  holding  a 
monopoly on the choices of individuals, for disempowering citizens, and 
for being undemocratic and unresponsive to the needs of the citizens they 
were meant to serve (Buchanan and Wagner 1977; Clarke and Newman 
1997; Hummel 1977; Nozick 1975).          
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  Similar to the criticisms employing the discourse of powerlessness 
and  autonomy,  arguments  for  according  schools  and  teachers  greater 
autonomy from centralised education bureaucracies gained currency. For 
many  scholars  in  the  field  of  education,  restricting  the  local  control  of 
schools by the centralised bureaucratic management of school systems had 
damaging effects on the individual (Anderson 1973; Clark 1965; Gittell 
1972;  Kanter  1981;  Lopate  et  al.  1970;  Sarason  1971;  Sergiovanni  and 
Carver 1973). Take as an example the research by Lopate et al. (1970), who 
use the Human Relations research on the psychological benefits of working 
in  small  groups.  They  argued  in  their  analysis  that  central  education 
bureaucracies were damaging for teachers because those working within 
schools were denied autonomy and decision-making power and therefore 
could not identify with their tasks. This meant they were less satisfied and 
had lower productivity.  
  But  of  greater  concern  for  Lopate  et  al.  was  that  education 
bureaucracies contributed to the sense of ‘alienation’ experienced by many 
students,  families  and  communities,  especially  those  experiencing 
disadvantage.  This  was  because  as  bureaucracies  were  monolithic 
governmental institutions reliant on prescription and authority structures, 
these restricted the opportunity for community members to participate in 
decision-making at the school level. They argued:  
 
These groups feel they have little access to power in educational 
and other social-political institutions, and since they have found the 
public school ineffective in fulfilling their needs, they have become          
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unwilling and at times hostile second-class participants in society. 
(Lopate et al. 1970, 148)   
 
The  conclusion  Lopate  et  al.  drew  from  their  study  was  that  when 
individuals,  especially  those  from  ‘disempowered’  social  groups,  feel 
incapable of determining their lives and being self-sufficient, a range of 
negative effects ensue. These include alienation, a sense of powerlessness, 
low self-efficacy, and poor academic achievement. By contrast, when there 
are opportunities for parents to participate in the life of the school, positive 
effects ensue.  
  In  other  words,  the  central  bureaucratic  management  of  schools, 
once considered central to the pastoral role of the state, was now a problem 
because it created a distance between the school and the family. It was 
therefore a hindrance to improving the strategic alliance between the family 
and the school. With the education bureaucracy now a problem, breaking 
down bureaucratic enclaves by devolving decision-making to schools and 
communities promised to bridge this gap between the family, community 
and school, which so troubled political authorities. Decentralisation, and 
associated  innovations  such  as  school  boards,  constituted  a  ‘program  of 
freedom and empowerment’ facilitating the “active participation of parents 
in school affairs” (Lopate et al. 1970, 143), effectively taking the school 
into  the  community  and  bringing  the  school  into  the  community 
(Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975).  
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Government or freedom? 
 
On  the  one  hand,  this  program  or  strategy  of  freedom  is  clearly 
governmental. The Schools in Australia report stated “the openness of a 
school to parents is a means both of extending its educational influence and 
of  reinforcing  pupil  motivation”  (Karmel  1973,  13-14).  In  other  words, 
breaking  down  the  bureaucratic  government  of  schools  extends t he 
educational  influence  of  the  state  because  through  greater  interaction 
between  the  school  and  home  the  cultural  capital,  values,  habits  and 
normative  knowledges  of  parents  and  communities  could  be  developed. 
This could occur, for instance, through consciousness-raising around issues 
of educational matters, educating parents on child development issues and 
counselling them in their own personal problems (see for examples Karmel 
1973). This would extend the governmental reach of political and social 
authorities  by  developing  and  increasing  the  compatibility  between  the 
activities,  goals,  values,  expectations  and  nature  of  school  life  and  the 
students’ family and community life (Gittell 1972). 
  The governmental nature of this program is also evident in the fact 
that parental participation was expected to alter the negative perceptions 
and  attitudes  to  schooling  that  many  parents  possessed,  and  which  they 
often  unwittingly  passed  on  to  their  children.  When  individuals  and 
communities fail to have sufficient influence over their schools and they 
feel their personal autonomy is diminished, they feel alienated and helpless. 
However, parents that participate in school matters and decision-making          
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not only develop positive relationships with the school and its teachers, but 
through their interactions with the school they also develop knowledge and 
skills related to educational and parenting issues. This then increases their 
sense of power of over their circumstances, giving them a “greater sense of 
fate control” (Lopate et al. 1970, 144). By enabling parents to participate in 
school decision-making by decreasing bureaucratic power and increasing 
the school’s capacity to be self-determining, parents’ aspirations for their 
children improve and children sense their parents’ increased control. This 
empowerment of the parent and school is said to produce a positive flow-on 
effect to the child’s own sense of control and their educational achievement 
(Lopate et al. 1970; Sarason 1971), although not always (Skeen 1974).  
  Therefore,  as  devolution  and  school  autonomy  opened  parental 
behaviour  and  the  socialisation  of  the  child  in  the  family  home  to  the 
scrutiny and intervention of a range of expert, civil and educational norms 
and  values,  it  constituted  a  governmental  strategy  for  extending  the 
school’s educational influence, or its pedagogical apparatus. It was, as the 
Commonwealth Schools Commission (1978) described it, a positive form 
of  welfare  because  it  had  the  capacity  to  empower  citizens  through 
cultivating  desirable  attributes  in  citizens  rather  than  compensate 
individuals  through  ‘passive’ w e l f a r e.  However,  framed  by  advanced 
liberal  rationalities  of  government,  this  governmental  strategy  sought  to 
translate  the  political  aspirations  for  free  citizenship  based  around 
individual empowerment, autonomy, activity and full participation into the 
personal desires and aspirations of families and community members. The 
Schools Commission in its description of school autonomy intimated this:          
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The complexity of public issues in a society such as our own, which 
is also a political democracy, requires that ordinary citizens, not just 
a minority of experts, be able to consider alternatives and evidence 
and to accept the provisional rather than absolute nature of social 
arrangements  and  solutions.  Attitudes  as  well  as  knowledge  are 
involved. Participation in decision-making in a community seeking 
workable solutions to problems facing it, in an atmosphere of respect 
for persons, may give people an appreciation of their own capacity 
to participate in shaping circumstances and the obligations to take 
the  wishes  and  interests  of  others  into  account  in  doing  so. 
(Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975, 11) 
 
Here, devolution and school autonomy encourages parents to participate in 
the  decisions  of  their  local  schools,  develop  the  knowledge,  skills  and 
techniques for cultivating a sense of power and control over their lives, take 
ownership over their community and problems, partake in the amelioration 
of  the  problems  that  confront  it,  and  in  the  process  be  trained  in  the 
competencies  for  democratic  citizenship.  So,  while  de-bureaucratisation, 
devolution and school autonomy constitute governmental strategies, if not 
programs  of  government,  these  nevertheless  sought  to  create  self-
governing, autonomous and empowered citizens. And as is becoming clear, 
the autonomous, empowered life is a site of power relations.  
 
Liberating teachers from bureaucracy 
 
The objectives of bridging the gap, fostering participation and developing 
individual capacities also required schools and the conduct of teachers to be 
corrected,  developed  and  reformed.  In  particular,  while  family  and          
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community life was to resemble the values and expectations of schools, the 
empowerment  of  teachers  through  the  devolution  of  responsibility  for 
curriculum, pedagogy and resource allocation re-regulated the internal life 
of schools so that they would reflect the life of the community they served. 
  As briefly mentioned above, Lopate et al. (1970) and Gittell (1972) 
were critical of the restrictions placed on the teaching profession by the 
bureaucratically organised education system. They argued that bureaucrats 
monopolised  decision-making  power  and  therefore,  stifled  by  centrally 
devised mandates of curriculum and school policy, teachers and principals 
were powerless to participate in substantive educational decision-making 
and influence at the local level. But more than being just a liberal concern 
for the individual’s rights to freedom, the implications of this lack of local 
participation and influence were perceived to be very practical.  
  This bureaucratic organisation of schooling limited the individual 
schools’  responsiveness  to  the  interests  and  needs  of  their  students  and 
communities,  meaning  that  there  was  an  incompatibility  between  the 
activities of the school and the life of the student. This, it was reasoned, 
exacerbated  students’  powerlessness  and  alienation  (Karmel  1973).  A 
standardised  curriculum,  for  instance,  assumes  prior  knowledge  and 
experiences  that  students  may  not  in  fact  possess.  Consequently,  many 
children  were  said  to  experience  school  as  unnecessarily  difficult  or 
irrelevant to their lives and future prospects. With negative perceptions of 
schooling  extending  to  negative  perceptions  of  themselves  as  learners, 
schooling becomes an alienating experience.          
  227 
  Educational  knowledges  have  increasingly  recognised  that 
improving student engagement, retention, achievement and self-perception 
depends  upon  tailoring  pedagogy  and  curriculum  to  the  life  of  the 
community,  that  is,  devising  these  in  light  of  the  prior  knowledge  and 
experiences of its students (Connell 1993). The important question arising 
from  this  for  schools  and  school  leaders  is:  what  are  the  optimal 
organisational conditions that may give teachers the authority, flexibility 
and  autonomy  to  devise  and  enact  curriculum  in  response  to  local 
circumstances?  
  Framing the problem in this way, the bureaucratic management of 
education systems emerged as an obvious target of reform because these 
centralised systems were organised around standardisation and centralised 
processes,  procedures  and  prescription.  This  top-down  organisation 
disempowered teachers, who were becoming increasingly professionalised 
and  sought  greater  authority  within  the  education  system  (Beare  1990), 
because teachers did not have the capacity to make autonomous decisions 
and to act upon these. As education management scholar Kanter reasoned, 
“People need power… just as they need opportunity” (Kanter 1981, 561). 
The  centralisation  and  uniformity  of  education  systems  came  at  the 
“expense of initiative, enterprise, and experimentation” (Pratt 1975, 13).  
  I  am  not  suggesting  that  these  descriptions  of  bureaucracy  were 
accurate, because all education bureaucracies differ. Crane (1969) wrote, 
for instance:  
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Although the Australian education system varies considerably in its 
degree of professionalization and openness as one moves from state 
to  state,  it  would  be  a  misunderstanding  to  assume  that  all  state 
systems are closed monolithic bureaucracies whose atmosphere of 
operation is that of unimaginative maintenance. It is an equally grave 
misunderstanding to imagine that a bureaucratic organization cannot 
innovate within itself at the managerial and technical levels. (Crane 
1969, 258) 
 
My point, however, is that a particular form of probelmatisation and reform 
of educational governance emerged from a certain notion or understanding 
of  bureaucracy,  regardless  of  its  accuracy.  Hence,  this  image  of 
bureaucracy was juxtaposed with the flexible, self-managing organisation 
of the system consisting of devolved authority for decision-making within 
schools  in  respect  to  curriculum,  pedagogy  and  many  administrative 
responsibilities. This would give teachers the autonomy necessary to be 
responsive  to  their  local  communities,  to  have  the  flexibility  to  involve 
students  and  parents  in  educational  decision-making  and  therefore  to 
successfully  convert  cultural  differences  into  educational  advantage 
(Commonwealth Schools Commission 1976; Karmel 1973).  
  But devolving authority to schools did not mean ‘freeing’ teachers, 
as if the fair, efficient and reasonable exercise of autonomy and authority 
would  naturally  occur  through  de-governmentalising  schooling.  This  is 
because,  firstly,  school  autonomy  would  remain  regulated  by  central 
bureaucracies  and  teacher  professional  knowledges.  Secondly,  and  less 
obviously,  devolution  and  autonomy  are  governmental  strategies  for 
producing a certain kind of ‘responsiblised’ teacher identity, illuminated by          
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findings  in  management  theory  and  psychology  that  greater  worker 
autonomy  improved  motivation,  satisfaction,  productivity,  commitment, 
engagement and a sense of responsibility (Kanter 1981; Lopate et al. 1970). 
For the management theorist, Kanter, it is “powerlessness that corrupts” 
(Kanter  1981,  560)  and,  therefore,  empowering  teachers  by  de-
bureaucratising  schools  and  giving  teachers  increased  autonomy  was  a 
means of regulating them to more effective and efficient ends. 
  Devolution  had  the  benefit  of  empowering  individuals  because, 
unlike  under  bureaucratic  forms  of  management,  teachers  working  with 
greater autonomy and in smaller organisations are less likely to construe 
themselves  as  merely  instruments  of  others’  will  and  therefore  be 
empowered. According to the Schools Commission: 
 
It is also becoming more generally accepted that people able to make 
their own decisions are likely to act more responsibly and to have a 
stronger commitment to the success of the enterprise in which they 
are  engaged  than  are  those  who  see  themselves  merely  as 
instruments  of  the  will  of  others.  (Commonwealth  Schools 
Commission 1978, 8) 
 
Hence, it was expected that devolution, rather than freeing the teacher from 
regulation  per  se,  would  more  effectively  produce  desirable  objectives, 
such  as  a  curriculum  and  pedagogical  approaches  consistent  with  the 
educational  needs  and  interests  of  the  community  in  order  to  improve 
educational achievement. The consequence of this was that the practice of 
devolved  authority  gives  the  “responsibility  to  the  people  involved” 
(Karmel 1973, 104) rather than relaying it up the chain of command:           
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Its belief in this grass-roots approach to the control of the schools 
reflect  a  conviction  that  responsibility  will  be  most  effectively 
discharged  where  the  people  entrusted  with  making  decisions  are 
also the people responsible for carrying them out, with an obligation 
to justify them, and in a position to profit from their experience. 
(Karmel 1973, 10) 
 
  Importantly,  then,  rather  than  being  a  statement  of  trust  in  the 
teaching profession, devolving authority to teachers represents a calculation 
of  power.  Congruent  with  governmental  techniques  applied  to  private 
enterprise  and  the  public  services,  the  Karmel  Report  and  the  Schools 
Commission  concluded  that  increasing  teachers’  responsibility  would 
increase the degree to which teachers viewed themselves as responsible for 
outcomes. Consequently, increased discretion and responsibility in work 
would  improve  work  and  educational  outcomes  because  of  teachers’ 
increased  “capacity  and  willingness  to  influence  it”  (Commonwealth 
Schools Commission 1975, 231). Once again, empowerment reveals itself 
as a governmental strategy pegged to a notion of individual freedom as 
freedom from constraints on autonomy and choice. 
 
Capitalising the self 
 
Finally, presupposing that the individual is empowered, autonomous and 
active, system devolution, de-bureaucratisation and school autonomy also 
constitute  a  response  to  an  expectation  that  citizens  are  to  live  like 
enterprises  that  calculate  their  life  choices  in  terms  of  investments  and 
risks.           
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  As I mentioned previously, the Human Capital School promoted by 
Becker (1983), Schultz (1960) and Friedman (1968) conceptualised human 
nature in terms of individuals who invest in their selves and make choices 
in  relation  to  the  development  of  their  capital,  or  potential  sources  of 
income.  The  principal  idea  here  is  that  humans  are  ‘capitalizable’  and 
consequently all social behaviour could be conceptualised and governed 
economically. For theorists of human capital human, and neo-liberals, this 
meant markets constituted a sufficient condition for governing individuals 
because they created a domain for relatively unfettered individual choice 
making.  
  As these ideas rooted themselves into political thinking, the choice-
making, investing and enterprising individual was seen to be ever more 
pivotal  to  national  economic  prosperity.  Through  the  faculty  of  choice, 
citizens were obliged to maximise their human capital. Government activity 
began  to  take  on  two  clear  roles  in  relation  to  this  ‘capitalisation  of 
citizenship’: 
 
A  negative  role:  to  remove  disincentive  to  this  process  of 
maximization of human capital and to improve incentives… And a 
positive  role:  to  facilitate  the  infrastructure  of  resources  that  will 
enable  individuals  to  obtain  access  to  the  skills  and  capacities 
necessary  to  enhance  their  human  capital  (skills,  training  and  the 
like). (Rose 1999c, 483) 
 
Illustratively,  throughout  the  1980s  many  constraints  imposed  by 
governmental or bureaucratic regulations were loosened. Labour markets 
and foreign purchases of domestic equity were deregulated, whilst public          
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utilities and services were privatised or rendered into quasi-public entities 
operating in market settings. No longer were social and economic health 
conceived  as  necessarily  derived  from  extensive  government  planning, 
intervention and regulation. Rather, individual choice-making needed to be 
freed from many political, governmental or bureaucratic constraints.  
  Where, then, does schooling fit into this governmental rationality?  
  The  bureaucratic  organisation  of  education  systems  was 
increasingly criticised because it represented a disempowering constraint 
on individual activity and choice. The bureaucratic control that determined 
which  schools  students  attended,  the  prescribed  policies  that  effectively 
standardised  public  schools,  and  the  dismal  funding  arrangements  for 
private schools were seen to stifle the efficiency and moral supremacy of a 
system  of  individual  choice  making  (Chubb  and  Moe  1990;  Friedman 
1997; Friedman and Friedman 1980). This bureaucratic control reflected 
what was seen, and continue to be seen, as the imposition by a paternalistic 
state of constraints to individual capitalisation, such as the pursuit of family 
prerogatives and interests, full individual self-realisation, and access to the 
rewards that supposedly flowed from these.  
  This  constraint  on  human  capitalisation  and  self-realization  was 
especially problematic for the organisation of education systems because 
schooling  was  increasingly  being  construed  in  terms  of  human  capital. 
Translating the value placed on education by political authorities into the 
value schemata of citizens, citizens increasingly perceived schooling and 
education to be a key site for empowerment, personal investment, skills 
development for full participation in the modern economy, for overcoming          
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the limits of one’s own capabilities and background, and for the production 
of  personal  capital  (Marginson  1997c;  Simons  2006).  Indeed,  in  a 
competitive globalised world a lot more now seems to depend on getting a 
‘good education’, and going to a ‘good school’ (Ball 1998a; Wolf 2002).  
  In  light  of  this,  the  governmental  or  bureaucratic  monopoly  and 
regulation  of  choice  was  perceived  as  incongruent  with,  not  only  the 
cultivation of ‘the family’ making responsible decisions geared towards its 
best interests (Hunter 1994), but also the individualism embodied in the 
political  reasoning  associated  with  this  notion  of h uman  capital  and 
capitalisation. For political authorities: 
 
Education can no longer be led but the producers… Education must 
be shaped by the users – by what is good for the individual child and 
what  hopes  are  held  by  their  parents.  (Kenneth  Baker  quoted  in 
Silver 1994, 142) 
 
Unsurprisingly, then, across many Western countries political authorities 
began  to  fund  the  expansion  of  the  private  education  sector,  and  they 
sought to create more flexible and competitive public education systems 
that  offered  a  range  of  choices.  As  the  Schools  Commission  reasoned, 
“there  is  little  point  in  choice  among  schools  which  are  all  the  same” 
(Commonwealth Schools Commission 1976, 14). Hence, individual public 
schools have been enjoined to operate as relatively autonomous enterprises 
competing with other schools for the custom of economically calculating 
and ethically responsible parents.          
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  It  is  true  that  this  shift  from  bureaucratic  prescription  towards 
organisational  autonomy  and  freedom  has  been  varied  across  public 
education systems in Australia. And there is still much criticism of the size 
and influence of educational bureaucracies and the inability of schools to 
deliver non-standardised programs. Nevertheless, through reforms such as 
devolution,  and  the  creation  of  selective,  specialised  schools  and 
Independent  Public  Schools,  constraints  on  parents  making  prudent 
investment choices in relation to the choice of school have been loosened. 
As well, public subsidies for private schools, National Assessment Program 
– Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) testing, and the MySchool website 
have sought to facilitate parental choice making, with the latter providing 
parents with information on school performance in order to inform their 
decision-making.  
  Despite  appearances,  however,  such  reforms  are  not  evidence  of 
government abstaining from protecting the welfare of its citizens. As Part II 
indicated,  the  care  and  welfare  of  citizens  are  in  the  genes  of  liberal 
political rationality. Peters et al. (2000), therefore, observe in relation to the 
market’s creation of ‘autonomous choosers’ as enterprises: 
 
These changed notions can and should be understood as involving 
changes in the forms that governmentality takes. But in providing 
leadership and husbandry successive governments… have, at the 
same time, claimed to be providing a better form of security for 
those for whom access to educational services has been difficult, 
by targeting individuals who for whatever reason cannot afford to 
because skilled and qualified. They have not abandoned security,          
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but  rather  reassessed  it  in  terms  of  individualism  and  the 
autonomous chooser in particular. (Peters et al. 2000, 122) 
 
For  Peters  et  al.,  education  and  social  reforms  indexed  to  human 
capitalisation  represent  a  transformation  in  how  the  state’s  security  and 
welfare  are  conceptualised  and  enacted.  The  state’s  interests  are  to  be 
secured  through  empowering  individuals  through  de-bureaucratisation, 
competition,  fostering  individual  and  organisational  autonomy,  self-
reliance and individual choice (Peters 2001a), that is, by contriving “the 
conditions  under  which  entrepreneurial  and  competitive  conduct  can  be 
allowed to come into play and the market can hence operate” (Dean 1999, 
157).  So  here  we  see  two  instances  of  the  same  strategy  of  ‘positive’ 
welfare:  (1)  in  the  instances  described  in  the  preceding  sections,  by 
increasing the autonomy of schools, parents can be self-empowered, more 
involved in school decision-making and practices, and schools can thereby 
better reflect the interests and needs of their community; and (2) in the 
descriptions of human capitalisation outlined here, school autonomy and 
diversification  give  parents  greater  capacity  to  choose  the  right  or  best 
school for their children (Harrison 2004), that is, to make responsible and 
prudent choices about their children’s education and future. 
  While these are two distinct objectives, and some may claim they 
oppose each other because one centres on the pursuit of self-interest and the 
other community participation, both objectives conceive parents as critical 
to the educational enterprise. Both are linked to the same governmental 
reasoning that seeks to cultivate as a matter of personal and state welfare          
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empowered,  self-responsible,  active  citizens  who  have  increased  power 
over their immediate environment and who are engaged thoughtfully in the 
education of their children, what Smith (1993) describes as the fostering of 
‘educational agency’. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I  began  this  chapter  by  suggesting  that  parenting,  the  family  and  the 
family’s  relationship  to  the  state’s  educational  enterprise  have  been  a 
persistent  problem  for  government.  However,  how  these  problems  have 
been understood and acted upon has undergone constant transformation. I 
argued  that  political  and  governmental  thought  has  been  influential  in 
shaping  this  problematisation  of  the  family  and  schooling.  There  is 
temporal  and  thematic  compatibility  between  the  types  of  governmental 
reforms in the education sector to emerge in this period, and the advanced 
liberal political culture of the 1970s and 1980s, with its invocation of the 
empowered and active individual, and a conception of government in terms 
of a “community of free, autonomous, self-regulating individuals” (Peters 
2001a,  68).  The  de-bureaucratising,  self-managing  and  devolutionary 
reforms of this period are indexed to this model of the empowered human 
being.  
  Importantly,  although  devolution  is  linked  to  the  downsizing  of 
centralised bureaucratic management and the break down of bureaucratic 
barriers between citizens, their communities and government, this is not for 
the purpose of empowering citizens from government, or about diminishing          
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the  state’s  concern  for  the  welfare  of  the  population.  It  is  instead  an 
advanced liberal governmental strategy for limiting certain powers of the 
traditional instruments of the state, such as the educational bureaucracy set 
up for administering the welfare of the population. This reform is linked to 
political  thought  that  attributes  deleterious  economic,  social  and  moral 
effects to ‘big government’, individual passivity and irresponsibility, and a 
belief that the best way to govern citizens for their welfare is to empower 
them  in  their  own  self-government,  effectively  reducing,  or  at  least  re-
configuring, the social and economic responsibilities of the state.   
  Therefore, the ‘autonomisation’ of education systems is linked to a 
longstanding governmental aspiration to bridge the gap between the family 
and  its  private  practices  and  the  school  and  its  public  concerns.  I  have 
described  this  aspiration  as  having  taken  the  form  of  fostering  the 
participation of parents and communities in the life of school, a strategy of 
which  parental  choice  is  an  offshoot.  This  freedom  to  participate  is 
understood  as  possible  by  limiting  the  power  of  the  educational 
bureaucracy over individuals and communities, while enabling the freedom 
of  choice.  So,  with  parents  having  greater  freedom  to  particpate  in 
educational choices, and yet parents also being increasingly made aware 
that it is not merely the state’s responsibility for the education and care of 
society’s children, self-managing school reforms have at the same time de-
regulated and re-regulated the domain of education.  
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Chapter 8: Analysing Entrepreneurial Self-
Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As I have argued thus far, the key to understanding why and how self-
managing reforms emerged is to grasp that it constitutes a governmental 
program or strategy emerging from a crisis of liberal governmentality. Self-
managing reforms, I have argued, enact an advanced liberal governmental 
rationality, by which I mean self-managing reforms re-regulate the domain 
of  education  in  response  to  the  late  twentieth  and  early  twenty-first 
centuries’ rationalities and techniques of autonomy, choice, freedom, self-
realisation and enterprise.  
  The  preceding  chapter  illustrated  this  in  its  examination  of  the 
attempts  to  maximise  the  effectiveness  of  the  instruments  of  education. 
With a focus on the case of the family and its relationship to schooling, I 
argued that there was a transformation in how the relationship between the          
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family and the state’s educational enterprise was to be strengthened for the 
purpose of achieving national security, wellbeing and prosperity. Indexed 
to  an  advanced  liberal  governmental  rationality,  devolution,  school 
autonomy  and  self-management  emerge  from  the  problematisation  of 
bureaucratic over-reach and individual disempowerment. A range of social 
actors  including  political  authorities,  critical  sociologists,  psychologists, 
and  organisational  and  management  theorists  variously  argued  that  the 
organisation  of  the  education  system  should  be  pegged  to  empowering 
parents, teachers and communities in their own self-government. 
  How, then, is another significant feature of self-managing reforms, 
managerialism, to be understood in terms of advanced liberalism and the 
crisis of liberalism? Surely, the use of management expertise in schools 
could not possibly signify a move towards empowerment and freedom. As 
the  very  label  suggests,  management  is  about  managing,  regulating  and 
controlling  people. T he  rise  of  managerialism  appears  to  discredit  the 
argument that self-managing reforms are tied to a crisis of liberalism which 
sought to revive such things as individual freedom, autonomy and choice.  
  In  the  following  two  chapters  I  address  this  line  of  questioning. 
Examining what Brennan (2009) refers to as the first and second waves of 
neo-liberalism, specifically managerialism and marketisation, I argue that 
the  expertise,  techniques  and  practices  of  corporate  management,  and 
associated  technologies  of  self-management,  have  rendered  central 
bureaucratic  management  problematic  and  re-regulated  the  domain  of 
schooling  around  advanced  liberal  rationalities  of  government,  which 
include entrepreneurialism (Ball 2002; Gewirtz 2002; Mac An Ghaill 1994;          
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Peters 1996; Peters 2001a; Troman 1996). The discourses of management, I 
argue, have not only been pivotal to the regulation of schools, but also to a 
certain  kind  of  ‘empowerment’  of  schools,  school  leaders,  parents  and 
communities.  
  In order to mount this argument, I must distinguish my analysis 
from  some  common  representations  of  managerialism  and  marketisation 
found in the education and sociology literature. Through an examination of 
critical  accounts  of  management,  I  argue  that  the  technologies  of 
management  should  be  construed a s  l i beral  technologies  of  government 
rather than as necessarily coercive, oppressive and exploitative.  
 
Representations of management 
 
Over  the  past  four  decades,  the  organisation  of  the  public  sector 
administration  has  undergone  ‘managerialisation’.  Management  practices 
favoured  by  private  enterprise  have  been  embraced  and  applied  to  the 
management  of  the  public  sector,  a  trend  variously  termed  New  Public 
Management (Hood 1991), New Managerialism (Pollitt 1993) or Corporate 
Managerialism (Weller and Lewis 1989). Integral to this transformation of 
the public sector has been a diminution of the centralised planning of public 
services and an increase in organisational and individual autonomy. As Du 
Gay (1996) observes, this has meant “‘offering’ individuals involvement in 
activities – such as managing budgets, training staff, delivering services – 
previously held to be the responsibility of other agents” (1996, 157). In 
others words, increasing the autonomy of public sector organisations has          
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been accompanied by techniques for securing the responsible exercise of 
that  autonomy.  Modelled  on  the  commercial  enterprise  and  its  putative 
‘virtuous’ practices (Ball 2007; Du Gay 1996; Du Gay 2000b; Du Gay and 
Hall  1996),  this  ‘responsibilisation’  has  included  the  insertion  into  the 
public  organisation  of  rationalities  and  techniques  related  to  outcomes, 
plans, standards, targets, audits, continuous improvement and performance 
management (Powers 1997).  
  The expertise of management that shaped the managerialisation of 
the public sector also informed the reform of education systems. Education 
management  experts  construed  management  know-how  as  a  tool  for 
overcoming  the  dearth  of  management  knowledge  at  the  school  level, 
which left schools adrift and unable to manage them selves, a consequence 
of central bureaucracy management (Bush et al. 1980; Caldwell and Spinks 
1988).  The  ethos  of  education  management  texts  is  that  management 
expertise  offers  schools  a  method  for  rendering  the  internal  features  or 
processes  of  the  school  organisation  knowable  and  amenable  to 
improvement  in  order  that  teachers,  under  the  condition  of  devolved 
authority, can be empowered from bureaucratic constraint so as to manage 
their own destiny responsibly, efficiently, effectively and equitably (Beare 
et  al.  1989;  Caldwell  and  Spinks  1988;  Caldwell  and  Spinks  1992; 
Hargreaves and Hopkins 1991; Schmuck 1984; Short and Greer 2002). 
  As I discussed at the beginning of this thesis, an important influence 
in  this  project  in  Australia  and  internationally  was  The  Self-Managing 
School  (Caldwell  and  Spinks  1988).  The  authors  of  this  text  outline  a 
comprehensive management apparatus in response to what they perceive to          
  242 
be ad hoc and auxiliary management practices (such as development plans 
and reviews) used within education systems that are governed largely by 
central  bureaucracies.  The  authors  provide  frameworks  for  corporate 
planning, policy development, programme budgeting and methods for in-
school  evaluation.  These  techniques  aim  to  engage  schools  in  making 
decisions about their priorities, objectives, procedures, and the allocation of 
resources within the school. How are we to understand these developments 
from the perspective of governmentality? In answering this question, I want 
to  distinguish  my  analysis  from  critical  analysis,  which  has  heavily 
influenced the criticism of managerial reform in education. 
 
Critical Analysis: Instrumentalism 
 
As I discussed in chapter two, the critical literature which associates self-
managing reforms with a restructuring of the welfare state and the problems 
of legitimacy, control and efficiency, tends to describe management know-
how  as  a  means  employed  by  the  powerful  to  gain  popular  consent,  to 
discipline  conduct  and  to  improve  economic  outputs.  Managerialisation 
within schools, it is often concluded, renders schools into institutions for 
servicing the state’s needs, which includes pursuing the economic interests 
of the state and powerful capitalists (Ball 1990; Ball 1993; Bottery 1992; 
Gewirtz 2002; Hatcher 1994; Knight, Lingard, and Porter 1993; Lingard, 
Knight, and Porter 1993; Whitty, Power, and Halpin 1998). It achieves this, 
so the argument goes, by centralising the control of school curriculum and 
pedagogy,  inserting  a  capitalist  logic  into  schooling  through  curriculum          
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change and educational commodification, and subjugating teachers through 
efficiency-driven  neo-Taylorist  and  performance-based  management 
regimes, and much more besides. Accordingly, the language and objectives 
of social justice, citizenship, public service and the public good have been 
increasingly  replaced  by  the  language,  knowledges  and  techniques  of 
business  and  markets.  In  this  context,  the  contemporary  discourse  of 
autonomy and empowerment associated with education reform is said to be 
hegemonic because it masks the economic instrumentalism, compliance, 
control,  social  reproduction  and  disempowerment  wrought  by 
managerialism and marketisation. 
  But  what  is  the  conceptual  ground  upon  which  this  specific 
characterisation stands? This account is indebted conceptually to Weber’s 
rationalisation thesis and its adaptation by subsequent critical theorists, one 
of the most notable being Habermas (Blake and Masschelein 2007; Dean 
1994).  According  to  Weber,  a  unitary  form  of  institutional  rationality 
termed  purposive  or  instrumental  rationality  threatened  the  historical 
rationalisation that promised to both emancipate humans from tradition and 
reconcile  social  action  with  humanity’s  essential  rationality 
(disenchantment). Instrumental rationality represented the subordination of 
the human form to forms of calculation and action determined by means 
and ends rather than, say, the individual choosing and acting autonomously 
and in accordance with some absolute value (values-rational action). This 
phenomenon, which Weber disparagingly perceives as a general process of 
rationalisation of the whole of existence, or a “transmutation of the history 
of progress of reason into one of the intensification of the domination of          
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instrumentalism” (Dean 1994, 61), is said to lie at the heart of modernity 
and the development of Western civilisation, bureaucracy and the capitalist 
system.    
  Accepting  this  proposition  to  be  true,  the  work  of  subsequent 
critical  theorists  such  as  Horkheimer  and  Adorno  (1982)  and  Habermas 
(1979)  extend  Weber’s  analysis  by  giving  instrumental  reason  an  all-
encompassing  capitalist  form  by  attributing  it  to  the  “bourgeois  epoch” 
(Dean  1994,  102).  For  Dean,  this  theoretical  manoeuvre  enabled 
contemporary critics to directly link ‘non-critical’ reason or rationality to 
structures of class domination and exploitation, the economisation of the 
world,  and  the  capitalist  domination  and  deformation  of  authentic  and 
autonomous  human  subjectivity.  This  mode  of  intelligibility  underpins 
much analysis of the domain of education reform.  
  Gewirtz (2002), for example, conceives education management as a 
form  of  instrumental  reason e mbedded  with  a  capitalist  logic.  This 
technical  rationality  encompasses  the  formal  structures,  techniques, 
procedures  and  practices  that  “facilitate  speed  of  decision-making, 
coordination,  the  setting  and  reviewing  of  objectives,  good  financial 
controls and information, cost improvement, responsiveness and consumer 
loyalty” (Gewirtz et al. 1995, 92). The standardising and calculative nature 
of  management  practices  represents  an  economic  rationalisation  of  the 
educational  process,  serving  strategic  and  economistic  ends  such  as 
economic  efficiency,  competition  and  commodification,  and  hence 
representing  a  capitalist  logic  (Clarke  and  Newman  1997;  Lauder  et  al. 
1999). Gewirtz sets as her task the unveiling of management’s inherent          
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systems of capitalist domination, the “normalizing vulgarities of capitalist 
modernization”  (Blake  and  Masschelein  2007,  43),  and  its  distortion  of 
individual autonomous conduct, thought and values. For Gewirtz, critical 
analysis will reveal how management renders individual identity congruent 
with private, capitalist interest. 
  At  stake  for  Gewirtz  is  the  organisation  of  schooling  around  a 
substantive  rationality  that  emphasises  the  “intrinsic  qualities  of  the 
‘product-process’ – here education, teaching and learning” (Gewirtz 2002; 
Gewirtz et al. 1995, 92). The reason Gewirtz is so alarmed by the threat to 
these  ‘intrinsic  qualities’  of  schooling  is  because  Gewirtz  understands 
popular schooling to have originated in democratic societies as the means 
of  realising  individuals’  capacities  for  political  self-governance. 
Embodying a value-oriented rationality signified by absolute values such as 
equality,  freedom,  human  self-realisation  and  social  and  political 
citizenship  (Hunter  1994;  Hunter  and  Meredyth  2000;  Meredyth  1994), 
popular  schooling  is  construed  by  Gewirtz  as  an  essentially  democratic 
forum that should be beyond extraneous relations of power and economic 
distortion. With this presupposition, the supposed economic rationality of 
management expertise and other related self-managing reforms, such as the 
use  of  markets,  corrupts  the  foundations  of  schooling  by  subordinating 
education and its promise of genuine human and social development to 
technicist, mean-ends calculations and commodity exchange relationships 
(Ball 1990b; Bates 1995; Bottery 1992; Porter 1993). 
  This dichotomous characterisation between an instrumentalism that 
seeks  economic  efficiency  and  a  substantive  rationality  that  seeks  the          
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materialisation  of  just  human  and  democratic  values  constitutes  the 
conceptual architecture around which the critical analysis of management-
as-instrumental rationality by Gewirtz is mounted. This analysis is indebted 
to  Weber  for  his  concept  of  a  unitary  instrumental  rationality  that  is 
opposed to an essential rationality embodied in humanity, to Horkheimer 
and  Adorno  for  their  argument  that  the  autonomous  individual  needed 
rescuing  from  the  totally  economised  capitalist  world,  and  finally  to 
Habermas  for  his  appeal  to  liberate  dialogic  communication  from  the 
colonisation  of  the  ‘lifeworld’  by  the  forces  of  capital.  But  from  the 
perspective  of  Foucauldian  scholarship  and  governmentality,  this 
conceptual presupposition has its limitations.  
  Two troubling aspects I wish to address are: (1) the dichotomous 
conception of an instrumental rationality opposed to a substantive/critical 
rationality, and (2) the assumption in much critical analysis of a rational, 
autonomous  and  self-determining  individual  that  requires  emancipation 
from extraneous and corrupting relations of power. 
   
Instrumental rationality versus multiple rationalities 
 
In the dichotomous construction of instrumental rationality and substantive 
or critical rationality, critical rationality, construed as an essential human 
faculty,  is  perceived  as  genuinely  ‘reasonable’  and  ‘true’,  while 
instrumental  rationality,  construed  as  a  product  of  capitalist  relations  of 
domination  and  exploitation,  is  judged  as  false  or  ideological.  As  Dean 
(1994)  points  out,  here  critical  rationality  constitutes  truth  purified  of          
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power,  while  instrumental  reason,  being  intertwined  with  extraneous 
elements of power, constitutes a fabrication of truth from false knowledge.  
  Consequently, the critical method often seeks the ‘truth’ of social 
developments and phenomena, such as management, through a process of 
distilling from these phenomena their hidden relations of power, and the 
ideological content and interests underlying these. Through this process of 
critique,  social  phenomena  such  as  management  are  revealed  to  be 
increasingly  refined  instruments  of  control  associated  with  an  economic 
rationalisation of society, which purportedly serves the interests of the most 
powerful,  although  disguised  by  the  language  of  autonomy,  self-
management  and  empowerment.  Criticism  of  this  kind  then  goes  on  to 
recommend social, political and economic change and emancipation, that 
would raise: 
 
the c o n s c i o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  i r r a t i o n a l  m o t i v e s  a n d  d e p e n d e n c e s  t h a t  
limit and restrict the rationality and freedom of individuals, which 
prevents them from seeing and defining their own true motives and 
aims and thus alienates them from their true humanity. (Masschelein 
2004, 354)  
 
Importantly,  however,  criticism  which  assesses  management  as  an 
instrument of a totalising and inexorable economistic rationalism in contest 
with a liberating critical or substantive rationality that enables individual 
autonomy and self-determination needs to be held up to interrogative light. 
Let me illustrate how Foucauldian inspired examinations of disciplinary 
and  governmental  institutions,  knowledges  and  techniques  justifies  such          
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scepticism of socio-critique (for example Barry et al. 1996b; Burchell et al. 
1991).  
  Approaching the question of rationality not as dichotomous but as 
“multiple, pragmatic, practical and problem-oriented, rather than unitary, 
formal,  theoretic,  and  general”  (Dean  1994,  116),  many  Foucauldian 
studies of government have been attentive to the multiple and contesting 
rationalities, problems, institutional practices and social actors that traverse 
domains of existence as wide and varied as the realm of work, the medical 
clinic, the school, the field of management and government (Barry et al. 
1996b).  These  studies  illuminate  how  the  ways  of  thinking,  seeing, 
speaking and acting within the varied domains of life are not explicable 
with  reference  to  unified  ‘global’  entities  such  as  the  state  or  capital 
pursuing  their i nterests,  nor  in  terms  of  the  dichotomous  distinction 
between  rationalities  of  liberation  and  control,  or  human  values  and 
economic efficiency.  
  The  field  of  management  is  no  exception  to  this.  Despite  its 
instrumentalist portrayal by many critics such as Gewirtz, the complex of 
management knowledge and techniques are so varied in their genesis and 
effects that it is imprecise to assume management to be a coherent body of 
knowledge. Corporate management, for instance, “has no single author, no 
unitary logic. It was never designed as a coherent, intellectually justifiable 
program.  This  is  a  coincidental  coming  together  of  public  and  private 
initiatives, a reaction to internal problems and external pressures” (Davis 
1989, 176). In fact, the knowledge and techniques of management, from 
classical to corporatist, have varied and heterogeneous histories, composed          
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of  contested  and  provisional  assemblages  of  knowledge,  techniques  and 
practices. 
  For  example,  economic  concerns  for  the  efficient  use  of  human 
resources  in  the  management  expertise  of  the  Quality  of  Working  Life 
movement  were  formulated  in  relation  to  a  range  of  psychological  and 
social criteria (Davis and Cherns 1975; Miller and Rose 1995; Rose 1999a). 
Job  satisfaction,  individual  autonomy,  personal  responsibility,  positive 
social  relationships  and  democracy  were  key  rationalities  according  to 
which  this  field  of  management  developed.  The  economic  purposes  of 
management  were  to  be  balanced  with  concerns  for  the  welfare  of  the 
individual, their self-perception and self-esteem, and for their relationships 
with others, which explains Wagner’s observation that the management of 
work has increasingly conceptualised workers “as subjects developing their 
own sense of tasks, responsibilities and satisfaction with regard to the work 
they are doing” (Wagner 1994, 129). 
  Of  course,  socio-critique  may  argue  that  these  concerns  for  the 
welfare of workers obfuscate the real intentions of employers or capitalists, 
or  that  such  concerns  merely  reflect  more  refined  means  for  improving 
efficiency and exploitation (Smyth et al. 2000). However, such an assertion 
overlooks that a multitude of management practices and knowledge claims, 
such as objective-setting, strategic planning, decentralisation, motivational 
strategies  and  the  democratisation  of  workplace  decision-making,  are 
assembled from a range of social and psychological fields in response to a 
plethora of concerns. The practices and knowledge of management do not 
have a single point of genesis or intent located in an economic doctrine or          
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capitalist  rationality  affiliated  with  a  single  group’s  putative  interest, 
including  capitalist  domination  and  instrumentalisation.  This  makes  it 
difficult to assert that management is reducible to a single, unitary project 
(Miller and O'Leary 1989; Miller and Rose 1995).  
  This is not to deny that the public sector, including the domain of 
education,  has  been  subject  to  an  increasingly  economic  manner  of 
government. It has. However, it is one thing to argue that an economic 
rationality  exists  and  quite  another  to  assess  it  as  an  unproblematic 
realisation  of  a  utilitarian  and  exploitative  economic  ideology,  that  it 
exhaustively constitutes the approach to defining a field, and moreover that 
that rationality and its techniques are mere servants of the powerful. The 
Self-Managing School, for instance, does not read like an economic text 
book  but  delves  into  behaviourism,  psychology  and  sociology  and  it 
expresses  concerns  for  not  only  efficiency,  but  also  for  traditionally 
progressive concerns such as collaboration, the goal of equity and teacher 
satisfaction (Caldwell and Spinks 1988).  
  Therefore,  acknowledging  this  intricate  web  of  connections  that 
constitute the relationship between management, politics and government 
means re-considering the use of top-down analysis that begins with “an 
assumption  that  the  outerworkings  of  power  can  be  detected  and  made 
intelligible  by  reference  to  a  broad  historical  postulate  such  as  that  of 
capitalist  domination”  (Miller  and  O'Leary  1989,  263).  Foucauldian 
inspired studies attempt to move beyond a critical form of analysis that 
reduces  social  developments  to  single  rationalities,  such  as  control, 
instrumentalism or domination. A part of his analytical approach is to ask,          
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in  relation  to  the  use  and  analysis  of  reason  and  rationality,  ‘Which 
rationality?’ That is, which rationalities constitute any domain of existence 
and indeed the conditions of human thought and action at any moment? I 
return  to  this  notion  of  rationalities  below.  What,  then,  is  the  second 
troubling  aspect  of  the  analysis  of  management  that  I  want  to  address 
before I explain how I will analyse management?  
   
 
 
The unified versus the decentred self  
 
A second challenge to critical analysis pertains to its presupposition of a 
rational model of the human whose emancipation can be secured through 
retrieving the individual’s critical reason. Critical theorists often interpret 
the specifics of social developments and reform in terms of a broader set of 
principle conflicts, such as of individual autonomy versus subjection, and 
of domination versus freedom (Blake and Masschelein 2007; Dean 1994; 
Masschelein 2004). At the centre of this mode of analysis is a classical 
philosophical conception of the rational and autonomous subjectivity of the 
individual. This individual’s capacities have been instrumentalised by the 
domination  of  a  unitary  Western  reason  that  seeks  to  establish 
standardisation, market relations, quantification and means-ends conduct, 
which ultimately ‘falsifies’ ‘true reason’, as well as the individual’s true 
nature (Dean 1994). This mode of critical analysis seeks to bring to light 
the deformation, repression and domination of rational human subjectivity          
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by revealing the instrumentalism and ideological content of knowledge and 
its application. 
  This  perspective,  however,  problematically  assumes  the  a  priori 
existence of the individual as autonomous, rational and self-determining, 
and that this notion of the individual should form the basis of their actions, 
identity  and  government.  This  belief  forecloses  the  possibility  of 
recognising the: 
 
historically specific modalities within which diverse practices of 
self-formation  take  place…  such  an  analysis  is  concerned  with 
displacing notions of the founding rational subject by way of an 
analysis  of  the  means  which  seek  to  establish  and  promote 
particular human capacities – including those we might wish to 
regard as ‘reasoning’ – within bodies of knowledge and types of 
rationality, forms of power and government, and ethical practices. 
(Dean 1994, 63)  
 
In other words, human rationality and autonomy should not be presupposed 
as essential to humans and their conduct and therefore something to be 
defended and retrieved. Dean’s point chimes with the argument of Foucault 
and Foucauldian scholars that human rationality and autonomy are an effect 
of the exercise of disciplinary and governmental power: 
 
the argument from Habermas and the Frankfurt school has taught 
us to view technocratic reason as emanating outside civil society – 
as part of the state – which is directed at its citizens for purposes of 
social control and administration. Habermas talks of technocratic 
reasons and the “scientisation of politics” in terms of the increasing 
administration of society as a whole and the colonization of the 
life-world. Against this view, then, the neo-Foucauldian approach          
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recognizes “technocratic reason” not as something purely negative 
that  necessarily  originates  from  a  source  outside  which  is  then 
applied in coercive fashion to us; rather it is part of “technologies 
of the self”, a practice we engage in willingly in the process of 
producing ourselves as “free” subjects of a certain kind. (Peters 
2001b, 78)   
 
Individuals  find  themselves  implicated  in  a  web  of  institutions  and 
communities  where  a  plethora  of  regulatory  and  normative  bodies  of 
knowledge, techniques and practices are deployed. It is in this web that 
“various identities of humans are made and unmade” (Dean 1994, 72) and 
individuals  are  constituted  with  a  range  of  cognitive  and  physical 
capacities,  attributes  and  affects,  including  the  capacity  for  ‘rational’ 
thought and autonomous self-government. 
  Those  critical  of  the  critical  method  argue  that  the  focus  on  the 
production  of  human  rationality  and  human  autonomy,  that  is,  on 
subjectification,  must  move  beyond  the  discourse  of  control,  oppression 
and emancipation (Marshall 2004). Based upon this assertion, I suggest that 
the techniques of management have had effects on individuals and schools 
that  are  irreducible  to  merely  economic  instrumentalism,  control  and 
diminished autonomy.  
  For  example,  in  concert  with  Peters’  above  observations,  many 
principals  and  teachers  have  actively  engaged  management  expertise  in 
cultivating  their  own  professional  identities  and  practice  of  self-
government, which has more recently taken the form of managerial and 
enterprising identities (Grace 1995; Leithwood et al. 1999; Mac An Ghaill          
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1994;  Nixon  et  al.  2001;  Troman  1996).  This  reflects  the  use  of 
management for forming an autonomous self. Moreover, managerial reform 
in  education  has  been  highly  contextual  and  shaped  by  pre-existing 
professional cultures in schools. Evidence suggests that teachers have not 
passively  received  managerialism  but  they  have  drawn  upon  multiple 
interacting  rationalities  of  teaching,  learning  and  the  organisation  of 
schooling,  which  have  included  welfarism,  social  justice  and  corporate 
managerialism (Arnott 2000; Bailey 2000).  
  This  is  not  to  say  that  many  teachers  have  not  experienced 
managerialisation as oppressive. However, we should be circumspect about 
drawing the conclusion that freedom and autonomy are the antithesis of 
power and government, or that the power of power is its capacity to deform 
human identity. Management has played an important part in the creation 
of calculating and responsible free subjects. With this presupposition, we 
can  ask  ourselves  what  the  role  management  is/was  in  the  crisis  of 
liberalism, or its role in the recalibration of government around notions 
such as autonomy and freedom.  
 
Two principles for the analysis of management as a liberal 
technology of government  
 
I could provide a more comprehensive discussion of the limitations of the 
critical approach to the analysis of education as well as management in 
self-managing  reforms  from  a  Foucauldian  analytic  of  power  (see  for 
example Hunter 1994; Masschelein 2004). However, the above will suffice 
because it enables me to elaborate two key principles for the analysis of          
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management as a liberal technology of government: management regulates 
by shaping the exercise of people’s freedom, and this regulation is shaped 
by  problematisations  and  rationalisations  related  to  administering  the 
population.  
 
Managing through freedom 
 
Rather  than  perceive  management  as  an  instrumentalist  tool  for  the 
deformation  and  suppression  of  autonomy  and  subjectivity,  we  might 
understand it as an expertise composed of knowledge and techniques that 
act upon individuals with respect to their freedom. Gewirtz’s description of 
the  objectives  and  effects  of  management  in  terms  of  control  and 
oppression  does  not  acknowledge  that  freedom  and  autonomy  are  key 
elements of the rationalities and practices of management. This is because 
management works not necessarily by diminishing freedom or disguising 
domination  as  freedom,  but  by  structuring  and  defining  the  individual’s 
field of possible action, shaping their conduct and providing the tools for 
relating to themselves as individuals and workers.  
  This  perspective  attends  to  Larner  and  Walter’s  (2004)  concern 
regarding the “conclusion that such techniques [managerial techniques of 
auditing  and  benchmarking]  are  ‘partial,  incomplete  and  ultimately 
ideological’”  (2004,  214).  As  Larner  observes,  while  such  a  view  is 
understandable, it misses how managerial reforms reconstitute spaces and 
subjects by introducing into the modern workplace new ways of perceiving 
work  and  the  workplace.  For  example,  the  discourses  of  corporate  or          
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entrepreneurial management have rendered schools intelligible according to 
such things as objectives, missions, outcomes and targets, and consequently 
teachers  have  increasingly  come  to  perceive  and  regulate  their  conduct 
according  to  this  form  of  perception  and  reasoning.  The  autonomous 
subject,  therefore,  is  enwrapped  in  managerial  language,  techniques  and 
practices through which the individual makes sense of themselves and their 
world. In the case of managerialism, enrolling individuals into forms of 
calculated reasoning and activity (such as objective-setting) induces them 
to think and become ‘managing selves’, consequently enabling an indirect 
rather than coercive regulation of the individual (Peters et al. 2000). 
  Of course some may argue that any freedom exercised under these 
conditions is illusory and a tool for further subjugation, and that indeed my 
argument  resembles  an  apologist’s  case  for  the  worst  aspects  of 
management. However, acting upon the conduct of conduct by structuring 
the  possibilities  for  individual  thought,  decision-making  and  action, 
management is one apparatus of techniques, practices and meaning making 
through which the individual in contemporary liberal society has come to 
experience their freedom. Therefore, and as described above, my analytical 
concern  is  not  with  how  management  crushes  human  freedom  and 
autonomy  but  rather  how  management  shapes  it  in  particular  ways,  for 
instance, rendering individuals entrepreneurial.  
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A rational and independent expertise 
 
Analysing management in terms of control and instrumentalism too readily 
reduces management to being an instrument of the state and capital without 
proper  consideration  of  its  relationship  to  the  liberal  government  of  the 
population. Gewirtz’s (2002) analysis is illustrative of this limited form of 
analysis. While beginning her argument with a mild positive assessment of 
Foucault’s  contribution  to  the  analysis  of  power,  Gewirtz  claims  that 
Foucault fails to take account of the macro machinations of power, such as 
the forces of the state. Her response to this perceived oversight is to employ 
a  state-centred  analysis  of  self-managing  educational  reform,  which  she 
sets apart from an analysis that perceives the state as essentially controlling. 
This state-centred analysis remains troubling, however, because Gewirtz 
continues to attribute self-managing reform to the crisis of legitimation and 
the  actions  of  the  state.  Management,  therefore,  is  still  analytically 
approached  as  essentially  an  instrument  for  increased  state  and  capital 
control, both in origin, purpose and effect (also Watkins 1992). 
  My point is not that management is not regulatory. It clearly shapes 
human conduct. However, the relationship between management and the 
regulation  of  individuals  is  complex  and i r reducible  to  political  or 
economic instrumentalism or to the function of control and domination. 
There can be, for instance, some distance between political and economic 
interests  and  the  regulatory  knowledges  and  techniques  developed  by          
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management expertise. This is because while management expertise has 
indubitably  developed  in  response  to  the  problem  of  managing  the 
efficiency of the enterprise and regulating the worker, it is nonetheless a 
relatively  independent  body  of  knowledge  and  practices  composed  of  a 
range of rationalities, interests and purposes. The fact that many conceptual 
and  technical  developments  in  management  expertise  have  occurred 
independent  of  political  or  economic  interests,  such  as  its  use  of 
behaviourism,  psychology  or  psychodynamic  theory,  indicates  the 
problematic nature of this relationship. The field of management is subject 
to its own internal rationalities, practices and transformations, as well as 
being  open  to  the  rationalities  and  transformations  occurring  in  other 
domains,  such  as  accounting,  psychology  and  philosophy
12  (Miller  and 
O'Leary 1987). This limits its capacity to function as a direct mechanism of 
control  by  states  or  capital  for  the  purpose  of  worker  submission  or 
increased economic efficiency. 
  In  fact,  management  expertise  rather  than  necessarily  being  a 
vehicle  for  exploitation  and  oppression  has  delimited  the  use  of  overt 
political  interference  in  work  and  the  abuse  of  power  by  the  state  and 
capital (Bendix 1974; Miller and O'Leary 1989). From the late nineteenth 
century,  management  became  one  of  many  authoritative  expert  sciences 
constituted  by  a  rational  body  of  knowledge  and  techniques  employed 
governmentally within liberal democratic states. This development was in 
                                                 
12 Even if management were unitary and coherent, the state and capitalism would 
not  be  able  to  directly  manufacture  new  forms  of  knowledge  and  techniques 
within them because the state and capitalist enterprises are not unitary thinking 
bodies that have the facility to make decisions and then act upon them Hindess, B. 
(1987a). Freedom, Equality and the Market, London: Tavistock Publications.          
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large  part  a  product  of  liberal  political  rationalities  seeking  to  make 
regulation  a  civil  matter  by  using  the  rational  knowledges  and  truths 
produced  in  the  human  and  social  sciences  for  supervising  and 
administering the population of human individuals.  
  Management, therefore, promised to offer the world of industry and 
work  a  scientific  and  rational  framework  for  the  just  regulation  of  the 
worker and the production process (Bendix 1974; Edwards 1979; Miller 
and O'Leary 1989). As an expertise, it developed a rational and scientific 
knowledge of the individual, the worker and work, and as its authority to 
speak  the  truth  grew,  it  became  a  legitimate  basis  upon  which  the 
administration of the population was to occur (Meyer et al. 1985). With 
management  expertise  increasingly  providing  a  reasonable  basis  for 
regulating  the  employee,  the  workplace  could  no  longer  be  regulated 
according to the arbitrary exercise of authority by political authorities and 
exploitative employers as it often had been prior to the twentieth century.  
  This promise of a scientific management continues to be embedded 
in  the  views  of  those  who  seek  to  use  management  expertise.  Pollitt 
observes the view held by public sector reformers of the 1980s that “if only 
management  and  administration  could  be  established  as  a  scientific 
discipline,  then  public  officials  would  be  better  protected  against  the 
irrationalities  of  ‘political  interference’”  (Pollitt  1993,  15),  whilst  the 
management scholar, Peter Drucker, suggests that “performing, responsible 
management is the alternative to tyranny and our only protection against it” 
(Drucker 1974, x).           
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  Of  course,  political  and  governmental  problematisations  have 
shaped  management  expertise  and  how  the  management  of  work  is 
conceptualised  (Rose  1999a),  and  there  is  no  reason  to  suggest  that 
management  cannot  be  used  oppressively.  However,  the  nature  of  the 
relationship between government, capital and management needs careful 
attention. While there is, for instance, the contemporary alignment of the 
political  discourse  of  enterprise  and  the  knowledge  and  techniques  of 
enterprise produced by the field of management, management is not at the 
behest  of  pre-determined  political  and  economic  interests  that  readily 
translate  their  interests  directly  (and  unproblematically)  into  truthful 
knowledge  and  techniques.  Management  should  be  analytically 
approached,  therefore,  as  a  rational  and  relatively  independent  expertise 
whose relationship to government is problematic.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has raised important questions around management and the 
analysis  of  managerialisation.  Departing  from  the  precepts  of  critical 
analysis of managerial reform, I argued for the analysis of management as a 
liberal technology of government. Specifically, I have pursued the idea that 
managerialism, as Peters et al. (2000) describe it, “functions as an emergent 
and  increasingly  rationalised  and  complex  neoliberal  technology  of 
governance” (Peters et al. 2000, 110). As a technology of government, the 
rationality  and  effects  management  can  be  thought  about  beyond  the 
discourse of control, instrumentalism and domination. This is useful to the          
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study  reported  in  this  thesis  because  understanding  the  power  of 
management to contribute to individual freedom and autonomy, and not 
simply  to  individual  repression,  enable  us  to  analyse  management  as  a 
pivotal  feature  of  a  crisis  of  liberalism  that  aimed  to  transform  the 
government of the welfare state with a government privileging personal 
autonomy and empowerment. 
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Chapter 9: Entrepreneurial Self-Management  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
For  at  least  the  last  three  decades,  one  trajectory  of  reform  to  the 
government  of  the  Australian  primary  and  secondary  public  education 
system  has  been  decentralisation  and  the  facilitation  of  school  self-
management.  Although  centralisation  has  been  criticised  throughout  the 
twentieth  century  (Thomas  et  al.  1975),  significant  attempts  at 
decentralisation and self-management have marked the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries. This recent development, I have argued, has 
been  linked  to  the  development  of  advanced  liberal  rationalities  of 
government,  with  their  emphasis  on  autonomy,  empowerment  and 
enterprise.  
  Arguably, the claim that decentralisation and self-management are 
linked to what has been described as a crisis of liberalism appears relatively 
self-evident.  It  is  probably  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  terms          
  263 
‘decentralisation’  and  ‘self-management’,  when  used  in  the  context  of 
government,  indicate  the  diminution  of  the  influence  of  the  centralised 
instruments of the welfare state and by implication greater autonomy and 
freedom for somebody. However, I want to suggest that the installation of 
corporate  managerial  forms  of  school  autonomy  that  accompany 
decentralisation and self-management is linked to the crisis of liberalism. 
While the term ‘management’ conjures up images of control, domination 
and sometimes coercion (Parker 2002), it is also the case that corporate 
forms of management are linked to the governmentalities of autonomy and 
empowerment. My point is not that management expertise creates some 
kind of authentic or essential personal autonomy or empowerment, but that 
managerialisation  and  corporate  forms  of  management  are  linked  to  a 
reconfiguration  of  the  rationalities  and  technologies  of  government  that 
now emphasise empowerment, choice, autonomy and self-governance. 
  This  chapter  explores  this  link  between  the  emergence  of 
entrepreneurial forms of school self-management and the problematisation 
of organization and governance of schools in terms of the socio-political 
objective to turn citizens into free and enterprising autonomous choosers 
(Peters et al. 2000). I argue that corporate forms of management, including 
the  regimes  of  performance  calculation  and  management,  equip  school 
leaders  and  teachers  with  the  politically  sanctioned  capacities  to  be 
enterprising, calculating, prudent and rational autonomous choosers. Here, 
management “creates the condition for teachers to govern themselves as 
enterprising  selves”  (Simons  2002,  629),  while  corporate  forms  of 
management  also  enjoin  parents  as  consumers  to  make  choices  in  the          
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education market. I interpret this as the installation of practices of freedom 
(distinct  from  those  created  by  centrally  directed  bureaucratic 
administration) linked to an advanced liberal government of the education 
domain.   
 
The problem with schools 
 
The argument I wish to begin with is that recent problematisations and 
developments  have  contributed  to  the  emergence  of  the  self-managing, 
entrepreneurial school and its corporate form of management. Let me draw 
attention to two developments within this milieu, one being a concern about 
the  management  of  teachers  and  the  other  about  the  organisation  and 
outcomes of schools.  
 
Teachers and the discourses of derision 
 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, scrutiny of the standards and quality of 
the teaching profession and the standards and effectiveness of education 
systems cast a shadow of concern over the activities of teachers and the 
organisation of schooling. This is not new, though. In relation to the quality 
of teaching, the probity of teachers has been an ongoing concern in the 
administration of schooling, as witnessed by the school Inspectorates and 
‘payment by results’ regimes of the nineteenth century (Silver 1994). The 
existence of this concern is hardly surprising given that teachers have such 
an important role in cultivating socially adjusted and productive citizens for 
the nation, and that they do this with a high degree of autonomy. Who, for          
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instance, knows what really goes on in the thousands of closed classrooms 
around the nation every minute of every school day?  
  In the latter part of the twentieth century, concerns for the standards 
and quality of teachers coalesced in a ‘discourse of derision’ (Ball 1990b) 
that  brought  the  ethical  and  authoritative  standing  of  teachers  and  the 
‘educational establishment’ into question. Teachers were accused of being 
politically motivated, self-interested, deterministic in their thinking (Rutter 
et  al.  1979),  and  insulated  from  accountability.  Teachers,  particularly 
progressive teachers, were frequently denounced as a threat to educational 
standards, and deemed responsible for social indiscipline, crime, violence 
and even economic downturn.  
  Reflecting the advanced liberal rationalities discussed previously, 
this discourse of distrust and derision scrutinised the authority of experts, 
bureaucracies and the institutions of the state from the point of view of an 
increasingly ‘empowered’ citizenry. Evidence of this was the creation in 
these public attacks of a divide between what many perceived to be the 
antagonistic  interests  of  the  public,  and  the  ‘education  establishment’, 
which included teachers. The goodness and reasonableness of citizens was 
opposed  to  the  supposedly  self-interested  and  dangerous  teaching 
profession, with the latter described as “those ‘experts’, ‘specialists’ and 
‘professionals’” and the “‘educational establishment’” (Ball 1990b, 18). In 
short, the ‘educational establishment’ appeared to frustrate the power of 
free citizens.  
  While Ball’s description of the discourse of derision describes the 
situation  in  the  United  Kingdom,  conservatives  in  the  public  debate  in          
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Australia throughout the 1980s also whipped up a sense of crisis and panic 
by construing teachers and education bureaucrats as subversive agents who 
wielded  too  much  authority  without  proper  public  accountability.  The 
dichotomous nature of the discourse of derision identified by Ball was also 
evident in Australia:  
 
We  have  seen  children’s  rights  juxtaposed  against  those  of 
teachers;  teachers’  unions  and  bureaucrats  constructed  in 
opposition  to  parents  and  taxpayers…  Tradition,  authority, 
discipline,  and  the  ‘disciplines’  have  been  equated  with  quality 
education and with excellence, while in contrast, progressivism and 
alternative  curricula  have  been  constructed  in  such  a  way  as  to 
signify  chaos,  and  educational,  social  and  economic  decline. 
(Kenway 1990, 199) 
 
Teachers were perceived to be “a threat to intellectual rigour, to parent 
control,  to  established  values  and  to  the  national  interest”  (Marginson 
1997a,  120).  The  nation’s  school  children  and  their  parents  were  the 
victims of both unruly teachers accused of not working hard enough, of 
failing to modernise, and for being poorly trained and managed (Merson 
2001). Along with the supposedly unscrupulous unions, teachers were seen 
to  actively  deny  parents  their  supposedly  rightful  influence  over 
educational decision-making, evident in the private-public school debates 
(Kenway 1990; Susskind 1987).  
  From the 1980s, public confidence in teachers discernibly waned 
and expectations rose that: (1) teachers’ work needed better management 
and rigorous and monitoring, and (2) parents needed greater involvement in 
and  say  over  their  children’s  education. D e centralisation  and  the          
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introduction of corporate managerialism could be seen to attend to these 
two issues. Management expertise offered the possibility of regulating the 
authority and conduct of teachers, particularly to politically defined ends, 
while  corporate  maangerialism’s  association  with  private  enterprise 
promised to support the self-management of schools and the creation and 
operation of an educational market where parents could be empowered to 
choose  which  schools  their  children  should  attend.  I  will  address  these 
points later. 
   
Outcomes and the organisation of schools 
 
Running  alongside  these  problematisations  and  developments,  concerns 
also  mounted  about  the  level  and  quality  of  output  of  the  Australian 
education  system  (Lingard  2000;  Marginson  1997a).  In  the  context  of 
diminished  national  economic  growth,  rising  unemployment,  increasing 
international competitiveness, and the perceived problems of the centralised 
bureaucratic  control  of  schools,  economic  development  was  linked  to 
improving the performance of education systems. For example, the Quality 
of  Schools  report  (Karmel  1985)  reasoned  that  the  massive  increase  in 
educational  investment  from  the  early  1970s  to  mid  1980s,  from  $285 
million  to  $1775  million  (Dawkins  1988),  required  more  openness  and 
clarity about educational objectives and outcomes, a better use of existing 
resources  to  facilitate  improved  outcomes,  and  greater  attention  to  the 
assessment of outcomes.          
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  Doubts existed as to whether centralised education bureaucracies 
could  make  the  kinds  of  improvements  required  to  achieve  the  goal  of 
maximizing  system  performance.  For  example,  the  bureaucracy’s 
concentration of power was understood by many in the Australian business 
community  to  be  a  frustration  to  delivering  school  efficiency  and 
effectiveness  (Business  Council  of  Australia  1991a;  Scott  1990).  This 
contention was supported by the empirical analysis of education systems 
across  the  globe  by  the  Organization  for  Economic  Co-operation  and 
Development  (OECD).  These  studies  found  that  highly  centralised 
education  systems  were  too  driven  by  rigid  compliance  to  centrally 
determined  procedures  to  have  the  flexibility  required  for  school 
improvement and economic responsiveness (Spring 1998; van Velzen et al. 
1985). While this anti-bureaucratic and neo-liberal discourse led to reform 
of education bureaucracies, with head offices being made “much smaller 
and  focused  on  finance,  facilities,  computing  and  personnel”  (Brennan 
2009, 343), another development occurred. 
  At the same time that education bureaucracies were problematised 
in terms of their inability to deliver system-wide improvement, increased 
attention  was  devoted t o   the  role  of  individual  schools  and  their 
institutional  conditions  in  improving  educational  outcomes.  Educational 
research  about  the  degree  individual  schools  had  an  effect  on  student 
outcomes  was  placing  increased  importance  on  the  organisation  and 
management of schools. The Coleman (1966) report played a significant 
part  in  this  shift  because  that  report’s  scepticism  about  the  educational 
influence of individual schools generated an unrelenting stream of contrary          
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educational, organisational and sociological research (Silver 1994; Thrupp 
1995). Contrary to Coleman’s contention, this research demonstrated that 
the  organisation  of  individual  schools  did  indeed  have  an  effect  on 
students’  educational  outcomes  above  and  beyond  social  forces  and  the 
school’s  social  composition  (Brookover  et  al.  1979;  Klitgaard  and  Hall 
1973; Weber 1971).  
  These  studies  linked  students’  scores  on  a  range  of  cognitive, 
emotional  and  social  tests  and  indicators  to  features  of  the  school 
organisation,  which  included  organisational  culture,  organisational 
structures,  organisational  practices  and  teaching  practices  (Bidwell  and 
Kasarda  1975;  McGaw  et  al.  1991;  Owens  1995;  Rutter  et  al.  1979; 
Sammons  1999;  Silberman  1970).  The  supposedly  inescapable  truth 
emerging from the fields of school effectiveness, school improvement and 
education  management w a s  t hat  educational  performance  and  outcomes 
were associated with the school’s organisation. Moreover, organisational 
performance was amenable to maximisation by those working in schools 
more  effectively  managing  the  school’s  internal  organisational  features. 
Writers  and  scholars  within  these  fields,  as  well  as  political  authorities 
(Ministry of Education 1987), encouraged school leaders and teachers to 
have  a  greater  appreciation  of  the  school  as  a  manageable  organisation 
composed of organisational structures, practices and norms. 
  The  increased  attention  to  the  individual  school,  and  its 
organisation,  performance  and  management,  directed  the  attention  of 
political and governmental authorities to intervening into the organisation 
and management of schools as a matter of public interest. It was in relation          
  270 
to  this  appetite  for  reform  that  the  self-managing  school  and  its  use  of 
corporate forms of management emerged. 
 
The entrepreneurial, self-managing school 
 
One  goal  that  emerged  in  the  context  of  the  denigration  of  centralised 
bureaucracy and the purported potency of a school’s effective organisation 
was  the  creation  of  school  autonomy  and  freedom  from  bureaucracy 
(Thomas et al. 1975). Former Australian Federal Education Minister, David 
Kemp,  unambiguously  evokes  this  enduring  discourse  in  his  Quality 
Schooling for All speech: “I would argue the way forward, to ensure that 
government  schools  can  compete  effectively,  is  to  give  them  greater 
autonomy  from  bureaucratic  control  and  more  freedom  to  exercise  this 
leadership...”  (Kemp  1997).  Diminishing  the  power  of  the  ‘education 
establishment’,  such  as  the  bureaucracy,  and  strengthening  schools’ 
autonomous organisation, decentralisation and devolution were associated 
with  enabling  schools  to  “maximise  their  potential”  (Dawkins  1988,  2), 
‘unlock their future’ (Western Australian Department of Education 2010b), 
and  “take  charge  of  their  destiny”  (Caldwell  &  Spinks  1988,  61). 
Importantly, however, it has been the image of the private enterprise that 
has  very  powerfully  shaped  the  emerging  discourse  of  this  autonomous 
school’s organisation and management.  
  This  is  evident  in  the  ‘form’  of  school  organisation  that  has 
appeared in the descriptions of schools in education management texts. The 
description  of  the  school  organisation  in  the  texts  by  education          
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management writers such as Caldwell and Spinks (1988; 1992) drew upon 
the  researchers  and  gurus  of  private  sector  management  and  leadership, 
which included Tom Peters (Peters and Waterman 1982) and James Burns 
(1978).  Putting  their  backs  to  bureaucratic  management,  political 
authorities and education management scholars and gurus employed and 
elaborated for the educational context the management theories, techniques 
and practices used in the corporate world. 
  The private enterprise was construed as a model of the excellent 
organisation  for  an  increasingly  dynamic  and  economically  competitive 
world (Ball 2007; Beare 1995; Beare et al. 1989; Bottery 1992; Bottery 
2000;  Business  Council  of  Australia  1991b;  Caldwell  and  Spinks  1988; 
Thrupp  2003).  The  ‘excellent’  business  was  innovative,  competitive, 
flexible, entrepreneurial and responsive to the preferences of individuals, 
able  to  “hold  a  place  among  those  companies  which  were  unusually 
productive and which were seen as market leaders” (Beare et al. 1989, 21). 
Given its glowing assessment, and the rise of the neo-liberal program for 
market creation, the private competitive business was held up as the model 
of  organisation  to  be  replicated  by  schools.  Politically,  the  Federal 
Education  Minister,  David  Kemp,  argued  that  because  the  competitive 
global  economy  called  for  entrepreneurship,  and  “Entrepreneurial 
institutions create entrepreneurial attitudes” (Kemp 1999b), schools should 
be entrepreneurial and competitive organisations. What was this to entail?  
  Creating the school as a private enterprise in the competitive market 
required more than school autonomy from bureaucracy. Rather, it required 
that those within schools adopt the managerial language, techniques and          
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practices more commonly associated with private business, which include 
organisational  objective-setting,  targets,  corporate  plans,  strategic  plans, 
development plans, partnerships and performance management systems, as 
well  as  a  focus  on  serving  the  client,  increasing  productivity,  resource 
management,  accountability  to  stakeholders,  and  being  responsive  to 
market forces (Beare et al. 1989). The integration of such rationalities and 
technologies into schools might be described as the creation of the self-
managing entrepreneurial school (Peters 2001a; Peters et al. 2000; Simons 
2002). Let us consider how the management techne of objective-setting and 
the  corporate  plan  contributed  to  rendering  the  entrepreneurial  self-
management into existence. 
   
Objective-setting in the self-managing school 
 
Management  expertise  is  concerned  with  the  decision-making  of 
organisational  members  so  that  the  internal  space  and  activity  of  the 
devolved  organisation  can  be  effectively  managed.  The  bureaucratic 
management of schools troubled Caldwell and Spinks (1988; Caldwell and 
Spinks 1992) because its ‘administrative’ approach did not adequately take 
account  of  the  research  showing  that  individuals  continuously  made 
decisions, that they were motivationally complex, and that they performed 
best with autonomy and responsibility. Schools needed greater decision-
making at the local level.  
  However, the administratively run schools were not up to this task 
because,  for  Caldwell  and  Spinks,  the  bureaucratically  managed  school          
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lacked  adequate  management  techniques  and  practices,  such  as 
organisational objective-setting. Without these, how could the autonomy 
and  increased  discretion  of  school  leaders  and  teachers  be  adequately 
harnessed to the ends of the school? In relation to the absence of systematic 
organisational goal-setting, they asked: 
 
When schools lack mission, when there is no meaningful way of 
saying  what  it  is  they  are  supposed  to  accomplish  – h o w  i s  i t  
possible,  even  in  principle,  to  design  an  effective  organization? 
Effective for what? (Caldwell and Spinks 1988, 55) 
 
For Caldwell and Spinks and other education management scholars, the 
logic  is  self-evident:  by  creating  an  organisational  mission  or  goal,  the 
needs  and  priorities  of  schools  can  be  known,  and  therefore  the 
improvement  of  schools  practicable.  Objective-setting  constitutes  a 
managerial  framework  inasmuch  as  these  known  and  shared  objectives 
enable  the  decision-making  of  school  leaders  and  teachers  to  be 
continuously shaped at a distance to organisational ends, however these are 
defined. This not only assists schools in managing themselves, but it also 
supports  entrepreneurship  by  enabling  a  degree  of  discretion,  while 
orienting this discretion to a calculus of objectives and outcomes. 
 
The corporate plan in the self-managing school 
 
The  second  managerial  technology  related  to  the  entrepreneurial,  self-
managing  school  is  the  corporate  plan.  The  corporate  plan  is  an 
organisation-wide  device,  linked  to  the  identification  of  objectives,  that          
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attempts to encompass the decision-making and activity of organisational 
members  (Ackoff  1969).  It  involves  teachers  engaging  in  a  range  of 
planning and policy-making activities across the various domains of the 
school, such as the whole school, the subject faculty, or the classroom, and 
systematically linking these activities to the organisation as a whole: 
 
This integration of functions leads us to define corporate planning 
as a continuous process in administration which links goal-setting, 
policy-making, short-term and long-term planning, budgeting and 
evaluation in a manner which spans all levels of the organization, 
secures  appropriate  involvement  of  people  according  to  their 
responsibility for implementing plans as well as of people with an 
interest or stake in the outcomes of those plans, and provides a 
framework  for  the  annual  planning,  budgeting  and  evaluation 
cycle. (Caldwell and Spinks 1988, 61)  
  
Linking  the  setting  of  organisational  goals,  the  identification  of  needs, 
policy-making, planning, budgeting, teaching and learning and evaluation, 
the corporate plan serves an administrative function in that it converts the 
organisation’s goals and values, however these are defined, into individual 
behaviours.  
  For  Ball  (2003),  harnessing  the  conduct  of  the  organisation’s 
members to the achievement of the school’s ‘effectiveness’ (as described 
by  Hargreaves  and  Hopkins  1991)  involves  cultivating  calculating 
capacities compatible with the entrepreneurial, corporate model of private 
enterprise. He writes: 
 
Within this ensemble, teachers are represented and encouraged to 
think  about  themselves  as  individuals  who  calculate  about          
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themselves, ‘add value’ to themselves, improve their productivity, 
strive  for  excellence  and  live  an  existence  of  calculation.  (Ball 
2003, 217) 
 
Through  managerial  knowledges,  techniques  and  practices,  such  as 
devising  and  implementing  the  school’s  mission,  policy,  programs  and 
evaluations, school leaders and teachers employ the discourse of corporate 
management as ‘technologies of the self’, shaping how school employees 
think about and act upon themselves, their schools and the world.  
  In particular, school employees develop a calculative capacity. This 
refers not only to the calculation of numbers as a result of the devolution of 
school budgets and the increased use of benchmark testing as a means to 
measure a school’s teaching and learning. It also refers to a means-ends 
economic calculation involving the calculation of the organisation’s inputs, 
outputs, problems, quality and effectiveness.  
  For  example,  the  corporate  plan  induces  school  leaders  to  make 
calculations  that  support  the  school’s  entrepreneurial  self-management. 
Education department policies and management texts, such as Caldwell and 
Spinks (1988; Caldwell and Spinks 1992), induce the school leader and 
teacher  to  make  calculations  about  the  objectives  of  their  school  by 
identifying the current needs of students and the school, to identify their 
school’s deficiencies and strengths in respect to achieving goals, and to 
calculate  the  use  of  resources,  organisational  efficiency,  educational 
outcomes and customer desires and needs.  
  My  concern  is  not  whether  the  calculations  or  needs  identified 
within this managerial framework are valid and defensible. Others have          
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made  that  analysis  (Angus  1994).  The  point  I  make  here  is  that  the 
corporate  plan,  like  the  business  plan  (Oakes  and  Townley  1998),  is  a 
pedagogical tool that trains the school leader and teacher to act upon the 
school  as  an  autonomous  and  entrepreneurial  organisation  capable  of 
improvement. To the extent that this positions the principal and teacher as 
active managers in the educational enterprise, both the corporate plan and 
objective-setting carve out the school as an autonomous, enterprising, self-
managing and mutable organisation.  
 
The principal as an entrepreneurial manager 
 
In both of the above descriptions, the techne of objective-setting and the 
corporate  plan  create  a  institutional  field  that  shapes  the  individual’s 
exercise  of  autonomy.  This  institutional  field,  informed  by  the 
governmentalities  of  autonomy,  empowerment  and  enterprise,  has  been 
reshaping  the  conception  and  conduct  of  those  working  within  schools, 
especially the principal. Up until the 1970s and 1980s, an administrator 
notion of the principal was predominant. This administrator function was 
associated with top-down bureaucratic forms of public sector governance, 
which worked well for education systems, given that school organisation 
and curriculum were relatively standardised, and most senior administrative 
positions  were  held  by  classroom  teachers  not  trained  in  management 
(Farquhar  1975).  However,  the  political  and  governmental  goals  of 
autonomy, flexibility, initiative, self-realisation and enterprise, along with          
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the  increased  pertinence  accorded  to  the  effective  school  organisation, 
rendered the ‘administrator’ problematic.  
  The effective principal was increasingly positioned, not as someone 
who simply follows procedure and ensures compliance, but as someone 
who had a range of managerial and entrepreneurial attributes that enabled 
her or him to lead their schools like a CEO directs her or his company. 
Within  this  discursive  re-working  of  the  principal’s  identity,  it  is 
unsatisfactory  to  rely  on  bureaucracy.  Reliance  on  centrally  devised 
policies  and  procedures  was  a  sign  of  ineffective  management,  partly 
because  the  contingencies  of  school  life  in  what  was  construed  as  an 
economically  and  socially  unstable  world  could  not  be  adequately 
responded to by a ‘one size fits all’ approach associated with bureaucratic 
governance. This is an argument that remains powerful today (Government 
Media Office 2009).  
  In  contrast,  instead  of  denying  school  leaders  autonomy  and 
decision-making power, the self-managing entrepreneurial school requires 
the principal to be a manager capable of exercising power over his or her 
immediate  organisational  environment.  Corporate  managerial  techniques, 
such  as  objective-setting,  the  corporate  plan,  cost-centres  and  public 
relations, enjoin school leaders to self-manage. Self-management is equated 
with  the  capacity  to  calculate  and  act  in  response  to  needs,  objectives, 
outcomes  and  quality  (Simons  2002),  to  respond  with  alacrity  to  the 
competitive market and changing environment (Beare et al. 1989; Caldwell 
and Spinks 1992; Gerstner 1994), and to problem solve and innovate in 
response  to  local  social  and  educational  circumstances,  demands  and          
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problems (Angus 1994; Gunter 2000; Popkewitz 1996; Popkewitz 2000a; 
Whitty et al. 1998). Attaining this power over their circumstances enjoins 
school  leaders  to  act  as  entrepreneurs  with “ s e l f -direction,  self-reliance, 
ingenuity and initiative” (Crowther and Caldwell 1991, 8).  
  With  a  focus  on  “vision,  autonomy,  courage,  empowerment  of 
others, strategic planning and development of self” (Caldwell and Spinks 
1992, 24), the effective school leader has resonated with the image of the 
effective business leader from popular leadership texts. With freedom to 
engage in the competitive market, and now enmeshed in the rationalities, 
practices  and  techniques  of  corporate  forms  of  management,  the 
enterprising leader calculates about and acts upon the school as a business 
that  is  open  and  responsive  to  external  demands,  including  to  its 
stakeholders, the private sector and consumers (Ball 2007; Burke and Picus 
2001; Leithwood et al. 1999; Sanders 2006). Like a commercial enterprise, 
the  enterprising  leader  uses  a  range  of  management  techniques  and 
frameworks  to  promote  their  school  to  potential  customers,  to  collect 
statistical information and data so as to improve and promote the school, to 
read market signals, and to adjust organisational practices in response to 
shifting demands and market fluctuations. It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
Gewirtz observes that principals from her case study schools now believe 
that “market driven, financial or managerial decisions were compatible and 
indeed could enhance good educational practice” (Gewirtz 2002, 46).   
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Freeing the manager? 
 
The governmental effect of this entrepreneurial management is two-fold.  
  On the one hand, entrepreneurial self-management accords school 
leaders  and  teachers  increased  discretion  for  managing  their  schools. 
School  leaders  and  teachers  experience  themselves,  not  as  teachers 
conforming to established ‘roles’, but as decision-makers, innovators and 
problem-solvers. The knowledges, technologies and practices of corporate 
management have fostered the capacities of schools leaders to self-manage 
their  school,  and  to  have  power  over  their  environment  (Bottery  2000; 
Gewirtz 2002; Thrupp 2005). Even exposure to the vagaries and existential 
risks of the market is construed in the enterprise mentality as empowering, 
an  opportunity,  something  that  engages  the  individual’s  self-optimising 
impulses, including their self-motivation, self-reliance, self-determination 
and self-responsibility (Du Gay 2000b).  
  On  the  other  hand,  entrepreneurial  self-management  brings 
“responsibility  back  into  the  school”  (Karmel  1973,  12),  effectively 
rendering the school’s organisational members responsible for the school 
and its outcomes (Silver 1994), which is why Beare et al. suggested in their 
education  management  text  that  there  “are  no  learner  failures,  only 
programme failures” (Beare et al. 1989, 168). Here, the individual school 
leader interprets reality and destiny as a matter of individual responsibility. 
The  technologies  of  entrepreneurial  self-management  place  the  onus  on 
school  leaders  and  teachers  to  take  responsibility  for  identifying  and 
resolving the contingencies that confront their school, and respond to the          
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diverse demands of local contexts. Within this rationality, “a good school is 
usually a reflection of its principal and staff” (Karmel 1985, 111).  
 
Entrepreneurial management and the crisis of liberalism 
 
This consideration of the freeing and regulatory effects of self-management 
leads me to propose that the self-managing and entrepreneurial model of 
schooling was central to the crisis of liberalism that afflicted the domains of 
politics,  government  and  education.  The  entrepreneurial  self-managing 
school responds to political and governmental concerns about individual 
autonomy and powerlessness, government over-regulation and bureaucratic 
constraint,  the  authority  of  bureaucrats,  professionals  and  experts,  the 
inefficiency  of  public  sector  organizations,  and  the  failure  of  state 
institutions to provide opportunities for individual discretion and choice, 
for both parents and school leaders (Kemp 1999b).  
  To address these maladies of the welfare state, entrepreneurial self-
management and the competitive market are conceived by their proponents 
as  means  to  empower  school  leaders  from  a  range  of  unnecessary 
regulatory  constraints.  Entrepreneurial  self-management  and  market 
competition ensures that the school leader and teacher are, in the words of 
management  advocates,  “liberated,  inspired  and  empowered  to  face  an 
uncertain future with optimism, [and] to seize the opportunities it offers, 
and to develop creative solutions to its problems” (Crowther and Caldwell 
1991,  13).  This  autonomizing  from  the  traditional  constraints  of  the 
bureaucracy  by  devolving  to  principals  the  responsibility  for  managing          
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schools  has  been  described  as  a  doctrine  of  ‘freeing  the  manager  to 
manage’ (Clarke and Newman 1997), and it has been observed that the 
empowering  the  school  leader  in  local  management  and  market 
entrepreneurship has been “experienced as modern, progressive, dynamic 
and stimulating developments” (Grace 1995, 138-139).  
  Importantly,  however,  ‘freedom  to  manage’  does  not  designate 
enabling complete autonomy for school leaders or managers. As the above 
descriptions indicate, ‘freedom to manage’ refers to according managers 
increased power over their immediate environment as part of a process of 
shifting from highly centralised and direct bureaucratic governance towards 
an autonomous and competitive organisational arrangement (Kanter 1985; 
Osborne  and  Gaebler  1993;  Peters  and  Waterman  1982).  In  its  place, 
therefore,  has  been  put  a  new  governance  assemblage.  So,  while  the 
principal  is  free  from  some  constraints  imposed  by  the  centralised 
management of education systems, the manager is now enwrapped in the 
regulatory discourses of organisational and managerial expertise that shape 
and instrumentalise the individual’s self-steering capacities. Entrepreneurial 
self-management,  therefore,  reflects  a  transformation  in  the  rationalities 
and technologies of government.  
  At this point we can discern the reasons for linking corporate forms 
of self-management with the crisis of liberalism. Despite corporate self-
management not producing some authentic form of freedom and autonomy, 
for advanced liberal and neo-liberal rationalities of government, the market 
economy,  competition,  choice-making  and  entrepreneurship  evince 
freedom. Therefore, the proponents and implementers of advanced liberal          
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and  neo-liberal  programs  conceive  self-managing  reforms  to  the 
organisation  of  the  state  and  education  systems  to  be  liberating. 
Entrepreneurial schools create autonomy from statist political technologies 
(a threat to the autonomous self) whilst strengthening individual activity 
and  self-government  (particularly  by  means  of  local  calculations  of 
strategies, tactics, costs and benefits) within the putatively free domain of 
the market economy.  
  Reflecting a re-calibration of the relationship between the power of 
the  state  and  the  individual,  advanced  liberalism  rationalities  and 
technologies  of  government  seek  to  establish  the  conditions  for 
competitive,  entrepreneurial  conduct  because  this  is  equated  with  the 
exercise of freedom, now defined as “the capacity for self-realization which 
can be obtained only through individual activity” (Rose 1999b, 145). So, 
the fact that school leaders and teachers increasingly exercise their freedom 
“in  more  cost-effective,  flexible,  competitive,  consumer-satisfying  and 
innovative ways” (Gewirtz 2002, 6) is indicative of governmental reforms 
that  have  set  the  conditions  for  freedom,  or  at  least  the  exercise  of  a 
particular form of freedom. Here, the school leader takes responsibility for 
their school as they now do their own life, being active in the formation of 
both. 
 
Performance calculations 
 
It is in relation to the production of freedom that I want to explore the more 
recent collection and use of data on schools and students. Although not an          
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exhaustive list, this measurement apparatus refers to benchmark testing to 
measure ‘what people know’, the collection and publication of data on such 
things as retention and graduation, and the comparisons of data within and 
between countries to enable judgments on the performance (Berliner and 
Biddle  1995;  Bracey  2003),  productivity  and  quality  of  schools  and 
education systems (Dale 1999; Smyth 2006) for the purpose of maximising 
educational  output  and  national  economic  competitiveness  (Levin  and 
Kelly 1994; Spring 1998; Wolf 2002). 
  Of course, information about school and student performance has 
existed for some time and its use and implementation in education has not 
been smooth
13. In relation to benchmark testing, resistance from teachers’ 
unions  and  the  contest  around  states  rights  in  respect  to  education 
responsibilities in the 1970s and 1980s ensured a slow and troubled take up 
in Australia. In the late 1980s there was agreement between state education 
ministers that there needed to be collection of data on the output of the 
education  systems,  and  having  these  reported  to  governments  and  other 
interested  stakeholders,  including  parents  (Brennan  2009;  Ministerial 
Council on Education 1989). However, it was not until the commencement 
of a new funding agreement between the Commonwealth and the states in 
the mid 2000s that national standardised testing became institutionalised as 
a prominent feature of the education landscape (Smyth 2006). 
                                                 
13 National Assessment of Educational Progress Program in the US existed in the 
1960s, the Assessment of Performance Unit existed in the UK in the mid 1970s, 
and in Australia there was a Survey of Literacy and Numeracy conducted in 1975 
for  the  House  of  Representatives  Select  Committee  on  Specific  Learning 
Difficulties and a survey in 1980 by the Australian Education Council.          
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  The use of these monitoring and accountability regimes has been 
subject to a number of criticisms: that rather than improve the performance 
of  schools  and  students  these  reforms  do  the  opposite  because  all  that 
matters is what can be counted and quantified (Gillborn and Youdell 2000); 
that  the  political  ‘culture  of  performativity’  sacrifices  social  and 
educational  principles  on  the  altar  of  economic  efficiency  and 
competitiveness  (Ball  2003);  that  testing  now  constitutes  the  means  of 
fixing the supposed ‘crisis’ in education (Meier 2002); that schools would 
invest in those things that demonstrate measurable short-term gain whilst 
complex educational problems would be reduced to simplistic analysis that 
foster  simplistic  solutions  (Thrupp  2005);  that  schools  would  engage  in 
fabricating  their  performance,  concealing  as  much  as  they  reveal  (Ball 
1998c); and that the technologies of performativity direct teacher conduct 
toward  the  pursuit  of  targets  and  outcomes  rather  than  relationships  or 
educational values (Smyth 2006).  
  These  criticisms  of  the  measurement  apparatus  and  numerical 
monitoring, calculation and publication raise important questions. No doubt 
technologies  of  performativity  exact  a  transformation  in  the  identity  of 
school leaders and teachers, as Ball identifies. And no doubt this is partly a 
consequence  of  a  political  culture  that  is  concerned  with  efficiency, 
outcomes and standards.  However, does this “metrics of accountability” 
(Ball  2003,  223)  do  more  than  mystify,  commodify,  terrorise, 
instrumentalise and dominate? What are the implications, for instance, of 
the fact that monitoring, measuring and testing have emerged in Western 
liberal democratic countries whose political authorities also value freedom,          
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democracy and the rights of citizens? Consider, for instance, the political 
discourse on this matter.   
  For political authorities, the introduction of benchmark testing is not 
necessarily  a  means  for  increasing  political  control  of  education  and 
coercion of teachers. Rather, it is an attempt to drive a national agenda for 
improved  educational  standards.  How?  Numerical  measurement  and 
accounting place schools under public surveillance (Gleeson and Husbands 
2001) and in so doing, according to former Federal Education Minister, 
Julia  Gillard,  shed  a  light  on  underachievement.  This  would  make  it 
possible to identify well performing and ‘failing schools’, to focus attention 
on  improving  teaching,  to  provide  school  leaders  with  information  for 
improving their management, and increase the availability of information to 
parents  on  school  performance  so  as  to  support  their  choice  of  schools 
(Gillard 2009; Kemp 1999a; Nelson 2004b).  
  When  described  thus,  these  regimes  take  on  a  significance  not 
captured by the critiques of the ‘metrics of accountability’ centred on their 
coercive effects or how they diminish teacher autonomy. In the following 
section  I  want  to  draw  attention  to  how  these  numerical  performance 
regimes are linked to an ambition to, not only monitor and regulate schools 
at a distance, but also cultivate empowered, self-managing, entrepreneurial 
schools  and  schools  leaders  that  operate  in  a  marketplace  with  equally 
enterprising,  autonomous  and  calculating  parents.  In  short,  I  want  to 
examine  how  these  performance  regimes  constitute  technologies  for 
governing  (and  therefore  bringing  into  existence)  the  enterprising, 
autonomous chooser.             
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The authority of numbers 
 
The  critics’  criticism  of  testing  and  numbers  resembles  aspects  of  the 
conventional  histories  of  quantification  and  numbers  put  forward  by 
American scholars such as Cline (1982). In these accounts, numbers are 
construed as politically useful in that they ‘decomplexify’ reality and this 
enables them to control, dominate and discipline populations of democratic 
nations (Rose 1991), Similarly, educational research frequently construes 
the  use  of  testing  and  statistics  as  damaging a t t empts  to  quantify  the 
qualitative, of making schools and individuals compliant to political and 
economic needs, and of diminishing the “autonomous or collective ethical 
self” (Ball 2003, 226). 
  An alternative perspective on the procedures of quantification is that 
numbers and quantification have been and continue to be critical to how 
policy makers and governors govern for people’s freedom. In brief, the 
collection  and  calculation  of  numbers  make  democratic  government 
operable  (Rose  1991;  Rose  1999b).  Sure,  quantification  can  be  put  to 
spurious and deceptive ends. However, numbers possess an objectivity and 
impersonality that enable political authorities and public bureaucracies to 
quantify and impersonally calculate about a qualitative world riven with 
political,  social  and  economic  self-interest  (Neylan  2008;  Porter  1995). 
From  the  calculation  of  births  and  deaths  to  cost-benefit  analysis,  the 
collection of numerical data forms an integral part of the way in which          
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political  and  governmental  actors  of  liberal  and  democratic  persuasions 
think about and enact their regulatory activities.  
  In  other  words,  in  democratic  governmental  discourse,  numbers, 
statistics  and  the  calculations  made  of  them  are  not  “univocal  tools  of 
domination, but mobile and polyvocal resources” (Rose 1991, 684). For 
example,  the  collection,  calculation  and  dissemination  of  numbers  are 
especially valuable in the case when there is distrust of authority: 
 
When  the  authority  of  authority  is  secure,  when  authoritative 
judgments carry inherent authority, when the legitimacy of their 
authority is not subject to sceptical scrutiny and challenge, experts 
have  little  need  of  numbers.  But  where  mistrust  of  authority 
flourishes,  where  experts  are  the  target  of  suspicion  and  their 
claims  are  greeted  with  scepticism  of  politicians,  disputed  by 
professional rivals, distrusted by public opinion, where decisions 
are  contested  and  discretion  is  criticized,  the  allure  of  numbers 
increases. It is in these circumstances that professionals and experts 
try  to  justify  their  judgments  on  the  ground  of  objectivity,  and 
frequently frame this objectivity in numerical form. Numbers are 
resorted to in order to settle or diminish conflicts in a contested 
space of weak authority. (Rose 1999b, 208) 
 
This analysis of distrust and authority may sound familiar to the ears of 
those living in ‘advanced liberal societies’. In the context of rabid critiques 
by both the Left and the Right of government overreach and bureaucratic 
and  professional  authority,  numbers  and  their  instruments  of  collection 
such as testing promise one way in which the exercise of authority could be 
re-regulated.  Here,  quantification  and  the  publication  of  numbers  and 
statistics promise political and public accountability. These procedures and          
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technologies can be used to monitor the activities and outcomes of public 
officers,  steer  these  activities  to  politically  desirable  ends,  and  enable 
organisational self-reflexiveness and improvement.  
  This type of analysis is also appropriate to the case of education at 
the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries. The 
governmental  technology  associated  with  the  collection,  analysis  and 
publication  of  numbers,  such  as  standardised  testing,  (1)  governs  the 
conduct of teachers and school leaders to politically desirable ends because 
what  is  measured  is  what  matters,  and  (2)  provides  the  public  with 
information on schools so that parents can make informed choices about 
which school their children should attend.  
  Perhaps,  therefore,  we  could  consider  the  power-effects  of  the 
employment  of  the  regime  of  numbers  and  statistics  in  the  domain  of 
education not necessarily in terms control and domination, but as ethical 
technologies. Because, as Rose (1991) explains: 
 
Democracy  requires  citizens  who  calculate  about  their  lives… 
Henceforth, the pedagogy of numeracy was an essential part of the 
constitution of subjects of a democratic polity. If government was 
to be legitimate to the extent that it was articulated in a discourse 
of calculation, it was to be democratic to the extent that it required 
and  sought  to  produce  responsible  citizens,  with  a  subjectivity 
disciplined by an imperative to calculate. (Rose 1991, 683) 
 
With numbers “purporting to act as automatic technical mechanisms for 
making  [objective]  judgements,  prioritising  problems  and  allocating 
resources” (Rose 1991, 674), the procedures and technologies associated          
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with  the  collection  and  dissemination  of  numbers  constitute  one  set  of 
ethical technologies for producing responsible, autonomous and democratic 
subjectivities. Therefore, a commitment to a “public habitat of numbers” 
(Rose 1991, 689) enables individuals to exercise foresight, discipline and 
rational decisions for achieving personal or public objectives, depending on 
whether the person making the calculation is a private citizen or a public 
servant.  
  How,  then,  does  this  notion  of  numbers  and  their  calculation  as 
ethical  technologies  integral  to  liberal  democratic  societies  relate  to  the 
self-managing  reform  of  schools?  The  next  section  suggests  that  these 
ethical  technologies  attempt  to  (1)  make  the  calculation  of  school  data 
integral to managing the effectiveness of schools, and therefore to better 
serving  students  and  local  communities,  and  (2)  use  these  data  and  its 
calculation to orient the organization and activities of schools to citizens 
through the market. Let us consider these in turn. 
 
Testing and statistics in school self-management 
 
With  school  leaders  and  teachers  increasingly  required  to  manage 
themselves  and  their  schools,  the  capacity  to  know,  understand  and 
calculate about the performance of individual schools by those within them 
has become vitally important.  
  It  must  be  remembered  that  school  self-management  aimed  to 
remedy a number of deficiencies of bureaucratic management prior to the 
1980s, including a lack of adequate knowledge of schools as organisational          
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entities and a limited capacity to assess organisational effectiveness. A new 
rationality was being inserted into the educational domain that sounded like 
this: how could effective and informed decision-making regarding schools 
and  education  be  made  without  statistical  information  being  locally 
available?  The  lack  of  local  data  discouraged  school  improvement  and 
innovation,  as  well  as  discouraging  openness  and  responsiveness  to  the 
needs of students, parents and communities (Beare et al. 1989; Chubb and 
Moe 1990).  
  With principals and teachers increasingly obliged to self-manage, 
problem-solve  and  employ  organisational  missions,  targets  and  other 
management practices, information about school performance has become 
integral  to  their  current  duties.  The  Western  Australian  Department  of 
Education  introduced  data  software  such  as  Educational  Assessment 
Reporting System (EARS) for principals, and workshops to train school 
leaders in data interpretation to make it “easier for district office and school 
staff  to  incorporate  into  their  school  review  and  whole-school  planning 
processes” (Western Australian Department of Education 2010a). In these 
workshops school leaders learn to use data triangulation templates, use a 
line of inquiry framework, manipulate data sets at the individual, class and 
cohort level, identify strengths and weaknesses in numeracy and literacy, 
and  use  data  as  an  evidence  base  for  school  improvement  planning.  In 
other words, the collection and analysis of data about schools creates a new 
domain of knowledge for introspection and school improvement. 
  This  quantitative  data  is  not,  therefore,  merely  an  administrative 
tool for centralised authorities to monitor educational performance, or for          
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improving efficiency of the enterprise by identifying needs and targets and 
assessing their achievement. Ready access to quantitative information by 
schools also has the potential to shape organisational behaviour (Hoggett 
1996) because with the expectation that schools are to self-manage, school 
leaders and teachers are enabled to calculate and make rational decisions in 
light of the facts provided by numbers. For example, a strategic priority of 
the Western Australian Department of Education over the last decade has 
been to encourage and support teachers and schools in the use of a range of 
“achievement  data  over  the  course  of  a  student’s  schooling  to  plan  a 
personalised  approach  to  each  individual’s  learning”,  and  to  “help 
principals work together to analyse data, set targets for improvement and 
match interventions to identified student needs” (Department of Education 
2010a). In short, this enables school leaders and teachers to “question how 
we do things better” (Gray et al. 1999, 77).  
  Supporting  the  means-ends  rationality  of  management,  statistics 
and  facts  represented  by  examination  results  and  standardised  testing 
results  could  be  tools  for  school  leaders  and  teachers  to  calculate  their 
actions  in  relation  to  the  objectives,  outcomes  and  targets  of  the 
organisation. Hence, numbers support self-management to the extent that 
they give decisional authority and therefore flexibility to those who know 
the local context. Decisions could be responsive to local needs and issues, 
and  when  used  within  the  abovementioned  corporate  management 
framework  (such  as  objective-setting  or  responsiveness  to  customers), 
these  could  improve  the  effectiveness  of  decisions.  In  so  doing,  this 
institutional arrangement of schools attempts to bring into existence the          
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empowered,  rational,  goal-driven,  problem-solving  and  self-governing 
school  leader  and  teacher  (albeit  also  steered  at  a  distance  by  centrally 
devised targets and procedures).  
 
Data and the market 
 
While performance data encourages those within schools to improve their 
organisations based upon the purported authority of numbers, performance 
data such as rates of graduation, exam results and results of benchmark 
testing,  also  orient  the  activities  and  management  of  schools  to  their 
‘customers’.  This  is  because  publicly  available  data  enjoins  parents  to 
make certain calculated choices about which is the ‘best school’ to enrol 
their children in. These data supports the choice-making of parents because 
it differentiates schools by establishing for the consumer what are deemed 
by political and other social authorities, such as newspapers, to be valuable 
if not supposedly neutral indicators of educational quality and the desirable 
end product of the education process.  
  With school leaders positioned to see themselves as providers of 
educational goods and services (Chubb and Moe 1990; Friedman 1968; 
Friedman and Friedman 1980; Harrison 2004) who must therefore attract 
the parent (or student) for custom, the publication of school performance 
data appears to be an essential factor to how parents make the choice of 
which  school  to  send  children  to.  As  a  tangible  indicator  of  the 
‘educational  product’  provided  by  schools  to  be  used  by  consuming 
parents, school performance data facilitates the use of the market economy          
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to govern schools and individuals, both in terms of encouraging parents to 
be  active  in  choosing  the  ‘best’  school  for  their  children,  but  also  by 
orienting  the  activity  of  school  leaders  towards  satisfying  consumer 
demands for delivering a ‘quality product’. Whether or not the majority of 
parents  actually  use  this  performance  data  to  make  such  decisions, 
performance  data  is  increasingly  understood,  particularly  by  political 
authorities, as a ‘market signal’ denoting ‘excellence’ and ‘quality’. This 
orients management decisions towards satisfying the demands of parents as 
consumers as a way to attract parents to their school. In this scenario, then, 
data  collection  and  publication  play  a  significant  role  in  fostering 
competitive  relations  between  schools  and,  therefore,  a  neo-liberal 
government of the educational domain. 
  In  this  circumstance,  school  leaders  are  regulated  by  the 
competitive  market  and  consumer  choice  and  in  the  process  become 
“business decision-makers” (Buchanan and Wagner 1977, 71). Supported 
by technologies such as EARS and NAPLAN, school performance data 
enters into the decisions (at least that is the expectation) of school leaders 
and  teachers  who  monitor  and  manage  their  own  performance  and 
activities in the context of market activity. This means that the educational 
organisation  is  remodelled  around  the  market.  As c entral  bureaucracies 
diminish in their direct management of the activities of schools, individual 
entrepreneurship,  creativity,  self-reflexivity,  flexibility,  commitment  to 
outcomes  and  a  planful  relation  to  the  future  emerge a s  a  powerful 
commonsense  discourse  of  corporate  styles  of  management  by  school 
leaders (Gee and Lankshear 1995).           
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  An  important  point  to  mention  here  is  that  the  collection  of 
statistics  and  data  fail  at  cultivating  in  school  leaders  and  teachers  a 
capacity to be critical about the numbers and statistics that are used and 
collected about schools. While the data collected may be based upon the 
premise that we can generally predict school outcomes according to levels 
of literacy and numeracy, these do not teach teachers or parents about the 
limits of testing and performance regimes, such as how social influences 
influence performance results. However, numbers and statistics support the 
cultivation  of  school  leaders  and  teachers  as  “public  entrepreneurs” 
(Ostrom 1973, 129). While school leaders and teachers may object to the 
quantification  of  educational  outcomes,  the  regime  of  performance  data 
nonetheless  positions  them  to  take  responsibility  for  the  outcomes  and 
quality of their schools.  
       
Conclusion 
 
The  self-managing  entrepreneurial  school  is  constituted  by  the 
individualising technologies of management and the market and these have 
brought into existence the self-managing entrepreneurial school leader. I 
began  by  linking  these  developments  to  the  political  and  governmental 
concerns for the conduct of teachers, the outcomes of the education system 
and the pertinence given to the effect of school organisation on student 
outcomes. In this context, the self-managing entrepreneurial school leader 
is regulated according to the putatively neutral and objective knowledge 
and techniques of management and the market. Corporate management and          
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the markets have cultivated the school leaders’ capacity to: (1) calculate 
about the management of the school as an autonomous entity driven by 
goals  and  outcomes,  (2)  ensure  an  entrepreneurial  and  even  economic 
calculation  of  activities  and  resources,  and  (3)  direct  their  activities  to 
satisfying the needs of parents and communities. 
  Importantly,  management  and  the  market  provide  the  normative 
structures,  roles,  frameworks  and  standards  though  which  teachers  are 
empowered to understand schooling and its processes, be active in goal 
setting and decision making, to reflect and make rational calculations, to be 
professionally and personally responsible for their activities, and to be in 
charge of and responsible for managing their school’s destiny. This is also 
the case in the use of test results and the statistics compiled from these. 
These technologies enable self-managing schools to identify problems and 
improve school practices.  
  It  is  worth  noting,  however,  that  although  texts  like  The  Self-
Managing School encourage teachers to reflect upon themselves and their 
world in terms of objectives, planning for the achievement of objectives, 
and evaluating the extent to which these objectives have been achieved, this 
does not mean that is all school leaders and teachers calculate. Teachers 
continue  to  bring  to  bear  their  expert  pedagogical  and  curriculum 
knowledge  on  problems  and  decisions.  Nevertheless,  with  the  authority 
bestowed on corporate styles of management and the market by a range of 
authorities  including  policymakers,  these  are  held  up  as  the  legitimate 
means  according  to  which  individuals  can  enact  forms  of  teacher 
professionalism  responsibly  in  a  devolved  system  of  governance  where          
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school,  school  leaders  and  teachers  are  empowered  and  autonomous 
choosers.   Embedded  in  this  reasoning  around  empowerment  and 
management  are  advanced  liberal  rationalities.  Believing  that  big 
government and bureaucracy have stifled the natural benefits that arise for 
the economy and society from individual empowerment and the exercise of 
initiative and entrepreneurial freedom, corporate styles of self-management 
foster  the  exercise  of  greater  economic  freedom  for  school  leaders  and 
parents.  While  school  leaders  and  teachers  are  positioned  as  active, 
adaptable,  flexible  and  entrepreneurial,  corporate  forms  of  management 
within the market position parents as discerning choice-makers calculating 
about their investment decisions. This lay behind the claim that parents and 
communities are empowered by school performance information and the 
capacity to exercise choice. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School self-management and school autonomy are key reforms to the field 
of education in Australia over the past three to four decades. The aim of 
this thesis was to offer an analysis of these self-managing school reforms 
using  the  historical  and  theoretical  insights  of  Foucauldian  studies  of 
governmentality.  I  pursued  this  line  of  inquiry  because  these  reforms 
appeared  temporally  and  thematically  connected  to  the  emergence  of 
advanced liberal and neo-liberal government. My concern in this thesis was 
to explore this connection between self-managing school reforms and the 
emerging ways of rationalising and enacting the government of the state. 
To a large extent, this thesis has been confined to the study of a specific 
rationality impinging on and constituting the domain of education; that is, 
governmental  rationality.  Some  key  points  emerge  from  the  preceding 
inquiry. By way of summary, these include:           
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•  Self-managing  reforms  are  a  feature  of  late  twentieth  century 
governmental  and  political  life,  including  a  feature  of  the  field  of 
education; 
•  In  the  late  twentieth  century  there  was  a  transformation  in  the 
rationalities  and  modalities  of  government  of  many  Western  liberal 
democratic societies, which many have understood as a crisis of the 
welfare  state  but  which  Foucault  describes  as  a  crisis  of  liberal 
governmentality; 
•  This crisis of liberal governmentality involved a critique of the social 
mode  of  government  (for  instance,  as  excessively  regulatory)  and  a 
concomitant valorisation in political and governmental discourse of the 
notions  and  techniques  of  empowerment,  autonomy,  choice, 
competition and enterprise; 
•  Self-managing school reforms are effects of this late twentieth century 
transformation  of  the  rationalities  and  modalities  of  government, 
evincing  a  reshaping  of  how  the  government  of  schools,  parents, 
teachers and communities is thought about, rationalised and enacted; 
•  The  cultural  renewal  of  freedom,  emancipation  and  autonomy 
associated  with  this  advanced  liberal  rationality  of  government 
reconceptualises  government a s  w e l l  a s   reconceptualising  the 
conditions for the state’s welfare and security.  
Below I review these points and I draw out some implications of this study 
for the future of school governance.  
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Self-managing reforms 
 
Since  the  1970s,  the  bureaucratic  and  professional  organisation  of  the 
provision  of  public  goods  and  services  in  many  liberal  democratic 
countries, while still a feature of these countries, has been reformed. This 
reform has included the introduction into the public sector of rationalist and 
corporate styles of management, the privatisation and commercialisation of 
the provision of public goods and services such as health care and utilities, 
the detachment of public departments or agencies from bureaucratic control 
and  the  strengthening  of  their  autonomy  to  operate  in  competition  with 
other providers of goods and services, the increasing use of the rationalities 
and  techniques  of  standards,  outcomes  and  targets,  the  collection  of 
performance data on these increasingly autonomous organisations, and the 
use of market devices and practices to coordinate the provision of goods 
and  services  through  competition  for  consumers.  I  have  termed  this 
assemblage of reforms ‘self-managing reforms’.  
  The  autonomous,  self-managing  and  entrepreneurial  school 
manifests this reform in the field of education. While I do not want to over-
state  the  extent  of  decentralisation  and  devolution,  schools  have 
nevertheless been increasingly detached from bureaucratic centres and their 
prescriptive  forms  of  management.  This  process  of  autonomisation,  or 
deregulation,  has  been  accompanied  by  technologies  and  practices  of 
responsibilisation, or reregulation. These technologies and practices include 
corporate  managerialism,  which  has  cultivated  education  bureaucrats,          
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school leaders and teachers with the capacities for thinking and acting in 
terms of objectives, outcomes, targets, quality and customers. This has been 
supported by performance management regimes that involve the collection 
of data on schools and teachers. These data have a regulatory function in 
that they enable the monitoring and improvement of school performance, as 
well  as  supporting  parents’  ability  to  choose  schools  by  publicising  the 
supposed effectiveness or quality of schools. Schools are now subject to the 
competitive  pressures  of  the  market  as  restrictions  on  enrolments  are 
loosened, political authorities endorse selective and specialist schools, and 
the  private  school  sector  is  strengthened  through  state  funding.  I  have 
termed  this  assemblage  of  reforms  in  education  ‘self-managing  school 
reforms’. 
 
A transformation in the rationalities and modalities of government 
 
The inquiries pursued in this thesis have outlined the link between these 
self-managing reforms and the political discourse of many Western liberal 
democracies at the end of the twentieth century. However, distinct from 
analyses  that  attribute  self-managing  school  reform  to  (1)  politically 
disinterested  technical  developments,  (2)  a  crisis  of  legitimacy  of  the 
welfare  state,  or  (3)  the  ascendant  ideologies  of  those  in  control  of  the 
state’s  levers  of  power,  I  have  used  the  methodological,  historical  and 
theoretical  insights  of  Foucauldian  studies  in  government  to  make  an 
alternative assessment of reform. What has the use of Foucauldian studies 
in  government  made  possible  to  the  analysis  of  self-managing  reforms?          
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With an emphasis on the study of governmental rationality, I have argued 
that  self-managing  reforms  reflect  the  late  twentieth  century 
transformations  in  the  government  of  the  public  sector,  economy  and 
society, and this transformation is an effect of a transformation in how the 
government of the state has been rationalised and enacted. 
  The character of this transformation was canvassed in Part II where 
I  argued  that  the  transformation  of  governmental  rationalities  and 
technologies  involved  the  problematisation  of  the  social  modality  of 
government  associated  with  the  welfare  state.  Where  once  proper 
government  involved  an  extensive  regulatory  apparatus  of  state 
bureaucracies, experts and professionals that were authorised to socialise 
the  economy,  the  instruments  of  the  state,  and  citizens’  interests  and 
activities, by the late twentieth century the role of the state and the objects, 
ends  and  means  of  government  were  re-appraised.  Many  features  of 
political  and  governmental  life,  including  centralised  planning  by 
politicians and bureaucrats and the leading role of the state in determining 
social and economic progress were construed as a threat to the economic, 
social and moral wellbeing of liberal democratic nations.  
  This critique of the social rationalities and modalities of government 
reflected  a  crisis  of  liberal  governmentality.  This  crisis,  I  argued,  was 
generated from an internal dilemma of liberalism. This dilemma, a product 
of  the  liberal  state’s  twin  practices  of  totalisation  and  individualisation 
(where the state becomes governmentalised), refers to an agonistic tension 
in liberal governmental rationalities between the pursuit of personal and 
economic freedom and the pursuit of the security and wellbeing of the state.          
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This constant review of the exercise of political and governmental power in 
terms  of  freedom  can  be  seen  to  have  framed  the  problematisation  and 
critique of social government. For example, the critique of the social state 
was conducted in terms of the perceived costs to political, economic and 
personal freedom of a state that had grown too large and whose pastoral 
technologies and networks had become too intrusive, too encompassing and 
too insidious. These state-phobic critiques of excessive government were 
linked  to  a  cultural  renewal  of  notions  of  freedom,  empowerment, 
autonomy and emancipation, and the rediscovery of a culture of the self and 
its actualisation. For many, the emerging forms of rule promised greater 
individual and economic freedom and less interference by the state, politics 
and government.  
  Influenced  by  German  and  American  neo-liberals,  governmental 
and political reasoning began to be shaped by notions such as (1) human 
nature was autonomous, active, self-realising and enterprising, (2) that all 
human activity could be understood through an economic framework of 
human capitalisation, and (3) that competitive economic activity was the 
epitome  of  personal  and  political  freedom.  As  a  consequence  of  these 
views, the objective of government was the empowerment of people and 
the  restoration  of  their  freedom,  increasingly  conceived  in  terms  of  an 
economic freedom. Rose observes that “the wealth, health and happiness of 
the nation” was now thought to be best fulfilled not when the individual 
was dependent or had an obligation to the state but “when they seek to fulfil 
themselves as free individuals” (Rose 1999b, 166). The state’s objective 
was to foster the institutional conditions that enabled individuals to behave          
  303 
like  enterprises  in  a  competitive  market  economy  relatively  free  from 
constraints on personal autonomy and the personal exercise of choice.  
   
School reform and transformations of the rationalities and 
technologies of government 
 
I  have  argued  that  the  problematisations  and  rationalisations  of  the 
government of the state that emerged from this crisis of liberalism have 
played  a  part  in  moves  “to  pass  progressively  wider  decision-making 
powers  to  the  school  community  of  teachers,  parents  and  students” 
(Commonwealth  Schools  Commission  1976,  13). T he  ‘de-
bureaucratisation’  of  the  education  system  was  linked  to  deep-seated 
concerns  that  the  welfare  state  and  its  role  in  coordinating  social  and 
economic activity was producing economic, social, personal and moral ills. 
The  welfare  state’s  bureaucratic  and  regulatory  orientation  was  said  to 
frustrate economic freedom, efficiency and growth, as well as disempower 
parents and teachers by fostering passivity and the attitude that the state 
was  to  cater  for  their  needs  and  security.  By  contrast,  decentralisation, 
school autonomy and self-management promised to empower the parent 
and the school leader by establishing the conditions for increased autonomy 
and freedom from an increasingly downsized bureaucracy.  
  The  case  studies  in  Part  III  of  this  dissertation  explored  these 
transformations  in  the  field  of  education.  I  made  the  case  that  the  late 
twentieth century emphasis on empowering parents and communities with 
authority  to  participate  in  or  to  influence  decisions  related  to  their 
children’s  education  (including  choosing  which  schools  to  enrol  their          
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children)  was  not  necessarily  an  encroachment  of  an  instrumentalist 
rationality into education, nor the realisation of the social democratic ideal 
of  authentic  community  self-determination.  Using  insights  and  concepts 
derived  from  Foucauldian  studies  of  governmentality,  I  examined  the 
policy of devolution and community empowerment as a reflection of an 
emerging advanced liberal rationality of government and its suspicion of 
the  power  of  the  state,  bureaucracies  and  professionals.  At  this  time, 
education was increasingly seen as a domain of government that required 
the  activation  and  empowerment  of  citizens  in  their  autonomous  self-
government.  
  I also examined the employment of corporate managerialism in the 
organization  of  school  life  in  terms  of  its  links  to  emerging  ways  of 
rationalising and enacting government. I suggested that the discourses of 
corporate  management  and  private  enterprise  have  sought  to  empower 
school  leaders  and  teachers  to  run  their  schools  like  autonomous 
competitive  enterprises  that  are  responsive  to  local  circumstances, 
consumers  and  market  signals.  The  practices  of  entrepreneurial  self-
management support individual and organizational autonomy, competition, 
choice and empowerment. 
  The recent development in Western Australia of the Independent 
Public  Schools  (IPS)  policy  attests  to  the  continued  relevance  of  self-
managing  reform  and  its  influence  by  advanced  liberal  rationalities  of 
government. IPS builds upon earlier innovations of school autonomy by 
offering  selected  schools  greater  independence  in  such  things  as  staff 
recruitment,  student  recruitment,  budgeting,  school  management,  school          
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promotions and curriculum development. In an information pamphlet for 
parents  and  communities,  the  Department  of  Education  and  Training 
explained:  
 
One  of  the  WA  government’s  major  pre-election  policies  for 
education was to empower school communities, giving them greater 
capacity to shape the ethos, priorities and direction of their school… 
Independent Public Schools will be freed from many central controls 
and have greater flexibility to respond to their communities. They 
will create more diversity in our public school system and provide 
real choice for school communities. (DET 2009, 1) 
 
An anti-bureaucracy discourse that privileges autonomy, self-governance 
and  choice  pervades  the  reasoning  behind  this  policy.  Introducing  the 
initiative, the Premier, Colin Barnett, described the IPS policy as cutting 
the  “suffocating  red  tape  that  prevents  imaginative  leadership” 
(Government  Media  Office  2009),  while  the  Education  Minister,  Liz 
Constable, is quoted as saying the transfer of authority from the education 
bureaucracy  to  local  schools  would  ensure  school  decisions  “match  the 
needs  and  aspirations  of  their  students  and  staff  as  well  as  their  local 
communities”  (Government  Media  Office  2009).  Clearly,  then,  as  an 
instance  of  self-managing  reforms  the  IPS  policy  is  propelled  by  a 
characteristically advanced liberal problematisation of the government of 
the state.  
  Importantly, however, it has not been the intention of this thesis to 
assess whether or not self-managing reforms, such as IPS, actually live up 
to the hype and rhetoric that surrounds them. Clearly many elements of          
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self-managing  reforms  require  much  unpacking  and  inquiry,  including 
whether  devolving  increased  authority  to  schools  does  in  fact  improve 
educational  outcomes,  or  whether  parents  and  communities  actually  do 
behave in ways these policies anticipate. However, the subject matter of 
this thesis has been restricted to describing and exploring the relationship 
between changes in how we rationalise and enact government, and the self-
managing reform trend in education. 
 
Freedom, autonomy and government 
 
The  crisis  of  liberalism  and  self-managing  reforms  has  not  resulted  in 
citizens  in  liberal  democracies  enjoying  freedom  and  autonomy  from 
governmental or state power. Although neo-liberals and those associated 
with  the  governance  literature  may  mistake  advanced  liberal  rule  for  a 
march of progress towards an authentic freedom unbounded by the state, no 
matter  what  language  is  used  to  describe  self-managing  reforms,  these 
reforms must be thought of governmentally. As I established in Part II, 
even liberalism is committed to the goals of state security, prosperity and 
wellbeing and achieving these through an extensive pastoral government of 
the population.  
  So, while it is true that political authorities of the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries in countries like Australia, the United Kingdom 
and Canada have sought to limit those things that constrain the capacity of 
individuals to make economic and personal choices related to achieving 
their s e l f -realisation,  this  should  not  be  interpreted  as  the  absence  of          
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government. It is a government pegged to limiting the direct interference of 
‘the  state’  into  the  lives  of  ‘normal’  people,  whilst a l s o   fostering  the 
‘normal’,  autonomous  and  self-managing  capacities  of  individuals, 
especially  through  the  contrivance  of  markets  and  the  conditions  for 
competition.  This  is  a  modality  of  government  that  seeks  to  foster  the 
independent  use  of  professionals,  experts,  the  cultural  industries,  and 
voluntary  and  non-government  organisations  in  the  government  of 
individuals and the population.  
  In other words, the discourse of empowerment, autonomy, freedom 
and self-realisation is indicative of a mode of government that now (1) 
creates new ways for individuals to exercise their freedom or autonomy, 
and (2) construes the task of securing the wellbeing, prosperity and security 
of the state as depending upon fostering personal autonomy, empowerment 
and  enterprise  (Peters  2001a;  Peters  et  al.  2000).  Let  us  consider,  for 
example, the two case studies explored in Part III.  
  In the first case study, the promotion of ‘educational agency’ (Smith 
1993),  which  involves  empowering  parents  to  participate  in  educational 
activities and decision-making outside of and within the school, is seen as a 
way of maximising the welfare of one and all. Insofar as making prudent 
education-investment  choices  works  to  insure  against  personal  risk  and 
insecurity (Besley and Peters 2007), parents are enjoined to choose the best 
school  to  enrol  their  children.  This  choice-making  is  supported  by  a 
complex of books, manuals, websites and school prospectuses created by 
experts,  professionals  and  marketers  to  guide  the  parent  in  making 
responsible, normative, child-rearing choices (Smith 1993). Proponents of          
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neo-liberalism and advanced liberal programs claim or assume that citizens 
making responsible choices about their own welfare will ensure the welfare 
of all, and the security of the state. 
  In  the  second  case  study,  the  wellbeing  of  the  state  and  its 
population is conceived to be a product of education systems that delimit 
the influence of central bureaucracies in local educational decision-making 
while  fostering  the  freedom  and  capacity  of  schools  to  operate  in  a 
competitive  market  setting.  Empowering  school  leaders  to  pursue  the 
delivery of a quality product for consumers through entrepreneurial forms 
of  corporate  management  is  construed  as  a  means  to  strengthen  the 
economic and social wellbeing of ‘one and all’.  
  Both  of  these  cases  suggest  that  self-managing  reforms  reflect  a 
reconceptualisation of state security and welfare. Increasingly, the state is 
not expected to fully cater for the individual’s every need or to protect the 
individual  from  the  insecurities  of  unemployment  or  the  risk  of  a  poor 
education. Instead, the wellbeing of the state and its population requires a 
degree  of  freedom  not  afforded  by  the  social  forms  of  government 
associated  with  the  welfare  state.  Individuals  are  enjoined  to  be  free  in 
order that they may care for themselves, to empower themselves and to be 
active  in  their  own  government.  This  means  enjoining  individuals  to 
personally  seek  out  opportunities,  information  and  professionals,  and  to 
make choices, that will help improve their lives. Consequently, the pastoral 
role  of  the  state  will  be  best  fulfilled  in  the  domain  of  education  by 
fostering  an  education  system  that  is  modelled  around  this  autonomous 
individual  that  is  enterprising,  competitive  and  an  active  choice-maker.          
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Whether making schools less dependent on education bureaucracies and 
more responsive to the market does fulfil the needs of the state remains a 
moot point, but it is nonetheless a belief informing many people involved 
in the government of education.   
     
Concluding thoughts 
 
Having argued that there is a link between self-managing reforms and the 
transformation of governmental rationalities and technologies occasioned 
by a ‘crisis of liberalism’, I want to use this final section to consider the 
potential risks of the governmentalities of self-management and autonomy.  
  In  particular,  this  focuses  on  liberal  governmental  rationality’s 
inherent  concern  about  the  costs  in  terms  of  freedom  of  governing  too 
much, and the costs measured in freedom of not governing enough. This 
tension  and  torsion  between  the  register  of  freedom  and  the  register  of 
administration produced the ‘tricky adjustment’ we have called the social 
or welfare state from laissez faire. It has also informed the subsequent neo-
liberal critique of the welfare state and its pastoral technologies. It is at the 
juncture of these registers that questions about advanced liberal government 
may also be raised. This may concern, for instance, the consequences that 
ensue  from  a  belief  that  the  market  economy,  consumer  choice, 
competition,  self-governance  and  the  commercial  enterprise  can  be  the 
motor  of  social  stability,  economic  prosperity  and  the  protection  of  the 
collective welfare.           
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  In other words, advanced liberal rationalisations and technologies of 
government have not resolved the internal dilemma of liberalism (the limits 
of state and government power versus the scope of individual freedom) but 
are generating further problems of government to be resolved. For example, 
can  we  expect  that  empowering  individuals  in  their  self-governance,  as 
self-managing enterprises, or creating markets and market type behaviour, 
necessarily produce that which is conducive to the wellbeing of the state 
and the population, for one and all? 
  Let  us  consider  the  potential  limitations  of  advanced  liberal 
government in relation to the more recent literature on educational self-
management.  This  literature  has  begun  to  speak  of  networks,  self-
governance and self-organisation as the path to improve educational, social 
and  economic  outcomes  (Caldwell  2006;  Caldwell  and  Harris  2008; 
Educational Transformations 2007; OECD 2003). Brian Caldwell (2006) 
has  recently  argued  that  conventional  managerial  approaches  to  self-
management  (the  use  of  structures,  roles,  responsibilities  and 
accountabilities) are insufficient for optimising the effectiveness of schools. 
Caldwell’s goal is to create independence for schools by getting them to 
draw upon what he terms their horizontal relations of authority. That is, to 
build and align the cultural, social and material capital existing in schools 
and their communities, to build networks and partnerships, and to operate 
in competition with other schools. 
  Caldwell (2006) justifies this network and self-governing vision of 
school governance, not by claiming any economic merit in re-organization, 
but by claiming self-governance is more in tune with the autonomous, self-         
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determining and self-governing modern identity. His argument is that the 
self-governing  citizen  is  a  product,  not  of  the  state  and  its  associated 
political instruments, but of grassroots empowerment, the strengthening of 
communities, and the capacity to make choices. He argues, therefore, that 
respecting and fostering individual autonomy and self-government requires 
reform to the welfarist organisation of civic and political life. Enacting an 
advanced  liberal  rationality  of  government,  Caldwell’s  future-oriented 
portrayal of the government of education systems links national wellbeing 
to, on the one hand, the withering of the power of political instruments such 
as  bureaucracy  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  the  empowerment  of  self-
governing individuals and communities.  
  What Caldwell’s program of autonomous, self-governing and self-
organising schools reveals is a worrying belief that there is little positive, or 
at least a highly circumscribed, role for the state, politics or government in 
contemporary life. This belief exists partly because Caldwell ignores the 
constructedness of autonomy (Hindess 1996b), or the conditions that make 
personal or community autonomy possible. Caldwell fails to see that it was 
the  technologies  of  the  governmental  programs  of  the  nineteenth  and 
twentieth  centuries  that  now  lead  us  to  view  individual  autonomy  as  a 
‘natural presupposition’. We are so accustomed to thinking that individual 
autonomy is a natural feature of human life that we are now ignorant of the 
fact that responsible personal autonomy and self-government is a product 
of governmental programs and interventions. In the governance literature, 
however,  these  interventions  are  now  construed  as  inappropriately 
interfering with the natural state of autonomy.           
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  In  the  field  of  education,  this  belief  in  individual,  school  and 
community  self-governance  contributes  to  the  assessment  that  the  state, 
political authorities and education bureaucracies are irrelevant, or at least a 
hindrance to proper government. But this belief is troubling because failure 
to  appreciate  the  political  and  governmental  conditions  required  for  the 
formation of autonomous and self-governing citizens actually risks limiting 
the  capacity  of  education  systems  to  deliver  key  outcomes  such  as  the 
responsible exercise of autonomy, or the wellbeing and security of civil 
society and the state.  
  That is to say, the belief that education systems, and through these 
individual members of the population, can be governed through the self-
regulating capacities of markets, communities and individuals with only 
limited  political  and  bureaucratic  intervention  we  may  lead  to  further 
marginalisation  of  bureaucratic  instruments  capable  of  overseeing  and 
intervening in the entire education system (Meredyth 1998). Diminishing 
the power of education bureaucracies, and celebrating individual choice, 
may limit not only the technologies available to political authorities but 
also the reasonableness of pursuing educational equity and social cohesion 
and  stability.  This  may  be  evidenced  in  parents’  demands  for,  or 
proclaiming their rights to, exercise school choice without concern for, say, 
public schools becoming ‘residual’ schools.  
  Similar  risks  are  posed  by  the  expectation  that  school  leaders, 
parents  and  communities  have  the  requisite  knowledge,  skills,  time  and 
resources to effectively self-govern or to engage in market type behaviour 
to  the  benefit  of  students.  Increased  local  responsibility  for  student          
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outcomes may mean the success of schools may unfairly become a function 
of the management and enterprising skills of individuals within schools. 
This risk is posed by the Conservatives’ ‘Free Schools’ policy in the United 
Kingdom  (Gabbatt  2010)  and  the  Gillard  government’s  recent  briefing 
paper for Australian state education ministers that proposed the creation of 
a national system of self-governing schools (Ferrari 2010).  
  In  these  scenarios,  the  freedom  of  school  leaders,  parents  and 
communities  to  take  charge  of  the  education  of  their  children  and 
communities  is  prioritised  over  bureaucratic  involvement  in  educational 
decision-making. We may ask, however, what happens to those schools, 
school leaders, parents and communities that do not possess the requisite 
capacities  to  make  schools  successful?  This  is  an  important  question 
because  evidence  indicates  that  financial,  social  and  cultural  capital  is 
unevenly distributed among the population. Moreover, will failure to make 
schools successful be understood politically as local school leaders, parents 
and communities being incompetent or irresponsible? Will this therefore 
provide  a  reason  for  targeted  authoritarian  forms  of  government 
reminiscent of police, such as the United Kingdom’s ‘Special Measures’ 
policy? What roles will bureaucracy increasingly assume in this scenario? 
   In  a  potentially  extreme  outcome  of  these  initiatives,  political 
authorities may have to contend with a situation in which individuals and 
communities who take charge of their children’s education teach values and 
beliefs that the majority of society find repugnant, or which are antagonistic 
to the creation of a peaceful and cohesive civil society.           
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  I am not suggesting that self-managing reforms and their embedded 
governmental  rationality  raise  these  questions  today  as  a  dire  matter 
requiring  immediate  response.  In  Australia,  schools  do  not  operate  in  a 
context  of  laissez  faire,  and  political  instruments  such  as  education 
bureaucracies remain influential. Indeed, many of the recent self-managing 
reforms  have  required  immense  regulatory  effort  on  the  part  of 
bureaucracies.  
  Moreover,  any  threat  to  civil  and  economic  peace  and  security 
created by an education system that fails to deliver on the goals of state 
peace and security will draw political and governmental responses. As Rose 
and Miller (1992) observe, governing is a congenitally failing enterprise 
and therefore the current governmental mutations and ‘experimentations’ 
will  no  doubt  mutate  again,  influenced  by  political  and  governmental 
authorities. The pivotal role of education in the formation of the liberal 
state’s future citizens makes this assertion a certainty.  
  Despite this, the above concerns may be heightened by the belief 
that the education of the nation’s citizens will be better served by devolving 
ever-greater authority to individuals and communities expected to govern 
themselves within a marketplace of autonomous education providers. These 
governmental rationalities that construe the state and political instruments, 
such  as  education  bureaucracies,  as  threats  to  individual  and  economic 
freedom  risk  atrophying  the  authority  of  educational  bureaucracies  and 
professionals in educational decision-making, a development which itself is 
not  risk  free.  Further  research  is  required  into  the  link  between  the 
continued  elaboration  of  advanced  liberal  governmental  rationalities  in          
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education, and their wide-ranging implications for the liberal democratic 
state.  
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APPENDIX (A) 
 
Self-management from an official perspective 
 
Policies, reports and Acts  Relationship to self-management 
 
Schools in Australia  
(Karmel 1973) 
 
This national report called for an increase in resources for public and 
private schools, resulting in a doubling of outlays by the 
Commonwealth. Through its funding arrangement, the 
Commonwealth nourished the existence of the private school sector. 
It supported in principle the right of parents to choose schools. Most 
significantly, it also argued for the devolution of a range of 
responsibilities for schools in order to improve educational 
innovation and the congruence between educational programmes and 
student and community life.  
 
 
Triennium reports 1973-
1982 
(Commonwealth Schools 
Commission 1975, 1976, 
1978) 
 
 
These reports covered many concerns about the state of education in 
Australia. While these did not offer a clear image of the modern 
school, they nonetheless consistently argued for greater 
independence and autonomy for schools and improved educational 
choice for parents and students as a means to improve access, 
participation, engagement and outcomes.  
 
 
The Beazley Report 
(Committee of Inquiry into 
Education in Western 
Australia 1984) 
 
This report outlines curriculum, pedagogical and organisational 
reform to schools in Western Australia, including greater 
organisational independence for schools. Although professional 
development and a performance appraisal system were advocated, 
the system did not respond with an fervour to these 
recommendations. 
 
 
Quality in Schools  
(Quality of Education 
Review Committee 1985)  
 
Acknowledging the limits of direct Federal government intervention 
into state education systems, this report sought the best way to direct 
Federal funds for the purpose of raising standards in communication, 
literacy and numeracy and improving the relationship between 
schooling and post-school options. The report marks a shift at the 
Federal level from an emphasis on inputs to an emphasis on 
educational outcomes. In order to achieve system improvement, the 
report argued that education systems needed to be clear about the 
competencies they expect students to develop, and to have greater 
accountability for educational outcomes. Education is construed as a 
means for improving the economic prospects of Australia in an 
environment of fiscal restraint and increased economic competition.  
 
 
Managing Change in the 
Public Sector 
(Burke 1986) 
 
 
Western Australian Premier, Brian Burke, outlined corporate 
managerial reforms to the public services. The benefits of such 
reform included improved efficiency, effectiveness, community 
responsiveness and public sector accountability. To achieve these 
reforms, the human resources of public sector needed to be 
developed, specifically through supporting the acquisition of 
management knowledge and skills. 
 
 
Better Schools  
(Pearce 1987) 
 
This report introduced into the deliberations of policy-makers in 
Western Australia the object of the autonomous school. It concluded          
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that the policy focus on educational systems and the concomitant 
rationality that good educational systems make good schools was 
incorrect because it was good schools that make good educational 
systems. In concert with many educational management and 
organisational research of the time, the report oriented policy 
development towards improving individual schools while containing 
costs. It recommended greater self-determination, the flexible use of 
school development plans, and improved accountability according to 
the designated outputs outlined in school development plans. 
Moreover, parents were encouraged to be involved in school 
decision-making through school councils.  
 
 
School Renewal: A strategy 
to revitalise schools within 
the New South Wales state 
education system  
(Scott 1990) 
 
Although pertaining to the New South Wales education system, this 
was a significant report. It emphasised local management within 
corporate managerialist framework. The report supported a reduction 
in bureaucracy, which the report construed was ensconced with a 
self-serving educational establishment that constrained the activity of 
schools and parents. Organisational efficiency and effectiveness were 
cornerstone principles.  
 
 
Devolution: the next phase 
(Black 1993) 
 
The path to decentralisation has been a troubled one in Western 
Australia. This report caused much consternation in the public 
education sector on its release. It sought to extend the devolution of 
responsibilities to schools implemented from the Better Schools 
report. 
 
 
Independent Commission to 
Review Public Sector 
Finances  
(McCarrey 1993) 
 
 
The McCarrey Commission inquired into the reform of the Western 
Australian public services. Within its remit of investigation was the 
education system. This report supported corporate managerial 
reforms in the public sector and advocated the devolution of 
responsibilities to schools already under way. Furthermore, it 
recommended staff reductions and the contracting out services such 
as cleaning and payroll. Although acknowledging improvements 
made by the implementation of Better Schools, the Commission 
argued that there has still too much dependence on central 
bureaucratic management.  
 
 
Review of Education and 
Training  
(Vickery 1993) 
 
 
 
 
Occurring in close succession with the McCarrey Commission, the 
Vickery report supported a client-focused system within a 
strategically agreed set of parameters. It also argued that decisions 
should be made closest to the site where they are carried out and 
hence the continuation of the policy and program of devolution.  
 
 
Schools of the future  
(Directorate of School 
Education 1994) 
 
Although pertaining to the Victorian education system, this report by 
the Kennett government articulated a bold vision of the autonomous, 
self-managing school. It devolved 93% of the state’s public 
education budget to individual schools. School boards approved the 
budget and devised school charters. More than any other report of its 
time in Australia it envisioned the self-managing school as operating 
in a competitive market environment.  
 
 
Devolution of Decision-
Making Authority in the 
Government School System 
of Western Australia  
(Hoffman 1994) 
 
The Hoffman report was concerned with the processes of devolution 
and involved key stakeholders such as parents, department, the 
teachers’ unions and industry. The report supported local control and 
authority, flexibility to respond to local needs and diversity, 
improved performance management of teachers, and a curriculum 
framework indexed to national profiles for the flexible formation of 
local curriculum and pedagogy. It also recommended schools be 
accorded the capacity to select staff based on merit or suitability.          
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Policy framework for 
Performance management 
(Education Department of 
Western Australia 1996a) 
 
 
This policy developed out of a long process of consultation and 
formulation dating back to 1989. It instituted performance 
management processes into Western Australian schools which had 
the purpose of fostering an environment which ‘fosters an 
individual’s growth and development while focusing on the 
achievement of the organisation’s goals’ (EDWA 1996a, 8).  
 
 
School Education Act 1999 
 
This Act of the parliament of Western Australia makes provisions 
for greater school choice for parents. It removed restrictions on the 
enrolment of students outside school catchment zones, with the 
effect that parents could choose to have their child attend public 
schools outside of their neighbourhood. 
 
 
School Assistance (Learning 
Together – Achievement 
Through Choice and 
Opportunity) Act 2004 
 
This Federal government legislation sought to reform schools by 
making funding conditional on State agreement to increase the 
autonomy of schools and principals and to enable benchmark 
testing and the publication of their results.  
 
 
Independent Public Schools 
policy (IPS) 
(Department of Education 
2010b)  
 
 
This policy was introduced immediately after the election of the 
Barnett government. It promises to increase the autonomy and 
flexibility of a range of aspects of individual schools, but schools 
must apply for and be accepted for IPS status in annual rounds. 
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